500 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY events. Later and more calm reflections do not pronounce Hull a traitor. Evidently he was somewhat incapacitated by lack of vigor through early exposures and his habits of life. His nature was passive and he lacked aggressiveness. His policy of nonresistance was based upon the belief that even should he be gloriously victorious over the British by an attack, this success would be only temporary. He evidently reasoned that later he would be compelled to capitulate, perhaps after a long siege and the exposure of the army to the cruelties of the savages. His motives were based upon reasons of humanity rather than cowardice. Detroit was a long journey from the base of supplies and man power. The Indians of the vast surrounding territory were mostly enemies and friendly to the British. And back of the whole situation, the government at Washington was sadly lacking in proper aid and cooperation. Again, one of Hull's greatest errors was that he did not take his subordinate commanders into his confidence. He evidently considered their judgment clouded by enthusiasm, over-confidence and inexperience. Even Captain McAfee in all his bitterness over Hull's surrender believed in according the general justice, for in his concluding statement he says this : "If General Hull had made a bold and vigorous attack upon Malden when he first crossed into Canada, though he had even then lost much precious time, there cannot be a doubt, but that the fort would have surrendered without much loss on our part, and all the British forces in that quarter would have fallen into our hands. But it is doubtful whether the British, having the command of the Lake, would not have soon compelled him to abandon it. Fortifications might have been erected on the island of Bois Blanc opposite Malden, which would have commanded the River Detroit still more effectually; but it would have been very expensive to maintain an army there, sufficient with these advantages only, to hold the country against the command of the lake, the importance of which had been duly appreciated by the British government. The fall of Malden, however, would doubtless have awed the savages into a temporary neutrality at least, which would have greatly relieved our frontier settlements. The administration of the general government exhibited great want of foresight in sending General Hull to Canada without having taken the necessary measures to obtain the command of Lake Erie; and, unless it had been determined to hold Upper Canada TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 501 during the war at least, and thus to cut off all communication between the British and Indians, the invasion of that territory was wholly unnecessary and improper. Although the foregoing account of the operations of General Hull, clearly proves his incapacity to conduct any species of warfare, yet we ought not to conceal the errors of others in relation to the affairs he had to man age. It is a fact that General Hull, while governor of Michigan, previous to his being appointed a brigadier in the army, and as early as the 6th of March, 1812, in a memorial which he laid before the War department, did suggest the propriety of having a superior naval force on Lake Erie, as an auxiliary in the reduction of Upper Canada, without which it would be impossible to effect that object; and he pointed out the various difficulties which must attend a different course. In another communication on the 11th of April, after he had received his appointment in the army, he recommended in strong and explicit terms the building of a navy on the lakes. The United States had then but one old transport vessel on Lake Erie, which was repairing, and was not even launched for a month after the declaration of war. He represented to the government that unless the Northwestern Army was strengthened by addition to its numbers, and followed by detachments to keep open the communication, and insure supplies from the State of Ohio; and without the aid of a superior naval force on Lake Erie, it would be impossible for that army to carry on offensive operations in Upper Canada, or even to maintain its position at Detroit. But the war department disregarded these suggestions, and expected General Hull to get command of the lakes with the forces placed at his disposal. Nothing could be more chimerical, unless General Dearborn had been ready to cooperate with a powerful army on the Niagara strait. By the capture of Malden, with all the British forces in that quarter, and by an efficient invasion at the same time from Niagara so as to cut off the communication of the British with Lake Erie and the upper country, the objects of the government might have been effected, without the expense of a navy on Lake Erie. But General Dearborn was not even ready to make an attempt at invasion, before the unfortunate affair at Queenstown on the 12th of October. While Hull was invading Upper Canada Dearborn was lying at his ease at Greenbush, and on the 9th of August he concluded an armistice with the governor-general of the Canadas, which was not to extend above Fort Erie on the Niagara. This measure was proposed by General Prevost, in consequence of 18-VOL. 1 502 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY intelligence that the orders in council were repealed. By excluding General Hull from the benefit of this arrangement his opponent, General Brock, would have been able in a short time to bring all the British forces against him. This forms no excuse, however, for the surrender of Detroit, for the armistice below was unknown to General Hull till he was informed of it after the capitulation to General Brock. In this instance General Dearborn acted very imprudently, in suffering himself to be lulled by an armistice, which was disapproved by the President, when it was his duty to cooperate with the Northwestern. Army, by threatening an invasion at least, which would prevent General Brock from pressing with all his force against Hull. Thus, in the catalogue of our early failures, we discover many blunders and causes of miscarriage, besides those for which the commander of the Northwestern Army has to answer." Hull's Trail or trace, which was opened from Urbana to the Scioto River (Fort McArthur) and which ran thence north to Fort Necessity, Fort Findlay and from there still northward to the Maumee River and on to Frenchtown (Monroe) and to Detroit, became an important military road and route of travel for civilians. From Fort Necessity in now Hancock County, the trail to the northward followed the line of present Main Street, Findlay, kept close to the present Dixie Highway route, ran a little west of where is now Cygnet and reached the west branch of the Portage River, just south of the Village of Portage, Wood County, • and some eighty rods west of the Dixie route. Here a stockade or storehouse was built for supplies.; and going east along the south bank of the river, the army crossed the Portage at almost the point where the New York Central Railroad now has its bridge crossing there. The trail then ran northward along the present railroad line through Bowling Green, Ohio, after which it turned westward and reached the Maumee River opposite Presque Isle Hill and Turkey Foot Rock. The nature of the river here made it one of the best fording points along the stream at ordinary water stage, and from the left bank, or present Lucas County side of the river, the course lay through where is Maumee until the site of Fort Miami was reached. Here Hull's army veered to the westward and followed through where is now Toledo, on the line of Detroit Avenue. From the River Raisin at Frenchtown (Monroe) the trail reached near the bank of the Detroit River, where it enters Lake Erie and followed across the River Rouge to where is now the central business section of Detroit. Northwestern Ohio TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 503 from the Greenville Treaty line near Fort McArthur to the north Ohio boundary, was Indian Lands. Mention has been made of the appeal of General Hull at Detroit to Governor Meigs of Ohio at Chillicothe for supplies and the necessity of keeping open the line of communication between the Ohio country and Detroit. The messenger who carried the dispatch from General Hull to Governor Meigs already quoted, necessarily traveled along Hull's Trail in his route south to Ohio. Of the company raised at Chillicothe that July evening to guard the supply train of seventy pack-horses carrying 14,000 pounds of flour and the 300 beef cattle, one of the volunteer privates from Chillicothe was a Mr. Williams, who kept a daily account of the expedition's journey, also over Hull's Trail northward. The volunteer company of near one hundred members made up from the best citizens of Chillicothe, under the command of Capt. Henry Brush, left Ohio's capital July 21, 1812, and were escorted beyond the limits of the town by a large procession of citizens. A brief farewell address, wishing success for the expedition was delivered, and was ably responded to by Captain Brush on behalf of the company, the captain being a prominent Chillicothe attorney. The first day's march was twenty-one miles to the quarters of General Timmons, where they encamped in a grove, lying on the ground in the open air, without tents. The march the next day was over thirty miles, through the "barrens," or open plains, where the men were exposed nearly all day to the fierce rays of a mid-summer's sun, in very sultry weather. A march of nineteen miles the third day brought them to Urbana in the afternoon, where they encamped on the commons. The indoor occupations of nearly all the company had wholly unfitted them for long marches on foot and exposure to the sun, each carrying a weight of thirty pounds, and hampered by the straps and fastenings of his outfit. Marching thus all day, and sleeping at night on the cold ground, without tents, was very severe. Mr. Williams writing to his wife from Urbana, on July 24, 1812, says, "My limbs were so stiff and sore at the end of each day's march that I could hardly walk." After a detention of two days at Urbana, and being reinforced by about twenty soldiers of the Fourth United States Infantry who had been in the battle of Tippecanoe, the company resumed its march on the 25th, having in charge the brigade of seventy pack-horses, each laden with 200 pounds of flour, in a 504 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY bag, lashed on a pack-saddle. The drove of about three hundred beef cattle was also an important adjunct. The order of march was thus : a scouting party of three or four men went in advance, a half mile or more; the company usually in single file; next followed the brigade of pack-horses; and after them the drove of cattle. On each side, at the distance of some two hundred yards, marched a flank guard of eight or ten men of the company on horseback. The regulars under the command of Sergeant Story, formed the rear guard. In the evening they encamped on the Indian boundary line, the frontier of the settlements, where they remained over the Sabbath, July 26th (Greenville Treaty line). On Monday, 27th, they entered the Indian territory; and thence their march was through an uninhabited wilderness, where there was no road except the trace, the width of a wagon track, cut by General Hull's army, and much cut up by his baggage-wagons and cavalry horses. In a letter to his wife dated at Fort M'Arthur, on the Scioto River July 29, 1812, Mr. Williams describes the usual routine of a day and night on the march: "While we are waiting a few minutes to store part of our baggage and provisions in this fort, to lighten our baggage-wagons for a more rapid march, I seize a moment to tell you that I am very well, in good spirits, and much improved in strength and general health. The fatigues and hardships of a soldier's life are just what I needed. You would hardly believe it possible for me to endure what I daily undergo in common with my fellow soldiers. Our food is coarse, and cooked in the roughest manner. For whole days together we have had to use the water from stagnant ponds, or from the wagon ruts and horse-tracks in the road. We sleep upon the cold damp ground, without tents. One-third of the company are on guard every night; so that each one of us, after a hard day's march, has every third night to mount guard and stand sentry four hours—or half the night—and during the remaining four hours turn out hourly to receive the 'grand round,' and 'relief' to the guard. The whole company not on guard sleep on their arms with all their accouterments on, ready for an attack from the hostile Indian tribes occupying the country. "You would smile at our mode of cooking, could you see us thus employed. Our company is divided into messes of six men each. Our rations are delivered to each mess when we encamp at night. This consists of flour, fat bacon, and salt. The flour is kneaded TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 505 in a broad, iron camp kettle, and drawn out in long rolls the size of a man's wrist, and coiled around a smooth pole some three inches in diameter and five or six feet long, on which the dough is flattened so as to be half an inch or more in thickness. The pole thus covered with dough, except a few inches at each end, is placed on two wooden forks driven into the ground in front of the campfire, and turned frequently till it is baked, when it is cut off in pieces, and the pole covered again in the same manner and baked. Our meat is cooked thus: a branch of a tree having several twigs on it is cut, and the ends of the twigs sharpened; the fat bacon is cut in slices and stuck on these twigs, leaving a little space between each, and then held in the blaze and smoked until cooked. Each man then takes a piece of the pole-bread and lays thereon a slice of bacon, and with his knife cuts therefrom and eats his meal with a good appetite. Enough is thus cooked each night to serve for the next day; each man stowing in his knapsack his own day's provision." A few miles north of Fort Findlay, on Blanchard River—now the flourishing town of Findlay—the expedition entered the Black Swamp, through which Hull's Trail passed, and much of which was almost impassable. On the 2nd of August they reached the Maumee River. After marching for many days through dense forests and thickets, and wading much of the way through deep and extensive swamps and morasses, to emerge suddenly therefrom into the dry, open plains on the east bank of the Maumee River, Wood County, was a transition so great that it had a most exhilarating effect upon the feelings of the weary and burdened travelers. A description of these plains and the Maumee Rapids, and the territory after crossing the river, together with some historical reminiscences of the localities, are given by Mr. Williams to his wife, dated, "Encampment, Foot of Maumee Rapids, August 3rd, 1812." He says : "The country we yesterday passed through is the most delightful I have ever seen. Our route was, most of the day, over natural plains of many miles, in extent, apparently as level as the ocean, seemingly bounded only by the distant horizon, and interspersed with a few small islets, or groves, of oak and hickory timber and hazel bushes, and here and there a solitary oak tree or two, standing out in the open expanse. These isolated trees and groves contribute much to the beauty of the scenery. But this is not all. These plains are covered with a most luxuri- 506 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY ant growth of