Exposed Situation of the Frontier - 125 understanding with Great Britain; that the attack will be made by the savages, whatever may be the result of our pending negotiations with England. They state further, that the Indians are amply supplied with arms, ammunition, blankets, &c., to enable them to prosecute war with vigor. The mode of attack is not so fully communicated. From some hints which have fallen, it is believed a force will have in charge to waylay the roads leading to the Ohio, with a view of interrupting and cutting off re-inforcements and supplies. Should this plan be adopted and adhered to for a few months, this post would be in great danger. We have no competent force in this quarter to force a communication. Having made the above remarks on this subject, considered simply in relation to the Indians, I wish to draw your attention to this question in the event a war with England should take place. The present military force stationed at Amherstburg, unaided by Indian auxiliaries, is not such as to excite apprehensions for the safety of Detroit. But, sir, it has heretofore been the policy of Great Britain, in her wars in America, to call upon the savages for aid. And When the immense sums of money that government expends annually to retain them in her interest is considered, no reasonable doubts can be entertained of her future policy in case of war with the United States. The fact is notorious, and well attested here by every person who has lately visited Amherstburg, that every possible exertion is making to render that fortress secure and tenable, and also to retain command of the upper lakes. The govgovgovernmenteady a large armed vessel upon Lake Erie, equipped and fully manned, superior to any naval force the United States can bring against it. Not content with this force, they are actually employed in building a second vessel of equal or superior force, which will be completed and manned at the first opening of navigation. By means of this force, all communication by water will be cut off between our ports. While one is stationed upon Lake Erie, the other will be ordered to Lake Huron to aid in the reduction of Michilimackinac and Chicago. In addition to the naval force, it is reported and believed by many that the British will seize upon and erect works at the mouth of the Detroit River, at or near what is called Big Creek, on the United States territory—a place strong by nature, and well situated to aid the navy in cutting off all supplies designed either by land or water for this garrison. It is believed that the point last mentioned will be occupied previous to a declaration of war, and the moment it is thought to be unavoidable. Several officers of distinction have lately visited Amherstburg. In their number is included an engineer and barrack-master ; also a Col. St. George. They report that the British are greatly enlarging their works, building extensive barracks, and apparently under an expectation of a much larger force than has ever been stationed in the upper country. From the various steps and movements of that government, it is to me evident that they will make a firm and 126 - Exposed Situation of the Frontier formidable stand in this upper country, contrary from what appears to be a prevailing sentiment in Congress. Great calculations are made from the aid which they expect to derive from the Indians. Should Detroit fall, it is evident it would cost the United States much blood and treasure to regain what they will have lost. By it an extensive wilderness will be thrown between the upper province and the physical force of the Western States. Our whole line of frontier will be ravaged and kept in a state of alarm. These are consequences calculated upon by the British government, and, in my opinion, on correct principles. It is, however, in the power of our government to .defeat their views, by marching six or eight hundred militia or volunteers from the State of Ohio or Kentucky before the lakes break up. If troops are not at Detroit before May or June, the opportunity and season of saving us will be lost. We shall be sacrificed with the interest of the public. I hope, sir, you will receive the remarks contained in this letter as intended by the writer. It has been hastily written, and is full of defects. The object I had in view was frankly to disclose my opinion of our dangerous situation. I sincerely wish you to have an interview with the Secretary of War. Impress him with the necessity of succor for this place. A few days delay may lose the place to the United States. Should you discover any part of my letter that can give umbrage, suppress it. If it contains any remarks that you think can be of service, you are at liberty to make use of them. Will you inform me if we may expect assistance shortly ? I am, dear sir, Your most obedient servant,  SOL. SIBLEY. Governor Hull had communicated similar warnings to the War Department, and had recommended the adoption of a like policy; and the same measures were also urged by General Armstrong, in a private letter of January 2d, 1812 ; yet the government proposed to use no other than military means, and hoped, by the presence of two thousand soldiers, to effect the capture or destruction of the British fleet. Nay, so blind was the War Department, that it refused to increase the number of troops to three thousand, although, informed by Governor Hull that that was the least number from which success could be hoped. When, therefore, Governor, now General Hull, (to whom, in consideration of his revolutiona services, and his supposed knowledge of the country and the native,. the command of the army destined for the conquest of the Canadas had been confided,) commenced his march from Dayton on the 1st of June, it was with means which he himself regarded as utterl inadequate to the object aimed at—a fact which, in some degree, mitigates his vacillating, nerveless conduct. Regarding the appoint- General Hull's Movements - 127 anent of General Hull, John Johnston, who, in the early part of the year 1812, was transferred from the agency at Fort Wayne to a new agency at Piqua, having in charge all the Indians of Ohio, with the Delawares, of Indiana, and who was in Washington at the time Congress was discussing the question of a declaration of war, communicated in 1846 to Gist's Miscellany the following : " Whilst at Washington, I learned that Hull was an applicant for the command of the Northwestern Army. Governor Worthington was then in the Senate. I took the liberty of warning him against the appointment. The people of the country where he was to operate had no confidence in him ; the Indians despised him ; he was too old, broken down in body and mind, to conduct the multifarious operations of such a command. The nomination was made, objected to, referred to a committee, reported on favorably, and confirmed. On the -very same day he passed the Senate, the poor, weak, vain old man was seen in full dress uniform, parading the streets 'of Washington, making calls." Through the whole month of June, General Hull and his troops toiled toward the Maumee country, busy with their roads, bridges and block-houses. On the 24th, advices from the Secretary of War, dated on the 18th, came to hand, but not a word contained in them made it probable that the long expected war would be immediately declared, al though Colonel McArthur, at the same time, received word from Chillicothe, warning him, on the authority of Thomas Worthington, that before the letter reached him, the declaration would have been made public. This information McArthur laid before General Hull ; and when, upon reaching the Maumee, that commander proposed to place his baggage, stores, and sick on board a vessel, and send them by water to Detroit, the backwoodsman warned him of the danger, and refused to trust his own property on board. Hull; however, treated the report of war as the old story which had been current through all the spring, and refused to believe it possible that the government would not give him information at the earliest moment that the measure was resolved on. lie accordingly, on the 1st of July, embarked his disabled men, and most of his goods on board the Cuyahoga packet, suffering his aid-de-camp in his carelessness to send by her even his instructions and army roll, and then proceeded upon his way. On the 1st of June, Mr. Madison recommended war to the Senate; on the 3d of June, Mr. Calhoun reported in favor of it, and in an 128 - General Hull's Incapacity. able manifesto set forth the reasons ; and on the 19th, proclamation of the contest was made. Upon the day preceding, Congress having passed the needful appropriation bill, the Secretary wrote to General Hull one letter, saying nothing of the matter, and sent it by a special messenger,—and a second containing the vital news, which he confided to a half-organized post as far as Cleveland, and thence literally to accident. And, as if to complete the circle of folly, the misled General, through neglect, suffered his official papers, which he owned ought never to have passed out of his possession, to pass into that of the foe, and thus informed them of his purposes and strength. But that strength, compared with their own, was such that it proved adequate to deter the British from making any attempt to prevent the march of the Americans to Detroit, or to interfere with their passage across the river to Sandwich, where they established themselves on the 12th of July, preparatory to attacking Malden itself, and commanding the conquest and conversion of Upper Canada. And here, at once, the incapacity of Hull manifested itself. By his own confession, he took every step under the influence of two sets of fears : He dared not, on the one hand