grass and herbs, and an endless variety of beautiful native flowers—Cardinal Flower, Lady of the Lake, Blue Flag, Honeysuckles, Red Lobelia, Wild Fox-Glove, Wild Iris and Wild Columbine, representing all the hues of the rainbow and loading the atmosphere with their perfume. These fill up the picture I have hastily drawn, and 'lend enchantment to the view.' Indeed, I had almost imagined that Gray must have seen this plain before he penned his inimitable 'Elegy,' and that it was in reference to it he wrote these beautiful lines : `Full many a flower is born to blush unseen, And waste its sweetness on the desert air.' "What a rich field this is for the botanist! Here are hundreds of plants, herbs and flowers, which were unknown to Linnaeus or any of his successors in that science. Some portions of these plains are rich and dry land; other parts are of a wet, cold and stiff clay soil. "The Rapids of the Maumee, I am told, are nine miles in length, and form a succession of small rapids, the principal one of which is at the place where this road crosses the river. Here the whole channel is stratified limestone rock, in horizontal strata and divided, at distances of three or four feet, by parallel vertical seams, running diagonally across the whole channel, which is about forty rods wide. The descent of the current over the successive ledges of rock, forms beautiful little cascades, at distances of a few yards between. The Rapids terminate five miles below the ford ; and from hence to the head of the Maumee Bay, a distance of some twelve miles, the river is from a quarter to a half mile or more in width, and navigable for the largest vessels, which readily ascend to the foot of the Rapids. "The plain on which we encamped last night, was the battle ground on which Gen. Anthony Wayne defeated and totally routed and dispersed the combined Indian forces, on the 20th of August, 1794—eighteen years ago. "This morning we moved down the river about five miles, and encamped on the upper end of a large and beautiful plain, bordering on the left bank of the river, a few rods below the old British Fort, and on the very ground upon which the great battle above described terminated. Here, by order of General Hull, we are to remain till reinforced by a company of volunteers from Cleveland, and another from Sandusky, both daily expected to arrive. Near our encampment, in the bank of the river, is a large spring TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 507 of pure, cold water, which is very refreshing after drinking, as we very often did, from the puddles in the road." The account of the various attempts of detachments from Hull's army to form a junction with the troops of Captain Brush in order to escort the supply train to Detroit has already been given. While these abortive efforts to relieve Major Brush were being made, his little battalion, numbering only some two hundred and thirty men, were in a position of great peril. The road and the whole territory between them and the American army was occupied by a large force of the enemy, within four hours' march of their encampment. The Americans were, therefore, in hourly expectation of an attack from the enemy, who might at any time have overpowered them by a force five or ten times their number, and massacred them all, as was the case of the unfortunate Kentucky brigade, under the command of General Winchester, at the same place the following winter. The daily occurrences, with whatever apparently authentic news that reached their encampment, are minutely given in the letters now written almost every day by Mr. Williams to his wife and others. In a letter to Governor Tiffin, dated August 11th, after noting the battle of Brownstown, three days previous, he adds: "It is certain that our affairs on this frontier wear a very serious and gloomy aspect. All communication between us and Detroit has been for several days wholly cut off by the enemy." The last of his series of letters to Mrs. Williams is dated Friday, August 14th, in which is the following paragraph : "All thought of being able to proceed to Detroit is now abandoned and our attention is turned exclusively to fortifying our position, and putting it in the best state of defense that we can. If the enemy should bring their field artillery to the attack—which, if they come, they will surely do—our rotten stockade will be battered to the ground in ten minutes. What our fate will be I cannot tell. But if we fall, we shall sell our lives as dearly as we can. We have lost all confidence in General Hull. In any event we cannot remain here longer than this week, or the middle of next." He tells then of the surrender of General Hull and continues : "The surrender of Detroit and the whole army was an event so unlooked for, so extraordinary, so astonishing, that the papers were regarded as forgeries and Captain Elliott (British and son of the notorious Matthew Elliott), being regarded as a spy, was immediately placed in confinement under guard. In the afternoon, however, three or four of the well known Ohio Volunteers 508 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY from Detroit, who were absent from the fort when it was surrendered, made their escape and arrived at Major Brush's encampment, fully confirming the sad news. A council of war was held in the evening, and it was unanimously resolved that the battalion should disregard the surrender and make their way back to Ohio. Accordingly every preparation was made, except that of cooking food, for which there was no time, and about 10 o'clock that night—Captain Elliott being first liberated, the men took up their march homeward. The night was cloudy and dark, and in the dense forest the narrow road could only be kept by traveling in the mud. "Early the next morning they had reached the foot of the Maumee Rapids, thirty-four miles. Here the few inhabitants furnished them a scanty breakfast of whatever could be gathered up, and the march was resumed. After crossing the river, Captain Rowland's company took the Sandusky road, and Captain Brush's that to Urbana. The march was continued all day and till midnight, when getting into the Black Swamp, where it was all mud, it was found impossible to distinguish where the road lay. A halt was called, and every man sought for himself a dry place at the root of some tree, where he sat on his knapsack and, leaning against a tree, slept till dawn the next morning, when the march was continued. A courier was sent ahead on horseback to Fort Findlay, on the Blanchard Fork, where on the arrival of the company about noon, they enjoyed the luxury of a good and plentiful meal of bread and jerked beef, hastily prepared for them by the sergeant's guard stationed at that post." To this point the company was pursued by "Brigadier-General Tecumseh," the noted Shawnee chief, at the head of 300 mounted Indians, sent by General Brock to capture and bring them back as escaped prisoners. But finding by the "sign," the footprints of the marchers, that they were several hours in advance of them, and would reach the settlements before they could be overtaken, the pursuit was abandoned, and Tecumseh and his brigade returned. The march was continued from Fort Findlay immediately after taking their meal, and late that night the company reached Fort M'Arthur, on the Scioto River. The next morning they made a very early start through a heavy rain, which continued the whole day, and in the evening arrived at "Manary's Block-House," on the Indian boundary, where was stationed a company of United States Rangers, under the command of General Manary. Here TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 509 every possible kindness was shown to the weary fugitives by the general and his men. Fires were made in all the huts, and their wet clothing dried, and the rangers gave up their "bunks"berths—for the repose of the visitors. Here the company entered the settlements, and being no longer in danger of pursuit, they continued their march more leisurely. At Urbana they separated into small parties for greater ease in traveling, and generally reached their homes at Chillicothe on Monday, August 23rd, after an absence of five weeks, without the loss of a man. Although the company thus escaped from the enemy, our Government recognized them as prisoners, and they were a few months afterward, regularly exchanged, and were ordered by Governor Meigs to be credited for a full tour of duty. It will be noted that the forces returned as far as the Maumee Rapid's on the same route they passed up. Here a part of the convoy turned to the left and marched over the Lower Sandusky (Fremont) trail. The Chillicothe detachment passed south again through present Wood County as they went. When Williams says "every man sought for himself a dry place at the root of a tree," the place was evidently but a few miles south of present Bowling Green. Manary's Block-House was on the northern border of now Logan County, and while built on the border line between the Indian Lands and the government territory (Greenville Treaty line) by private settlers, had been taken over and occupied by the government. Another most valuable historical fact is the statement that the celebrated Indian chief and statesman Tecumseh, at the head of 300 warriors, passed up and back on "Hull's Trail" on Wood County soil, marching. within a short distance of Fort Findlay. This Williams, by the way, in December, 1808, carried the presidential electoral vote of Ohio from Chillicothe to Washington on horseback. Reverting to the proceedings at Chicago before taking up the next step of the government. When General Hull at Detroit was warned of the fate of Mackinaw, the last of July (1812) he sent an express by way of Fort Wayne to Captain Heald, who commanded at Fort Dearborn, near the mouth of the Chicago River and at the southwest extremity at Lake Michigan, with orders to dismantle the fort and deliver to the Indians in that neighborhood all the public property of his possession, which he could not bring away. Captain Wells, who lived at Fort Wayne, volunteered his 510 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY services with the aid of about fifty Miami Indians, to bring away the garrison with the women and children. He set out from Fort Wayne about the 3d, and arrived at Chicago on the 12th of August. For several days a large number of Pottawatomies, and Winnebagoes had been encamped round the fort, but most of them professed to be friendly. Tecumseh and the British kept up a regular correspondence by runners with those Indians, who were waiting to hear the result of the contest about Malden before they would join either side. On the 14th, Captain Heald distributed the public stores among the different tribes, with which they were much pleased. In the evening of the same day, Mr. Griffith, who acted as an interpreter and trader at Fort Dearborn, was informed by a chief whose name was Black Partridge, that "leaden birds had been singing in his ears," and that they ought to be careful on the march they were going to take. From his suggestion, it was evident that the Indians had been holding councils on the subject of commencing hostilities. Their number in the neighborhood of the fort now amounted to five or six hundred. On the morning of the 15th at sunrise, the troops, consisting of about seventy men, with some women and children, marched from the fort, with the pack-horses In the center, and Captain Wells with his Indians in the rear. They had proceeded about a mile from the fort, when the front guard was fired on by the savages, who were posted behind a sandbank on the margin of the lake and in a skirt of woods which the party was approaching, the rest of the country around them being an open prairie. At the same time they saw a body of Indians passing to their rear, to cut off their retreat to the fort. The firing now became general, and the troops seeing nothing but death and massacre before them formed in line of battle and returned the fire of the enemy with much bravery and success, as they slowly retreated into the prairie. The Indians made several desperate efforts to rush up and tomahawk them; but every charge was repulsed by the firmness of the troops, who fought with desperation, determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible. Captain Wells being killed, his Indians retired from the party and joined the others. Several women and children were also killed ; and the American ranks were at last so reduced as scarcely to exceed twenty effective men, yet they continued resolute and stuck together, resolved to fight while one remained able to fire. But the Indians now withdrew some distance and sent a small French boy to demand a surrender, TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 511 The boy was Captain Heald's interpreter, who had run off to the Indians at the commencement of the action. He advanced cautiously, and Mr. Griffith, who was afterwards a lieutenant in a company of spies in Colonel Johnson's regiment from Kentucky, advanced to meet him, intending to kill him for his perfidy. But the boy declared that it was the only way he had to save his life and appeared sorry that he had been obliged to act in that manner. He then made known his business ; the Indians proposed to spare the lives of the men, provided they would surrender. The proposal being made known to the surviving soldiers, they unanimously determined to reject it. The boy returned with this answer to the Indians, but in a short time he came back and entreated Mr. Griffith to use his influence with Captain. Heald, to make him surrender, as the Indians were very numerous. The captain, his lady, and Mr. Griffith were all wounded. He at last consented to surrender, and the troops having laid down their arms, the Indians advanced to receive them; and notwithstanding their promises, they now perfidiously tomahawked three or four of the men. One Indian with the fury of a demon in his countenance, advanced to Mrs. Heald with his tomahawk drawn. She had been accustomed to danger, and knowing the temper of the Indians, with great presence of mind she looked him in the face and smiling said : "Surely you will not kill a squaw." His arm fell nerveless; the conciliating smile of an innocent female, appealing to the magnanimity of a warrior, reached the heart of the savage and subdued the barbarity of his soul. He immediately took the lady under his protection. She was the daughter of Gen. Samuel Wells of Kentucky. The head of Captain Wells was cut off; and his heart was cut out and eaten by the savages. The Indians having divided their prisoners as usual in such cases, it was the fate of Captain Heald, his lady and Mr. Griffith, to be taken by the Ottawas on the lake beyond the mouth of the River St. Joseph. Their wounds being severe, they looked upon destruction as inevitable; but heaven often smiles when least expected. Griffith had observed a canoe which was large enough to carry them ; and they contrived to escape in it by night. In this frail bark they traversed the lake 200 miles to Mackinaw, where the British commander afforded them the means of returning to the United States. The attack on the garrison of Chicago was caused by intelligence received from Tecumseh. On the night previous to the 512 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY evacuation of the fort, a runner had arrived with information from Tecumseh that Major Van Horn had been defeated at Brownstown, that the army under Hull had returned to Detroit, and that there was every prospect of success. This intelligence decided the Indians in that quarter to join the British side and they resolved to remain no longer inactive. CHAPTER XLI OPERATIONS OF HARRISON AND WINCHESTER WINCHESTER HEADS ARMY-INVESTMENT OF FORT WAYNE BY THE INDIANS-HARRISON SENDS RELIEF-WINCHESTER'S OPERATIONS AT HEAD OF MAUMEE-HARRISON APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF-BUILDS FORT WINCHESTER-PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN-RIGHT AND LEFT WING AND CENTER-ROADS AND WEATHER CONDITIONS DISASTROUS MENACE-EXPEDITION OF GENERAL TUPPER TO MAUMEE RAPIDS-STORY OF CAPTAIN LOGAN THE INDIAN-ADVANCE OF WINCHESTER DOWN THE MAUMEE. President Madison was authorized to levy one hundred thousand detached militia among the states for service. When Governor Meigs became fully informed of the deplorable situation at Detroit, he immediately ordered the remaining twelve hundred members of Ohio's quota to rendezvous under Brig.-Gen. Edward W. Tupper at Urbana near the southern boundary of the so-called Indian Lands. Further, when Hull's surrender became known, the governor used every effort to place the effective forces under his control in the best situation of defense; and as a protection to their families and property, warned the frontiersmen to build centralized block-houses and stockades. Governor Harrison of Indiana, who had been also commissioned commander of the troops of that Territory, together with the forces of Illinois, had displayed his efficiency and good judgment by providing places of security for the settlers under his jurisdiction. He was also authorized to call. on Gov. Charles Scott of Kentucky for any troops needed from that state not already in service. The reliable veteran governor of Kentucky had been prompt in assembling the quota of ten regiments averaging five hundred and fifty each required from that state, and by the invitation of Governor Scott who was with Harrison in Wayne's campaign against the Indians, Harrison visited Frankfort where he inspected the militia, was given a rousing public reception; "the principal citizens including Henry Clay gathering to do him honor." For the purpose of placing him in chief command of the Kentucky forces, Governor Scott also on August 25th, 1812, commissioned Harrison "Major-General of the Militia of Kentucky by brevet." It was not known at the time. - 513 - 514 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY by Governor Scott or Harrison that the latter had three days before been commissioned by President Madison as Brigadier-General in the Army of the United States. General Harrison appointed the Hon. R. M. Johnson, Wm. S. Hunter and John Logan of Kentucky his aides. From Cincinnati on August 27, 1812, Harrison informed Governor Meigs that the Kentucky troops present with him were two regiments of infantry and one regiment of mounted riflemen; which were immediately ordered to Urbana. Harrison also stated that three regiments of infantry and one of dragoons and one of mounted riflemen, were on the way to join him; the whole force totaling over four thousand men. It was the intention of Harrison—should the report of Hull's surrender prove untrue, to join at Urbana the forces assembling there, or meet them before they arrived at that point. He also wanted to know of Governor Meigs what assistance he could receive from Ohio. Marching up the Miami Valley, the Kentucky troops were on the third day overtaken by General Harrison before they reached Urbana and he was enthusiastically received. Above Dayton on September 2nd, a messenger overtook the marchers bearing to General Harrison his government appointment and also instructions for him to take command of the Illinois and Indiana troops and cooperate with General Hull and Governor Howard of Missouri Territory, in consequence of Gen. James Winchester being assigned to the command of the Army of the Northwest. General Harrison had some hesitancy in accepting the appointment until the status between himself and Winchester was definitely understood. On September. 3rd, the troops as McAfee says "arrived at Piqua eighty miles from Cincinnati and only three miles from the outside settlements. Piqua is the Indian name for this place, which is called Washington by the people of Ohio. It is a little village situated on the west bank of the Great Miami River." General Harrison here learning of the investment by the neighboring Indians of Fort Wayne, which in 1804 had been rebuilt by Col. Thomas Hunt, immediately detached the regiment of Colonel Allen, and two companies from the regiment of Colonel Lewis and one from Colonel Scott, with instructions to make a forced march for its relief. A regiment of seven hundred mounted men under the command of Colonel Adams had also advanced as far as Shane's Crossing of the St. Marys (present Rockford). McAfee says this corps was composed of the citizens TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 515 of Ohio, of all ages and conditions, who had, unsolicited by the government, volunteered and organized themselves for the protection of the frontiers, and the relief of Fort Wayne. Many gentlemen, who held important offices in the state, and not a few of the most wealthy and respectable citizens of Cincinnati, were to be found in this regiment. Such, indeed was the ardor of the citizens to serve in this way, that every road to the frontiers was crowded with unsolicited volunteers. Their zeal was highly honorable to themselves, but in the end it proved disadvantageous to the cause; for they consumed much of the provisions which had been accumulated at the outposts by the orders of General Hull, the want of which was afterwards severely felt. On the evening of the 4th, General Harrison received further intelligence that a British and Indian force had left Malden on the 18th of August, to join the Indians already at the siege. Having previously been advised that General Winchester was ordered by the war department to take command of the troops destined to reinforce the Northwestern Army, he had intended to resign them to him at Piqua, for which purpose he had written to Winchester to come on to that place ; but on learning the critical situation of Fort Wayne, he determined not to wait for Winchester, but to retain the command till he had relieved the fort. Early next day, the 5th of September, he paraded the remainder of the troops, and delivered them a speech, in which he stated that Fort Wayne was in imminent danger, and that it was absolutely necessary to make forced marches to relieve it. He read several articles of war prescribing the duty of soldiers, and explained the necessity for such regulations. He then observed that if there was any person who would not submit to such regulations, or who was afraid to risk his life in defense of his country, he might return home, as he did not wish to have any person with him who was afraid to fight or unwilling to discharge his duties. One man only said he wished to return, and his friends having obtained leave as usual to escort him on his way, he was hoisted on a rail and carried to the Big Miami, in the waters of which they absolved him from the obligations of courage and patriotism, and then gave him leave of absence. The troops were detained here till the 6th for want of flints, a very small, yet indispensable article. On that day they marched, leaving the greater part of their clothes and heavy baggage at Piqua, and overtook Colonel Allen's regiment early on the 8th at St. Marys River, where an express from the general had over- 516 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY taken him with orders to halt and build some block-houses, for the security of provisions and the protection of the sick. This place is commonly known by the name of (James) Girty's Town. (St. Marys). The men were here put on half rations, but any one who did not like such, fare had leave to remain at the block-houses. Major R. M. Johnson arrived on the evening of the same day, with a corps of mounted volunteers, consisting of the companies of Captains Arnold and Johnson, and a company from Mason County under the command of Captain' Ward. The army was now about two thousand two hundred men strong. While the troops were at Piqua, Mr. Johnson the Indian agent, at the request of General Harrison, had procured some Shawanoe Indians to go down to the mouth of the Auglaize, the site of old Fort Defiance, and examine whether any British force had passed up to the siege of Fort Wayne. A Shawanoe half blood by the name of Logan, who had received his name in consequence of his having been taken prisoner when a boy by General Logan in an excursion from Kentucky, had also been sent by the agent to ascertain the situation of the fort. He was an Indian of great merit, and a chief warrior in his tribe. He was about six feet high and robust, with broad shoulders and a prominent forehead. He was much attached to General Harrison and a warm friend to our cause, which he promoted by acting as a guide and a spy for our army. On his trip to Fort Wayne he eluded all the vigilance of the enemy, got into the fort, and returned with the information of its being besieged. He also brought intelligence that Stephen Johnson, a brother to the Indian agent, had been killed in sight of the fort, while attempting to escape as an express, and that the Indians had tried every stratagem to get possession of the fort. This information was important, as well as the report of the Indians from the Auglaize, that there was no appearance of a British army having gone up the Miami of the Lakes (Maumee). The hostile Indians were taking similar measures to obtain information of Harrison's movements. On the night of the 8th, while the army lay in tolerably open order at the St. Marys, the besiegers at Fort Wayne sent their spies to examine it. They did not get around the camp before daylight, and returned with a report that "Kentucky was coming as numerous as the trees." Early next morning the army marched for Fort Wayne, except the mounted volunteers, who remained till 12 o'clock to rest their horses and elect a major to command the corps. R. M. Johnson was chosen for this office, and Benjamin S. Chamber TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 517 was appointed quartermaster, and the Reverend James Suggette, adjutant to his battalion. The army arrived in the evening at the camp of Colonel Adams, at Shane's Crossing of the St. Marys (now Rockford, Ohio) ; and Major Johnson came up in the night and encamped half a mile above the main army. On the morning of the 10th, some delay was caused by repairing broken wagons and making other necessary arrangements. General Harrison was unremitting in the discharge of his duties. Every department underwent his personal inspection; and the temper and condition of every corps in the army was known to him. The arrival of Harrison's troops at Fort Wayne for its relief on September 12, 1812, was a source of great joy to the garrison and to the people who had taken refuge within the works. As McAfee again states, the Indians had fled, most of them on the evening before, and some only a few minutes before the appearance of the army. They were pursued by the Ohio horsemen, but without success. The fort had been closely invested for ten or twelve days by the Indians, who had made several pieces of wooden cannon by boring out pieces of timber, and strengthening them with iron hoops. The army encamped round the fort, where a few days previous there had been a handsome little village; but it was now in ruins, having been burnt down by the Indians, together with the United States' factory, which had been erected to furnish the ungrateful wretches with farming utensils. Until the 1st of September, the savages about the fort had professed friendship, with a view to get possession of it by some stratagem. Captain Rhea, who commanded, was addicted to intoxication, for which and his other misconduct he was arrested by General Harrison; but on account of his age he was permitted to resign. The fort was well prepared to resist a siege by Indians, as it had plenty of provisions and water, and about seventy men with four small field pieces. It was delightfully situated on an eminence on the south bank of the Maumee immediately below the formation of that river by the junction of the St. Marys from the southwest with the St. Josephs from the north. It was well constructed of block-houses and picketing, but could not resist a British force, as there were several eminences on the south side, from which it could be commanded by a six or nine pounder. This was the place where the Miami Indians formerly had their principal town; and here many an unfortunate prisoner suffered death by burning at the stake. It was here also that General Harmar suffered his army to be cut up and defeated in 518 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY detachments after he had burnt the town in the fall of the year 1790. For more than a century before that time it had been the principal place of rendezvous between the Indians of the lakes, and those of the Wabash and Illinois, and had been much restored about the year 1756 and previously, by French traders from Canada. The portage to the nearest navigable branch of the Wabash was but seven or eight miles, through a level marshy prairie, from which the water ran both to the Wabash and St. Marys. The corn which had been cultivated in the fields by the villagers, was nearly all destroyed by the Indians; the remains served as forage for the mounted troops. Captain Wells, who was massacred at Chicago, had a handsome farm in the forks of the river, with some good buildings, which were all destroyed in the general devastation. On the day after the arrival of the army, reconnoitering parties were sent out in every direction, and at the same time a council of field officers was convened, in which it was determined, agreeably to plans submitted by General Harrison, to divide the army into two divisions and march on the next day in quest of the Indians and their towns. The first division was composed of the regiments of Lewis and Allen, and Captain Garrard's troops of horse, under General Payne and accompanied by General Harrison. They were to destroy the Miami villages at the forks of the Wabash, about thirty miles from the fort. The other division was to destroy the Pottawatomie village on the Elkhart River, a branch of the St. Josephs of Lake Michigan. It was to be commanded by Col. Samuel Wells, and to consist of one battalion under Johnson and the mounted men from Ohio under Adams. The greater part of the latter corps, however, returned home next morning. The main object which the general expected to accomplish by the proposed expeditions, was to destroy the corn of the Indians so that they could not find the means of subsistence for making another attack on the fort. The party under Payne, having traversed a fine region of country, arrived on the 15th at the village in the forks, which was abandoned by the Indians. They encamped in the town, destroyed all its huts and cabins, and cut up the corn and other vegetables in the fields. Next day the spies discovered several other deserted villages lower down, which were all in like manner destroyed. The tomb of a chief, built of logs and daubed with clay, was found in one of these villages. He was laid on his blanket, with his gun and his pipe by his side, and a small tin pan o TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 519 his breast containing a wooden spoon, and a number of earrings and broaches—all deemed necessary no doubt on his journey to the other world. On the 18th they arrived again at the fort, without having lost a man or having seen a living Indian. The party under Wells had to march about sixty miles to the village against which they were sent. Captain Audrain, who was son-in-law, and Mr. Wells, who was son to the colonel, went with them as guides; and Captain Arnold's company marched at the distance of near a mile in front to act as spies. On the 16th, having crossed the Elkhart River, above the village about three miles, the line of battle was formed on a plain, thinly timbered. Major Johnson's mounted battalion was placed in front on the left flank, and Major Dunlap's mounted men on the right in front; with orders to advance to the right and left of the town and surround it. The infantry were formed in line of battle, then broke off by heads of companies, and followed the others in rapid motion. In a few minutes the mounted men were in the rear of the village, but to the regret of every person it was found destitute of inhabitants, the Indians having fled two days previous. They had left a considerable quantity of corn, gathered and laid on scaffolds to dry, with abundance of beans, potatoes and other vegetables, which furnished ample store of provision for the men and forage for the horses. This village was called Five Medals, from a chief of that name who made it his residence. On a pole before the door of that chief, a red flag was hung with a broom tied above it, and on another pole at the tomb of an old woman, a white flag was flying. The body of the old woman was entire, sitting upright with her face towards the east, and a basket beside her containing trinkets, such as owl and hawk bills and claws, a variety of bones, and bunches of roots tied together; all of which indicated that she had been revered as a sorceress, and probably a doctress. In one of the huts was found a morning report of one of Hull's captains—also a Liberty Hall newspaper printed at Cincinnati, containing an account of General Harrison's army. Several coarse bags, which appeared to have contained shot, and pieces of boxes with London and Malden printed on them, were also picked up in the cabins, which proved that these Indians were intimately connected with the British, and had been furnished with information by some traitor in our own country. The village with about seventy acres of corn was totally destroyed, and on the same evening the army returned as far as the Elkhart River. On the 18th the main body arrived at the fort a few 520 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY hours after the party under Payne. In the meantime Colonel Simrall had arrived on the 17th, with his regiment of dragoons, armed with muskets, 320 strong (and a company of mounted riflemen under Colonel Farrow, from Montgomery County, Kentucky). General Harrison sent them on the evening of the 18th to the town of Little Turtle, about twenty miles to the northwest, with orders to destroy it all, except the buildings erected by the United States for the Little Turtle, whose friendship for the Americans after the treaty of Greenville, had contributed greatly to the preservation of peace. Colonel Simrall executed his orders with a degree of promptness and dispatch, and on the 19th he returned in the evening to the Fort Wayne. It was September 19th, 1812, that Gen. James Winchester, in pursuance to his appointment, arrived at Fort Wayne to assume command of the Northwest Army and more immediately the first troops which had marched from Kentucky as reinforcements. Like Harmar, St. Clair and Hull, he had been a Revolutionary officer and was advanced in years. He was a wealthy citizen of Tennessee where he had lived many years in a degree of elegant luxury and ease, which was not calculated to season him for a northern campaign in the forest. His arrival produced much uneasiness among the troops; being a regular officer, with whom they were unacquainted, many of the militia seemed disposed not to be commanded by him. General Harrison with the field officers had to exert all their influence to reconcile the army to the change. The troops had confidently expected that General Harrison would be confirmed in the command, and by this time he had completely secured the confidence of every soldier in the army. He was affable and courteous in his manners, and indefatigable in his attention to every branch of business. His soldiers seemed to anticipate the wishes of their general ; it was only necessary to be known that he wished something done, and all were anxious to risk their lives in its accomplishment. His men would have fought better and suffered more with him than with any other general in America; and whatever might have been the merits of General Winchester, it was certainly an unfortunate arrangement which transferred the command to him at this moment. The men were at last reconciled to march under Winchester, but with a confident belief that Harrison would yet be reinstated in the command; and which accordingly was done, as soon as the war department was informed of his appointment in the Kentucky troops, and his popularity in the western country. TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 521 At the same time that the command of the troops at Fort Wayne were transferred to General Winchester, General Harrison informed him that any other part of the infantry which he might deem necessary to the execution of his plans, would be placed at his disposal. On the same evening, General Harrison turned back to take command of the forces collecting in the rear, and to prepare for a mounted expedition against Detroit. He intended to make a coup de main on that place, with a mounted force which would march by an unfrequented route from Fort Wayne, up the St. Josephs to the headwaters of the river Raisin. The troops collecting in the rear, were the three regiments from Kentucky under Barbee, Poague and Jennings; and three companies of mounted riflemen from the same state under Captains Roper, Bacon and Clarke; and also a corps of mounted men from Ohio, who were rendezvoused at Dayton on the 15th, in pursuance of a previous call by Meigs and Harrison, which had been made early in September with a view to employ them in an expedition against some of the Indian towns. This corps was commanded by Colonel Findlay, who had entered the service again after being surrendered by Hull. To advance his own plans, General Winchester had removed his camp into the forks of the St. Marys and St. Josephs rivers and early on the 22nd he marched down the Maumee on the north side, following very nearly the route by which General Wayne had returned after the battle of Fallen Timbers. Winchester's object was to go as far as the old Fort Defiance at the junction of the Auglaize and the Maumee, and wait there for the arrival of the infantry in the rear, who were to come down the river from St. Marys. It would be interesting to follow the detailed movements of Winchester's forces, as well as those under Harrison from this point, but through the various operations of Winchester's scouts and detachments of his troops, it was discovered that two hundred regulars under the British Major Muir, with four pieces of artillery and one thousand Indians under the command of Captain Elliott, had arrived at the junction of the Maumee and Auglaize and that they were the advance force of an army destined to attack Fort Wayne. They had brought their baggage and artillery up the Maumee River to old Fort Defiance where they had left their boats and were advancing up the south side of the Maumee towards Fort Wayne. But evidently on learning of the situation of Winchester's men and a prospect of his receiving 522 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY additional troops, Muir with his British and Indians retreated down the Maumee towards Detroit seemingly to the great relief of Winchester as appears later. An express was sent to General Harrison advising him of the retreat of Muir, and Winchester, it being now September 30th, moved his camp down the Maumee from the direction of Fort Wayne and to within a mile of old Defiance. Here he fortified himself on the high river bank and remained several days. On October 1st, Colonel Lewis was detached with 380 men to proceed down the Maumee and ascertain whether Muir with his enemy force had entirely deserted that section, and he found evidences of their full withdrawal. Winchester now called upon Governor Meigs of Ohio for more troops and on account of the approaching winter, was speeding up his preparations to advance on the enemy, when there came a radical change. General Harrison, following McAfee's story, had arrived at Piqua to expedite the supplies for his part of the army and mature his arrangements for the coup de main on Detroit. But there on the evening of September 24th, he received another communication from the war department, dated on the 17th which assigned to him the command of the 8th military district including the Northwestern Army. He was at the same time instructed to provide for the security of the western frontiers, to retake Detroit with a view to the conquest of Upper Canada, to penetrate that country as far as the force under his command would justify him to proceed. He was advised that every exertion was being made by the government to furnish him with a train of artillery from Pittsburgh, and all other necessary supplies. The forces now under his command by order of the government, were estimated at ten thousand strong, including the whole in the state of Ohio and the different territories. The real number was much greater, in consequence of many mounted volunteers having entered the service for short periods unauthorized by the war department. But the services which he was required to perform, were in the opinion of old, experienced, and able officers, the most extensive and arduous that ever had been required from any military commander in America. The endless number of posts and scattered settlements which he was obliged to maintain and protect against numerous and scattered bands of Indians, while he was contending with the difficulties almost insurmountable in the main expedition against the enemy at Malden, were sufficient to employ all the time and talents, and resources, of the greatest military TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 523 genius at the head of a well appointed army. His forces, however, were raw, undisciplined militia, which nothing but his address or Jackson's energy could render efficient. Chaos and misconduct reigned in every department, and particularly in that of the supplies, in which the best organization and arrangements were necessary to meet the inconceivable difficulties which were to be surmounted in that line. He had excellent materials for an army in the Kentucky militia, but he had no time to spend in preparing them for the field. The season for action was drawing to a close; not a moment was to be lost in pushing on the campaign. He immediately digested the following plan for the march of the army towards Detroit, viz: the right column, to be composed of the Virginia and Pennsylvania troops, to rendezvous at Wooster, and proceed thence by Upper Sandusky to the Rapids of the Maumee; the middle column, to consist of twelve hundred Ohio militia, to march from Urbana where they then were, by Fort M'Arthur on General Hull's route, through now Hancock and Wood counties to the Maumee Rapids; the left column, to be composed of the regulars under Wells, and four regiments of Kentucky volunteers, to proceed down the Auglaize and Maumee from St. Marys and Defiance to the Rapids. The mounted men, under a proper officer selected to command them, were to proceed on the route, by which he had intended to make the coup de main on Detroit. The latter intention, however, was now abandoned ; for if they should take Detroit, as the infantry could not be ready to support them in it, they must leave it again to the aggravated fury of the Indians. The object, therefore, at present was to sweep the western side of the strait and lake of the Indians, who were scattered from Brownstown to the Maumee Rapids, rioting on the plunder of the farms which had been abandoned by their owners. The attention of the General was at the same time directed to the important subject of the supplies, the most difficult part of his business in the present campaign. On the 27th he dispatched an express to Pittsburgh, to order the artillery and supplies from that place to proceed to Georgetown on the Ohio, and thence by New Lisbon and Canton to Wooster. Such as the state of Ohio could furnish cheaply, he preferred to procure in that country, as being the most convenient for a land transportation towards Detroit. The troops were nearly destitute of winter clothing; and as the prospect of obtaining an adequate supply 524 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY from the government, in due time, was not very flattering, an appeal had already been made on this subject by Shelby and Har-rison, to the patriotism of the people of Kentucky, for voluntary contributions of clothing to the militia of that state. In the plan of the campaign, the Rapids of the Maumee were considered as the first object upon which the forces were to ad-vance from a military base, drawn along the hither edge of the swampy district from Upper Sandusky to St. Marys, by three lines of operations, commencing at St. Marys, Fort M'Arthur, and Upper Sandusky, which places were to be the principal points of concentration and deposit, preparatory to a general advance and combination at the Maumee Rapids. "This," said Colonel Wood of the engineers, "was an excellent plan; for by sending the corps different routes, with a view of concentrating somewhere in the neighborhood of the enemy, the march of the army would not only be expedited, but the frontiers much more effectually protected." St. Marys was intended to be the principal depot for provisions, and Upper Sandusky for the artillery and military stores. That portion of the left wing now at Defiance, was to serve as a corps of observation; and at that place provisions were also to be accumulated preparatory to the advance of that corps to occupy the Rapids, which was to take place when the artillery had reached Upper Sandusky, and the other military base; and its arrival at the Maumee Rapids was to be the signal for a general advance with the supplies on all the lines of operation. A corps of observation was also to be placed at Lower Sandusky (Fremont) which with Defiance would form the extremities of a second base when the Rapids were occupied. By these arrange-ments the greater part of the troops would be kept within the bounds of the local contractors, consuming provisions brought forward at their expense, whilst all the energies of the quarter-master's department would be employed in accumulating provisions at the principal depots, and providing the means to transport them through the swampy country to the positions taken in advance, and particularly to the Rapids of the Maumee. From Piqua, General Harrison returned again to St. Marys where upon his orders, he was joined by the horsemen at Fort Wayne under Colonel Simrall and Major Johnson. The forces at St. Marys now amounted to nearly three thousand men. The three mounted companies were formed into a battalion, which, associated with Johnson's force constituted a regiment, at the TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 525 head of which R. M. Johnson was chosen colonel. This new regiment with Colonel Findlay's from Ohio now formed a brigade, which was placed under command of Brig.-Gen. E. M. Tupper of Ohio. A few hours after the organization of this force, about 12 o'clock of September 30th, an express arrived from General Winchester with the information that his march from Fort Wayne to Defiance heretofore mentioned, had been impeded by Indians and that on his arrival near Defiance he had discovered that they were accompanied by British troops and artillery (Major Muir's force). A few minutes later another express arrived from Governor Meigs at Chillicothe, with a letter from General Kelso in command of some Pennsylvania troops on Lake Erie, bearing the information that on September 16th, two thousand Indians with some British Regulars and militia and two pieces of artillery had left Maiden on an expedition against Fort Wayne. Within three hours all the forces at St. Marys were in motion to join Winchester who was supposed to have met all the Indians and British that these allies could raise in Upper Canada. At Fort Jennings on the way, word came that the enemy (Muir) had retreated, consequently, with his foot troops ordered back over very difficult roads to St. Marys, General Harrison directed that a road be cut from Fort Jennings to Defiance and proceeded there with his mounted force numbering nearly one thousand—"which in the woods made a grand appearance." The troops were much disappointed at the British and Indian withdrawal, as they were anxious for an engagement and the General himself was much displeased over the exaggerated report. Arriving on the evening of October 3rd at Winchester's camp, the troops went down to the mouth of .the Auglaize and encamped around the ruins of old Fort Defiance while General Harrison remained behind to take over the command of the Northwest Army from General Winchester. Affairs were in a very bad state and one of the Kentucky regiments was on the verge of mutiny. General Harrison ordered a parade of the troops, addressed them in his characteristic way and when it became known that he had been placed in full command, order and enthusiasm returned. The formalities of the transfer were made by General Winchester issuing the following order : "Camp at Defiance, October 3, 1812. "I have the honor of announcing to this army the arrival of General Harrison who is duly authorized by the executive of the 526 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY Federal Government to take command of the Northwest Army. This officer is enjoying the implicit confidence of the States from whose citizens this army is and will be collected and, possessing himself great military skill and reputation, the General is confident in the belief that his presence in the army, in the character of its chief, will be hailed with unusual approbation. "J. Winchester, "Brig.-Gen. U. S. Army." The army, as stated, was to consist of the right and left wings and center. In their march down the Sandusky, the right wing as will appear later, built Fort Ferree at Upper Sandusky, Fort Ball on the site of present Tiffin and Fort Stephenson at Lower Sandusky (Fremont). Fort Seneca on the Sandusky between Fort Ball and Fort Stephenson was still later built by General Harrison. General Tupper had command of the central division and was to move down Hull's Trace by way of Forts McArthur, Necessity and Findlay and the Maumee River. The command of the left wing was confided to General Winchester who accepted it at the solicitation of General Harrison. His principal duty assigned was the transportation of supplies for the Detroit main expedition. He was also instructed to occupy the Maumee Rapids as speedily as possible for the purpose of securing a large quantity of corn which had been raised along the river by the advance settlers who had now fled to the interior for safety. On account of delay in securing provisions for the advance on Detroit, this order was rescinded and Winchester was asked to return most of his command nearer to the base of supplies. As General Harrison was busily engaged in all quarters, and the operations of Generals Winchester and Tupper are of no special significance for a time, they are passed over with the statement that a disagreement arose between Winchester and Tupper as to their various duties and the latter showed a total lack of efficiency as a successful commander. Charges were made by Winchester against Tupper and the latter was ordered arrested by General Harrison, but on account of Tupper's change of base the matter was passed over without trial. As the situation of old Fort Defiance was inadequate for the accommodation of a large number of troops, General Harrison had drawn a plan for a new fort more than ten times the size of the old structure, to be located beginning about eighty yards above, on the high west bank of the Auglaize. The stockade in TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 527 the form of a parallelogram enclosed more than three acres of ground. There was a strong, two-story block-house at each of the four corners and a large mid-gateway on each side. From a cellar under the northeast corner block-house an underground passageway ran down to the river, where a barrier of logs was built for protection. The structure on its completion October 15, 1812, was named Fort Winchester by General Harrison in deference to the commander he had superseded. All during the War of 1812, the fort was an important rendezvous for troops and the headquarters for supplies to be sent down and up the Maumee and Auglaize in boats. As General Harrison was returning from Defiance to St. Marys he was informed by an express from Fort Wayne that the Indians were collecting again at that place. On his arrival at St. Marys, Harrison found a corps of 500 mounted volunteers who had gathered there to join the mounted expedition against Detroit. These troops were ordered to Fort Wayne and the campaign in that section including the attack of. the Indians on Fort Harrison, the massacre of Pigeon Root and the operations farther west, are outside the limits of this story. General Harrison himself proceeded from St. Marys by way of Piqua to Urbana, where some of the troops of General Tupper (still retained as a commander) were stationed, and went from there to his headquarters at Franklinton (Columbus site) where he was busy expediting the march of troops and hastening the forwarding of supplies and artillery for the campaign against Malden. No commander probably ever had a more arduous or difficult task, with the details of every branch of the service to look after over a wide range of territory and communication most difficult. Although Forts Barbee and Jennings have as a matter of convenience been already referred to in designating certain points, while some of the men under Winchester were building pirogues and canoes five or six miles down the Maumee River from Fort Winchester, a regiment under Colonel Barbee at St. Marys at this stage completed a defense at St. Marys and called it Fort Barbee and a regiment under Colonel Poague built Fort Amanda on the Auglaize about twelve Miles from St. Marys, in now Auglaize County. Colonel Jennings also completed the fort (Jennings) at his encampment (Putnam County). These regiments were also employed in building boats and canoes and General Harrison at Franklinton was forwarding military stores and provisions towards Fort McArthur and Upper Sandusky; to 528 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY which former place the Ohio troops at Urbana were removed the latter part of October. It must be kept in mind that the troops now moving on the line of operations which passed from Delaware through Upper Sandusky to Lower Sandusky, composed of the brigades from Virginia and Pennsylvania and that of General Perkins of Ohio, were designated in the general orders as the right wing of the army; Tupper's brigade moving on Hull's Trail formed the center division and the Kentuckians under Winchester were styled the left wing of the forces. According to Captain McAfee's writings, General Harrison at this period continued his headquarters at Franklinton and Delaware, and was chiefly employed in superintending the supplies. Notwithstanding the failure of an intended expedition to the Rapids of the Maumee under Tupper which brought forth the charges against Tupper by General Winchester, General Harrison still placed a high degree of confidence in the militia volunteers, of which his army was composed; but fearing that the extreme hardships and difficulties of the campaign might shake their firmness and evaporate their zeal, he thought it important to collect a body of men on whom he could fully rely in the most desperate circumstances. He therefore ordered, early in October, all the recruits of the regular army in the western states, to be marched to the frontiers. Those in Ohio were to be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, and those of Tennessee by Colonel Anderson, or some field officer of his regiment.. The different corps of the army were now chiefly employed for several months in forwarding supplies on the different routes on which they had marched, or were destined to march. The Virginia and Pennsylvania troops were employed in escorting the artillery and military stores towards Upper Sandusky; the Ohio troops conveyed provisions from Manary's block-house (on now the northern border of Logan County) near the head of the Big Miami, twenty miles north of Urbana, to Forts McArthur and Findlay on Hull's road; while the Kentuckians were traversing the swamps of St. Marys and the Auglaize, and descending those rivers in small craft, to carry provisions to Fort Winchester and the left wing. The difficulties of this business cannot be adequately exhibited in a cursory statement. The letters of the commander-in-chief, to the war department, at this period, were constantly filled with details on this subject. On the 22nd of October, he thus addressed the government: TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 529 "I am not able to fix any period for the advance of the troops to Detroit. It is pretty evident that it cannot be done on proper principles until the frost shall become so severe as to enable us to use the rivers and the margin of the lake for the transportation of the baggage on the ice. To get supplies forward, through a swampy wilderness of nearly 200 miles in wagons or on packhorses, which are to carry their own provisions, is absolutely impossible. "The object, however, can be accomplished by using the margin of the Lake as above mentioned, if the troops are provided with warm clothing, and the winter is such as it commonly is in this climate. No species, of supplies are calculated on being found in the Michigan territory. The farms upon the river Raisin, which might have afforded a quantity of forage, are nearly all broken up and destroyed. This article then, as well as the provisions for the men, is to be taken from Ohio—a circumstance which must at once put to rest every idea, for a land conveyance at this season—since it would require at least two wagons with forage for each one that is loaded with provisions and other articles. "My present plan is, to occupy Sandusky and accumulate at that place as much provision and forage as possible, to be taken from thence upon slides to the river Raisin. At Defiance, Fort Jennings and St. Marys, boats and slides are preparing to take advantage of a rise of water or a fall of snow." He further stated that he had kept the troops from advancing, with a view to save the expense of supplying them at a greater distance, until the whole should be ready to move on the main expedition; and that the contractors had as yet done little or nothing toward making the deposits which he had urged them to accomplish. The principal contractor had let out his contract for the northwestern part of the state at a rate so low, that the subcontractors were unable to furnish the supplies—and some of them, too, were characters on whom no reliance could be placed. The principal contractor, it was said, would make $100,000 by his contract for Ohio; yet he was not disposed to make the least sacrifice of his own interests for the public good. The General proceeds to state in the same letter, that on account of the troops being kept in the interior, "Depredations by small parties of Indians may and will be made, but it is impossible that any considerable body can advance against the settlements, without being in danger of being intercepted on 530 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY their retreat. I am persuaded that the Indians have done less mischief on the frontiers since the declaration of war than they did in the same time preceding it. It was suggested to me a few days ago by a member of Congress that the possession of Detroit by the enemy would probably be the most effectual bar to the attainment of peace. If this was really the case, I would undertake to recover it with a detachment of the army at any time. A few hundred packhorses, with a drove of beeves, without artillery and heavy baggage, would subsist the 1,500 or 2,000 men, which I would select for the purpose, until the balance of the army could arrive. But having in view offensive operations from Detroit, an advance of this sort would be premature and ultimately disadvantageous." A few days after the letter was written, from which the above extracts are made, Harrison was informed by Generals Perkins and Beall, belonging to a detachment of Ohio militia under General Wadsworth, in the northwestern part of the State, that the opening of a road from a point near Mansfield to Lower Sandusky, in which they had been engaged by the orders of Governor Meigs, was forbidden, by General Wadsworth; and that a road from Lower Sandusky to the Maumee Rapids would be impassable unless causewayed for a distance of fifteen miles. This information induced the General to set out immediately to make a personal examination into the state of affairs in that quarter. He found Major-General Wadsworth commanding 800 men, near the mouth of the river Huron, and 500 were under Brigadier-General Beall near Mansfield. The two corps were consolidated and placed under Brigadier-General Perkins with orders to proceed to Lower Sandusky and open a road thence to the Maumee Rapids, making the causeways required by the state of the country. He returned to his headquarters early in November; and about the 15th of the month, the Pennsylvania troops with the artillery passed Mansfield, destined to meet the Virginia troops at Upper Sandusky. On the 15th of November General Harrison informed the war department that he did not think it safe to move from the Maumee Rapids until one million of rations had been accumulated at that place. Considerable progress had now been made—but he adds : "You can scarcely form an idea, sir, of the difficulty with which land transportation is effected north of the fortieth degree of latitude in this country. The country beyond that, is almos TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 531 a continued swamp to the lakes. Where the streams run favorable to your course, a small strip of better ground is generally found, but in crossing from one river to another, the greater part of the way at this season is covered with water. Such is actually the situation of that space between the Sandusky and the Maumee Rapids; and from the best information I could acquire, whilst I was at Huron, the road over it must be causewayed at least half the way." He further stated, that in the opinion of the quartermaster it would require two teams, loaded with forage for their own subsistence, for every one employed in carrying the other articles from Franklinton (Columbus) to Upper Sandusky, at which place it was necessary to accumulate not only provisions for the men, but forage to serve at least two thousand horses and oxen, to be employed in advancing on the main expedition. The expenses of such transportation would of course be enormous. The intention of employing the dragoons on that expedition was for this reason abandoned. An event of much interest concerning the Lower Maumee section which has not been sufficiently emphasized is here detailed as follows: Early in November, General Tupper, who had previously marched his command from Urbana to the frontiers on Hull's road, sent his spy company, under Captain Hinkston, along through present Hancock and Wood counties to reconnoitre at the Maumee Rapids. The Captain concealed his men on the southeast side of the river, in now Wood County, where he had discovered a British and Indian encampment in the opposite bottom, which was an open prairie. Presently a British officer with a few Indians came over the river on the Wood County side and when they had advanced some distance from their boat, Captain Hinkston fired upon them, and took the officer prisoner, evidently just at the foot of the Maumee Rapids. He was a captain by the name of Clarke. Having returned with him to General Tupper's camp, Clarke informed the general that there were three or four hundred Indians and about seventy-five British at the Rapids, where they had come to carry off the corn, of which a considerable quantity still remained. General Tupper immediately prepared a strong detachment consisting of six hundred and fifty men, who volunteered to go against the enemy. He notified General Winchester of the intended movement, and marched on the 10th of November, 1812, from Fort M'Arthur, with a light six pounder and with five days' provisions, in the 532 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY knapsacks of his men. The badness of the road obliged him to leave the six pounder at Hull's pack-saddle block-house (probably old Fort Necessity), and when he arrived at Portage River, twenty miles from the Rapids (just south of now Portage, Wood County), he sent his spies in advance to reconnoitre. They met him in the evening, five miles on their return, with information that the enemy remained in the same position near the foot of the Rapids (Maumee, O.). The detachment was now halted till near sunset, to avoid being discovered by the allies, (British and Indians) and then marched to a ford about two and a half miles above them at Turkey Foot rock. Here spies were again sent to ascertain their precise situation, who returned about nine o'clock, with information that they were encamped in close order, and employed in singing and dancing. Orders were now given to cross the river, with a view to attack them at the dawn of day. Colonel Stafford commanded a battalion on the left flank in single files; Colonel Miller's regiment composed the right; and Major Galloway commanded a battalion in reserve. In this order they intended to cross the river and surround the enemy's camp. Special instructions were given to each officer and every soldier who did not feel willing to cross, that he had permission to shift for himself. The men were much fatigued and the weather was very cold. General Tupper pushed into the water. and crossed at the head of the first section. The others attempted to cross in double files, with their arms locked together, and when nearly two hundred had gone over, the greater part of one section were washed off their feet and lost their guns. The water was waist deep and ran very swift. The few horses belonging to the detach-ment were sent immediately to save the men, and happily suc-ceeded in getting out the whole. An attempt was next made to cross on horses, but they being weak were also washed down and the riders plunged into, the current. Finding it impracticable to get the detachment over at this place, those who had succeeded recrossed, and the whole retired to the woods and encamped within the bounds of now Wood County. Concerning the capture of this British officer not far above where is now Perrysburg., General Tupper made the following report to Governor Meigs at Chillicothe : "Camp, near McArthur's Blockhouse November 19, 1812. "Sir :—I have for some time thought a prisoner from near the Maumee Rapids would at this time be of much service, and highly TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 533 acceptable to General Harrison. For this purpose I ordered Captain Hinkston to the Rapids, with his company of spies, with orders to take a prisoner if possible. He has just returned and brought in with him Capt. A. Clarke, a British subject, who resides two miles above Malden, and was out with a party of about five hundred Indians and fifty British, with two gunboats, six bateaux and one small schooner at the foot of the Rapids (between Maumee and Perrysburg—Editor) to gather in and carry over to Malden the corn. Captain Clarke had just arrived with the van of the detachment. The vessels and boats had not yet been anchored when the spies surprised him as he advanced a few rods from the shore to reconnoitre, and brought him off undiscovered; and this from a number of Indians, who were killing hogs and beginning to gather corn. At the same time, several of Captain Hinkston's spies lay concealed on the bank within five rods of the place where some of the first boats were landing. Captain Hinkston has conducted this business with great skill and address. Captain Clarke was taken prisoner on the 7th instant, a little before sunsetting. "I am, Very Respectfully, "Your Excellency's Most Obedient Servant, "EDWARD M. TUPPER. "Brigadier Gen. Ohio Quota." It was the result of the information obtained from Clarke that caused Tupper's march to the Maumee down Hull's Trail. Next morning, the 14th, after he had failed to cross the river and engage the enemy General Tupper dispatched an express up the Maumee trail to General Winchester at Defiance, stating his situation and suggesting the propriety of a reinforcement, if one had not already been sent; at the same time remarking that he could not remain there longer than another day unless he could receive a supply of provisions. He then sent his spies down the river in view of the enemy, with a design to decoy them over, but the Indians were not to be caught in this way. Only a few crossed and they would not venture far on shore, which was open ground for half a mile. Failing in this project, the general marched the whole of his troops down in the woods and showed the heads of his columns in the open ground. This alarmed the enemy considerably. The squaws ran to the woods and the British ran to their boats and escaped. The Indians more brave than their allies, paraded and fired across the river, 19-VOL. 1 534 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY but without effect. The general then fell back, in hopes to entice them over, but he could neither induce them to cross nor scare them off like the British, without a fight. At last he marched back towards his camp. Some Indians were seen in the meantime to mount their horses and ride up the river, and some of Tupper's men imprudently pursued a gang of hogs about half a mile from the main body, while some others went into an adjoining corn field to gather corn. The mounted Indians, having crossed the river to the present Wood County side, came upon the latter party and killed four of them, and then boldly charged on the left flank, but were repulsed. A large body of the Indians at the same time crossed opposite the head of the column, where they were met by Major Bentley's battalion, and driven back with some loss. A noted chief by the name of Split-Log was their commander. Late in the evening Tupper's detachment retreated, leaving accidentally in the camp a sick man who was unable to march, and who fell a prey to the tomahawk and scalping knife. On the next morning, the 15th, the express arrived at Winchester's camp, with Tupper's request for a reinforcement. A detachment of 450 men had already been organized, and marched that morning under the command of Colonel Lewis, to whom the information in Tupper's despatch was immediately forwarded, The colonel proceeded all day in a forced march down the north side of the Maumee and in the night dispatched Ensign Tod, quartermaster, to the advance of the left wing accompanied by five guides with instructions to proceed to General Tupper on the other side of the river, and agree on some point for a junction of the detachments on the north side early in the morning, with a view to attack the Indians in their encampment. At 12 o'clock in the night, Tod reached Tupper's camp on the Wood County side of the river and found that it had been abandoned, apparently with much precipitation, as the fires were extinct and two men were lying there tomahawked and scalped. He recrossed the river immediately and joined Colonel Lewis before day, who then retreated to Winchester's camp, under the impres-sion that Tupper had been defeated. This movement to the Rapids by Tupper was sufficiently bold and hazardous for a spirited soldier, but his conduct after his failure in attempting to cross the river is not to be commended. He should doubtless have retreated up the river to a place where he could cross, and have waited there for the reinforcement under Lewis. After sending for that reinforcement, he was TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 535 surely blamable in breaking up his camp and retreating, without communicating to it any intelligence of such a movement. His men, however, behaved well, having acted bravely in every instance except in retreating; having performed a severe march, 160 miles in all, on a road which was then a continued swamp the whole way. Though but little execution was done on this excursion, it frightened off the British without the corn they had come for, and alarmed the Indians sufficiently to induce them to fall back to the river Raisin. Shortly after this expedition by General Tupper to the Maumee Rapids, a tragical adventure occurred in the left wing of the army, which merits to be minutely recorded. Capt. James Logan, the Shawanoe chief, by the orders of General Harrison, proceeded with a small party of his tribe to reconnoitre in the direction of the Rapids. He met with a superior force of the enemy near that place, by which he was so closely pursued that his men were obliged to disperse for safety in their retreat. Logan, with two of his companions, Captain John and Bright Horn, arrived at General Winchester's camp, Defiance, where he faithfully reported the incidents of the excursion. But there were certain persons in the army who suspected his fidelity, and reproached him with being friendly, and with communicating intelligence, to the enemy. The noble spirit of Logan could not endure the ungenerous charge. With the sensibility of a genuine soldier, he felt that his honor and fidelity should not only be pure and firm, but unsuspected. He did not, however, demand a court of inquiry. Following the natural dictates of a bold and generous spirit, he determined to prove by unequivocal deeds of valor and fidelity, that he was calumniated by his accusers. On the 22nd of November he proceeded the second time, accompanied only by the two persons named above, firmly resolved either to bring in a prisoner or a scalp, or to perish himself in the attempt. When he had gone about ten miles down the north side of the Maumee, he met with a British officer, the eldest son of Colonel Elliott, accompanied by five Indians. As the party was too strong for him, and he had no chance to escape, four of them being on horseback, he approached them under the disguise of friendship for the British. He advanced with confident boldness, and a friendly deportment, but unfortunately one of them was Winemac, a celebrated Pottawatomie chief, to whom the person and character of Captain Logan were perfectly well known. He persisted, however, in his first determination and told them he was going to the Rapids to 536 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY give information to the British. After conversing some time he proceeded on his way and Winemac with all his companions turned and went with him. As they traveled on together, Winemac and his party closely watched the others, and when they had proceeded about eight miles, he proposed to the British officer to seize them and tie them. The officer replied that they were completely in his power; that if they attempted to run they would be shot; or failing in that, the horses could easily run them down, The consultation was overheard by Logan ; he had previously intended to go on peaceably till night, then make his escape, but he now formed the bold design of extricating himself by a combat with double his number. Having signified his resolution to his men, he commenced the attack by shooting down Winemac himself. The action lasted till they had fired three rounds apiece, during which time Logan and his brave companions drove the enemy some distance and separated them from their horses. By the first fire both Wine-mac and Elliott fell ; by the second a young Ottawa chief lost his life; and another of the enemy was mortally wounded about the conclusion of the combat, at which time Logan himself, as he was stooping down, received a ball just below the breastbone; it ranged downwards and lodged under the skin on his back. In the meantime Bright Horn was also wounded by a ball which passed through his thigh. As soon. as Logan was shot, he ordered a retreat; himself and Bright Horn wounded as they were, jumped on the horses of the enemy and rode to Winchester's Camp, Defiance, a distance of twenty miles, in five hours. Captain John, taking the scalp of the Ottawa chief, also retreated in safety and arrived at the camp next morning. Logan had now rescued his character as a brave and faithful soldier from the obloquy which had unjustly been thrown upon him. But he preserved his honor, at the expense of the next best gift of Heaven—his life. His wound proved mortal. lie lived two days in agony, which he bore with uncommon fortitude, and died with the utmost composure and resignation. "More firmness and consummate bravery has seldon appeared on the military theatre," said Winchester, in his letter to the commanding general. "He was buried with all the honors due to his rank, and with sorrow as sincerely and generally displayed, as I ever witnessed," says Major Hardin, in a letter to Governor Shelby. Captain Logan had been taken prisoner by General L TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 537 of Kentucky, in the year of 1786, when he was a youth. The general on parting with him had given him his name, which he retained to the end of his life. Before the treaty of Greenville, he had distinguished himself as a warrior, though still very young. His mother was a sister of the celebrated Tecumseh and the Prophet. The summer preceding his death he stated that he had talked one whole night with Tecumseh, and endeavored to persuade him to remain at peace, while Tecumseh' on the contrary endeavored to engage him in the war on the side of the British. His wife, when she was young, had also been taken prisoner by Colonel Hardin in 1789, and had remained in the family till the treaty of Greenville. In the army he had formed an attachment for Major Hardin, the son of the colonel, and son-in-law of General Logan, and now requested him to see that the money due for his services was faithfully paid to his family. Before he expired Logan also requested that his family might be removed immediately to Kentucky and his children educated and brought up in the manner of the white people. He observed that he had killed a great chief, that the hostile Indians knew where his family lived, and that when he was gone, a few base fellows might creep up and destroy them. The troops of the left wing under General Winchester were doomed to wage an inglorious war with the elements, "the power and majesty of storms, mud, mire, water, and almost impassable swamps," in preparation for their expedition against Malden. Continuing, as related by McAfee they had left the greater part of their clothing in the first instance at Piqua, when marching to the relief of Fort Wayne, and suffered considerably before they received it again. But as the winter came, an additional supply of winter clothing became necessary. The government had ordered large supplies of this kind, but there was in this stage of the war an immense difference between the ordering of supplies and delivering them on the frontiers. General Harrison and Governor Shelby had also appealed to the patriotism of the people of Kentucky for voluntary contributions, and a considerable quantity of clothing was in this way collected under the superintendence of Shelby. The ladies of Kentucky were not wanting in such patriotic services as they had it in their power to render. Of the clothing thus collected, however, but very little reached the army before Christmas, and much of it was entirely lost, owing to the misconduct of wagoners and wagonmasters, and the insuperable difficulties of transportation. 538 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY Soon after Fort Winchester was finished, the left wing moved over the river (Maumee) and encamped on the north bank, for the convenience of firewood. The situation being wet and dis agreeable, they presently moved down to a second, and then to a third camp, six miles below the Auglaize. About the first of November they became extremely sickly. The typhus fever raged with violence, so that three or four would sometimes die in one day. Upwards of 300 were daily on the sick list, and so discouraging was the prospect of advancing, that about the first of December they were ordered to build huts for their accommodation. Many were so entirely destitute of shoes and other clothing that they must have frozen, if they had been obliged to march any distance. And sometimes the whole army for many days would be entirely without flour. All these privations were caused in a great measure by the difficulties of transportation. The roads were bad beyond description; none but those who had actually seen the state of the country could have formed a correct estimate of the difficulties to be encountered. The road from Loramie's block-house to the St. Marys, and thence to Defiance, was one continued swamp, knee-deep to the packhorses and up to the hubs of the wagons. It was found impossible in some instances to get even the empty wagons along, and many were left sticking in the mire and ravines, the wagoners being glad to get off with the horses alive. Sometimes the quartermaster, taking advantage of a temporary freeze, would send off a convoy of provisions, which would be swamped by a thaw before it reached its destination. These natural difficulties were also increased by a great deficiency of funds, and inadequacy of the other resources which were requisite in the quartermaster's department. The only persons who could be procured to act as pack horse drivers, were generally the most worthless creatures in society, who took care neither of the horses nor the goods with which they were entrusted. The horses, of course, were soon broken down, and many of the packs lost. The teams hired to haul were also commonly valued so high on coming into service, that the owners were willing to drive them to deviltry and death, with a view of getting the price. In addition to this, no bills of lading were used, or accounts kept with the wagoners. Consequently each one had an opportunity to plunder the public without much risk of detection. Little wonder then, with such difficulties and the means of surmounting them, that supplies TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 539 were not more rapidly accumulated at the various places of deposit. The following account will exhibit the difficulties of water transportation. About the first of December, Major Bodley, an enterprising officer, who was quartermaster of the Kentucky troops, made an attempt to send nearly 200 barrels of flour down the St. Marys in pirogues to Winchester's camp below Defiance. Previous to this time the water had rarely been high enough to venture on a voyage in those small streams. The flour was shipped in fifteen or twenty pirogues and canoes guarded by some twenty troopers. They descended the river and arrived about a week afterwards at Shane's crossing (Rockford) , upwards of one hundred miles by water, but only twenty by land from the place where they started. The river was so narrow, crooked, full of logs, and trees overhanging the banks that it was with great difficulty they could make any progress. And now in one freezing night they were completely icebound. Lieutenant Cardwell waded back through the ice and swamps to Fort Barbee, with intelligence of their situation. Major Bodley returned with him to the flour and offered the men extra wages to cut through the ice and push forward ; but having gained only one mile in two day's labor, the project was abandoned, and a guard left with the flour. A few days before Christmas a temporary thaw took place, which enabled them with much difficulty and suffering to reach within a few miles of Fort Wayne, where they were again frozen up. They now abandoned the voyage and made sleds on which the men hauled the flour to the fort and left it there. In the meantime General Winchester's left wing was suffering the greatest privations. Trusting to this attempt to convey supplies by water, the exertions by land were relaxed. From the 10th to the 22nd of December the camp was without flour, and for some time before they had only half rations. Poor beef and hickory roots were their whole subsistence. At the same time fevers and other diseases raged in almost every tent, in which the sick were exposed not only to the hunger, but to the inclemency of the season. The necessary vigilance of the general induced him to send out reconnoitering parties very frequently, which still further exposed the men. Yet they disdained to murmur, or to utter a thought derogatory to the honor of their country. About the first of this month General Harrison had thought his supplies in such a state of forwardness that he could very soon concentrate 540 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY his forces at the Maumee Rapids; and had instructed General Winchester to proceed to that place as soon as he had provisions for a few weeks on hand. But in the circumstances above described, his condition was very different from that which would authorize him to advance. The other divisions of the army had not been pushed out so far as the left wing, and, of course, had not to encounter such great privations. Their sufferings, however, were sufficiently great, and the difficulties of transportation with them may be understood from the details given in relation to the left wing. General Harrison in a letter dated December 12th, 1812, at Delaware, and addressed to the War Department, said that while every exertion had been made and every engine put in motion to procure and forward supplies for the army to the advance posts, the difficulties were almost insurmountable. The greatest obstacle was forage which had to be brought all the way from Chillicothe and the loss of horses was almost beyond belief. "Five teams which arrived on December 10th at (Upper) Sandusky with artillery are entirely worn down, and two trips from McArthur's block-house (near now Kenton) our nearest deposit to the Maumee Rapids, will completely destroy a brigade of packhorses." But the General believed that a small part of the great expense being incurred in attempting the early capture of Malden and the gaining of Detroit for political reasons, could it be "devoted towards obtaining the command of Lake Erie" the following April and May, would bring the downfall of the British at Detroit, Malden and Mackinac in rapid succession. Before the letter written by General Harrison (just quoted from) had been received at the War Department, James Monroe had become the acting secretary of war upon the resignation of Eustice and had written a long letter to General Harrison on the military situation of the. Northwest. They arrived at an accord as to what should be done. Harrison was left to prosecute the campaign in pursuance to his own views and the govern. ment determined finally to adopt the most vigorous measures to obtain the command of Lake Erie the following season. Positive instructions were given to the commander on two points alone. In the event of his entering Canada, he was ordered to pledge the government to the inhabitants no further than a promise of protection to their lives, liberty and property. He was also instructed not to make any transitory acquisitions of territory, or to wrest from the British any of their possessions TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 541 with temporary views only, but to advance prepared to hold all the ground gained. Thorough preparation rather than haste was the policy adopted. Early in December a detachment of Perkins' brigade arrived at Lower Sandusky and repaired the old stockade there which had been built to protect a government Indian supply store long established there, later Fort Stephenson. Soon after the whole of Perkins' brigade arrived at that post. On the 10th of December a battalion of Pennsylvania troops reached Upper Sandusky with twenty-one pieces of artillery which had been brought from Pittsburgh. About the 20th General Harrison established himself at the same place. But hearing from Colonel Campbell of the regulars of the serious situation at Mississiniway, he went to Chillicothe to plan with Governor Meigs another expedition to more effectually subdue the Indians in that western quarter. Voluminous correspondence with the War Department shows the importance of the Lower Maumee Rapids, in the plans Harrison had made for coming operations, and future developments show that it was the key to the whole Northwest as the campaign progressed. Concerning his ideas, General Harrison wrote the War Department on January 4, 1813, among other things that "In order to take advantage of every situation in our favor, boats and pirogues were prepared in considerable numbers on the Auglaize and St. Marys, in the hope that when the land transportation could not be used, we might by the means of these rivers, take on large supplies to the Rapids of the Miami (Maumee). An effort was also made to procure flour from Presque Isle (Erie, Pa.) by coasting the lake with small boats. These measures were calculated on as collateral aids only. The more sure one of providing a large number of pack horses and ox teams was resorted to. * * * Considering the Miami (Maumee) Rapids as the first point of destination, provisions were ordered to be accumulated along a concave base, extending from St. Marys on the left, to the mouth of the Huron (River) and afterwards Lower Sandusky (Fremont) on the right. From this base the Rapids could be approached by three routes or lines of operation, two of which were pretty effectually secured by the posts which were established and the positions taken upon the third. St. Marys, McArthur's block-house and Upper Sandusky were selected as principal deposits. The troops, except those with General Winchester, were kept within the bounds of the local contractors, that they might not consume the provisions 542 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY procured by the United States commissaries, and which were intended to form the grand deposit at the Miami (Maumee rapids. * * * My plan of operations has been, and now is, to occupy the Miami Rapids, and deposit there as much provisions as possible, to move from thence with a choice detachment of the army, and with as much provision, artillery and ammunition as the means of transportation will allow—make a demonstration towards Detroit and by a sudden passage of the strait upon the ice, an actual investure of Malden." The general further believed he would need a large force, as British troops that had been released in the East by successes there, might in all probability be encountered at Malden; and again strength needed to be shown amongst the cautious and wavering Indians. In one letter he stated that it was his desire to assemble from 4,500 to 5,000 men at the Maumee Rapids, from which to make his advance against the British, but the number was always perhaps fifty per cent. less than hoped for. Another of Harrison's letters in early January, 1813, says: "General Winchester is I hope now or will be in a day or two at the Rapids. Provisions in large quantities are progressing thither. I calculate on being there myself by the 20th with troops which are intended for the march upon Malden." Harrison qualified his expectations with "in the event of occurrences which may induce a suspension of operations beyond the Rapids" which "occurrences" took place as will be ,seen, hot not in the form at all anticipated. On the subject of obtaining the command of Lake Erie, Harrison wrote : "I have no means of estimating correctly the cost of a naval armament, capable of effecting this object, but from my knowledge of the expense of transporting supplies through a swampy wilderness, I do believe that the expense which will be incurred in six weeks in the spring, in an attempt to transport the provisions for the army along the road leading from the Rapids to Detroit, would build and equip the vessels for this purpose." The next pages will take up the story of Winchester's advance down the Maumee and the disaster following at the River Raisin. CHAPTER XLII WINCHESTER'S EXPEDITION TO RIVER RAISIN HIS VARIOUS CAMPS ON THE MAUMEE-FORTIFIES HIS POSITION ABOVE WAYNE'S BATTLE GROUND-ORDERS ADVANCE TO FRENCHTOWNSUCCESS OF COLONEL LEWIS-WINCHESTER MARCHES TO JOIN LEWIS -WINCHESTER'S DEFEAT AND CAPTURE-TERRIBLE MASSACRE OF HIS TROOPS-HARRISON'S ARRIVAL AT MAUMEE TOO LATE TO PREVENT WINCHESTER'S ADVANCE-CAUSE OF THE DISASTER. On his arrival at Upper Sandusky about December 18th, 1812, General Harrison had expected to be met by an express from General Winchester with information of the latter's advance to the Maumee Rapids as indicated in Harrison's letter to the War Department. As no such messenger arrived, he soon thereafter dispatched Ensign C. S. Tod, division judge advocate of the Kentucky troops to Winchester's camp on the Maumee below Defiance. With Tod on his journey were two prominent men of the Michigan Territory and three Wyandot Indians. The party proceeded directly across the country and "performed the journey with a degree of secrecy and dispatch highly honorable to their enterprise and skill, having completely eluded all the scouts of the British and Indians." This would probably take them from Upper Sandusky to near where is now Findlay, then Leipsic on the high ridges and to the Maumee below Defiance some six miles. Tod was instructed to communicate to General Winchester the following plans from the Commander-in-Chief : "That as soon as he had accumulated provisions for twenty days, he was authorized to advance to the Rapids, where he was to commence the building of huts to induce the enemy to believe that he was going into winter quarters; that he was to construct sleds for the main expedition against Malden, but to impress it on the minds of his men that they were for transporting provisions from the interior; that the different lines of the army would be concentrated at that place, and a choice detachment from the whole would then be marched rapidly on Malden; that in the meantime he was to occupy the Rapids for the purpose of secur- - 543 - 544 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY ing the provisions and stores forwarded from the other wings of the army." Repeating Winchester's movements somewhat, while at Defiance General Harrison "suggested" to General Winchester that two regiments of infantry be sent back to near the base of food and clothing supplies, and that General Tupper with the nine hundred and sixty cavalry be sent down the Maumee below old Fort Miami to disperse the Indians found, save the crops there left by the fleeing settlers and return to Fort Barbee by way of the Blanchard River Ottawa towns. There were several excuses why Tupper did not make the expedition, two being the dissatisfaction of some of the Kentucky troops with Tupper and the unfriendly relations between Winchester and Tupper. As has been noted, after the disorganized situation had somewhat changed and Tupper had been relieved of some of his troops by Winchester, instead of leading his command down the Maumee River and then to St. Marys as Winchester had ordered, he went direct to Fort McArthur by way of the Ottawa towns (Ottawa) and proceeded from there with his Maumee Rapids expedition already described. It was at this time that Winchester preferred charges of insubordination against Tupper, but his trial did not take place until after Winchester's defeat at the River Raisin, when the witnesses against him were British captives and Tupper was acquitted. Winchester's first camp down the Maumee after Fort Winchester had been completed and garrisoned, and he had started on his expedition, was on the north side of the river in now section 19th Richland township, Defiance County; distance below old Fort Defiance, one and a half miles. The situation being too low and wet he moved his forces down the river two miles farther on higher ground, now in the north part of section 21 the same township. This camp having too much wind exposure, camp number three still two miles farther down stream in present sections 22 and 23 Richland township, was selected where the troops remained some time. Suffering and hunger at these camps caused many breaches of discipline. Straggling soldiers wandered from camp against orders in search of fruit and for game hunting. An attempted deserter on being apprehended was sentenced to "ride the wooden horse before the whole army." This punishment consisted in the culprit being compelled to mount astride a bent sapling upon which he was subjected to a series of tossings, joltings and sway- TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 545 ings, greatly to his humility and degradation. James Givens, private in Capt. George Croghan's company, for being found apparently asleep and sitting down at his post with his gun in his hands, on the night of October 25, 1812, was tried and found guilty and was sentenced to "receive ten cobs on his bare posterior well laid on with a paddle four inches wide and one-half an inch thick, bored full of holes." Thomas Clark for altering his uniform without leave was "reprimanded while on parade." Finally, receiving a moderate supply of provisions and clothing on December 22nd, Winchester's forces at camp number three made active preparations to proceed. As McAfee continues: The river being frozen up, which rendered their water craft useless, they were obliged to take their baggage on sleds, many of which had to be hauled by the men. Having provided for the sick, and assigned guards to attend and protect them, the march for the Rapids was commenced on the 30th of December. At the same time, Mr. Leslie Combs, a young man of intelligence and enterprise from Kentucky, who had joined the army as a volunteer on its march from Fort Wayne to Fort Defiance, accompanied by Mr. A. Ruddle as a guide, was sent with dispatches to inform the Commander-in-Chief of this movement in order that provisions and reinforcements might be forwarded as soon as possible. General Winchester expected to be met by these at the Rapids by the 12th of January. This, however, was prevented by an immense fall of snow, which, as Mr. Combs had to traverse on foot a pathless wilderness of more than one hundred miles in extent, required four or five days longer in reaching even the first point of destination (Fort M'Arthur) than would otherwise have been necessary to perform the whole route. The supplies they had already received, and the prospects now before them afforded some comfort and encouragement to the troops; yet their appearance and their real efficiency were still very unpromising. Their progress was slow from the first, and was much retarded after a few days by the snow. While on this march General Winchester received another dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief, recommending him to abandon the movement to the Rapids and fall back with the greater part of his force to Fort Jennings. This advice was given in consequence of the intelligence received from Colonel Campbell at Mississiniway, respecting the force of Tecumseh on the Wabash. General Harrison was apprehensive that if the left wing advanced so far as the Rapids, Tecumseh would be able to attack and destroy all the provisions left on its line of 546 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY operations in the rear. But as Winchester had already commenced his march, he did not think himself required by this advice to discontinue it and return. Harrison went immediately himself into the settlements of Ohio, to arrange with Governor Meigs the means of sending another mounted expedition against the Indians under Tecumseh, at the principal town on the Mississiniway River. On the 10th of January, 1813, General Winchester arrived with his army at the Rapids, having previously sent forward a strong detachment of 670 men under General Payne, to attack a body of Indians which General Harrison had been informed was lying in an old fortification at Swan Creek (Evidently Fort Industry—Editor), a few miles farther down the river. The detachment went several miles below the old British fort at the foot of the Rapids (Fort Miami), and having sent their spies to Swan Creek, where they could discover no appearance of Indians, the whole returned again to the position which the army was intended to occupy. On the north bank of the river above Wayne's battle ground, and directly opposite the point where Hull's road struck the Maumee, General Winchester established and fortified his camp, on a handsome eminence of an oval form covered with timber and surrounded with prairies (On the high ground above Turkey Foot Rock—Editor). On the day of his arrival, a recent Indian camp was discovered about half a mile from this position. Captain Williams was immediately dispatched with twenty-five men, to pursue the Indians who had left it. He soon overtook and routed them, having exchanged a few shots, by which some were wounded on both sides. On the 11th of January a dispatch was sent to apprise General Harrison of the arrival and situation of the army at the Rapids; but it was sent by the persons who were taking in the starved and worn-out pack horses to General Tupper's camp at Fort M'Arthur, a place as distant from the Rapids as the headquarters of the general, and from which it must then pass through a swampy and pathless wilderness of forty miles to Upper Sandusky, where it did not arrive before Harrison had left that place, and was ultimately received by him at the Rapids where it started. The time of the Kentucky troops would expire in February, and General Harrison had requested General Winchester to endeavor to raise a regiment among them to serve six months TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 547 longer; and at the same time had suggested that it would be imprudent to employ them on any other condition in the expedition against Malden. General Winchester now advised him by a letter sent on the 12th to Lower Sandusky, that no reliance could be placed on retaining any of them in service after their time had expired. This communication was simply a note re-specting the above business, and had only this direction upon it: "His excellency, General William H. Harrison." Of course the writer did not intend that it should have a speedy passage, and inform the general of his arrival at the Rapids; nor did it answer that purpose, as it was delayed several days on its way to headquarters. On the letter sent by the pack horse conveyance of fifteen miles a day, was the following endorsement in Winchester's own hand writing: "General Tupper will please to forward this letter by ex-press.—J. Winchester." From all of which it is evident that he relied on the pack horse communication alone, to apprise General Harrison that he had reached the Rapids, although the general had directed him to communicate the intelligence of that event as quick as practicable. ' * * A large store house was now built within the encampment at the Maumee Rapids, to secure the provisions and baggage. A considerable quantity of corn was also gathered in the fields, and apparatus for pounding and sifting it being made, it supplied the troops with very wholesome bread. On the evening of the 13th, two Frenchmen arrived from the River Raisin with information that the Indians routed by Captain Williams had passed that place and gone on to Malden, with intelligence of the advance of our army. They stated that the Indians threatened to kill the inhabitants and burn their town and begged for protection from the American arms. They brought a dispatch from Mr. Day, a citizen who was friendly to our cause, and who stated that the British were seizing all suspected persons at the River Raisin and confining them in Mal-den prison, and that they were preparing to carry off all the pro-visions of every description. On the 14th another messenger arrived ; and on the evening of the 16th two more came in; they all confirmed the accounts brought in by the first express and solicited protection, as they were afraid that the people would be massacred and the town burnt by the Indians whenever our army began to advance upon them. They stated the present 548 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY force of the enemy to be two companies of Canadians and about 200 Indians, but that more Indians might be expected to assemble. The greatest ardor and anxiety now prevailed in the army to advance in force sufficient to defeat the enemy at that place. A council of officers was called by the general, a majority of whom were decidedly in favor of sending a strong detachment. Colonel Allen supported that side of the question with much ardor. General Winchester agreed to the opinion of the majority, and on the morning of the 17th detached Colonel Lewis with 550 men to the River Raisin. A few hours afterwards he was followed by Colonel Allen with 110 more, who came up with Lewis late in the evening where he had encamped at Presque Isle (mouth of the Maumee). Early in the morning of the same day, General Winchester prepared a dispatch to inform Harrison of this movement. He stated that his principal object was to prevent the flour and grain from being carried off by the enemy; that if he got possession of Frenchtown he intended to hold it; and that of course a cooperating reinforcement from the right wing might be necessary. Before the express had started with this letter, information was received from Colonel Lewis at Presque Isle, a distance of twenty miles in advance, that there were 400 Indians at the River Raisin, and that Col. Matthew Elliott was expected from Malden with a detachment destined to attack the camp at the Rapids. This intelligence was also inserted in the letter to Harrison, which was then dispatched by the way of Lower Sandusky. Colonel Lewis remained all night at Presque Isle and in consequence of the information noticed above, which he received by express from the River Raisin, he set out very early in the morning, intending if possible to anticipate Colonel Elliott at French-town. That village was in the middle between Presque Isle and Malden, the distance from each being eighteen miles. The greater part of his march was on the ice of the Maumee Bay and the border of Lake Erie. When he had arrived within six miles of the town, he was discovered by some Indians who hastened to give the alarm to the main body of the enemy. Before the detachment left the border of the lake, a halt was called to take some refreshment. Having resumed the march, a piece of timbered land was passed, and as the troops proceeded in the open plain they were formed in three lines, each corps being in its proper place for action. TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 549 When they arrived within a quarter of a mile of the village and discovered the enemy in motion, the line of battle was formed in the expectation of receiving an attack; but it was soon evident that the enemy did not intend fighting in the open field. The detachment then broke off by the right of companies and marched under the fire of the enemy's cannon till they arrived at the river, where the small arms began to play upon them. The line of battle was then formed again on the bank of the river and the long roll beat as the signal for a general charge, which was immediately executed with much firmness and intrepidity. The enemy were posted among the houses, and the picketting of the gardens on the north side of the river. Majors Graves and Madison were ordered to dislodge them, which they effected with great gallantry, advancing at the heads of their battalions under a heavy shower of balls. The enemy, routed and retreating from this place, were next met by Colonel Allen at some distance on the right, who pursued them about half a mile to the woods. Here they made a stand again with their howitzer and small arms, covered by some houses and a chain of fences, with a brushy wood full of fallen timber in their rear. Majors Graves and Madison were now ordered with their battalions to possess themselves of the wood on the left and move rapidly on the main body of the enemy, where they were contending with Colonel Allen. These orders were promptly executed; and as soon as they had commenced their fire Colonel Allen also advanced on the enemy, who were soon compelled to retire into the woods, into which they were closely pursued. The contest with Allen's command now became very warm, as the enemy concentrated all their forces on the right, with the intention of forcing his line. They were, however, kept constantly on the retreat, though slowly, as our men were too much exhausted to rush upon them with rapidity. In this manner they were driven to the distance of two miles, every foot of the way under a continual charge. The action commenced at 3 :00 o'clock, and the pursuit was continued till dark, when the detachment returned in good order and encamped in the town. In this warmly contested action every officer and soldier did his duty. There was not a solitary instance of delinquency. The troops amply supported "the double character of Americans and Kentuckians." The American loss was twelve killed and fifty-five wounded.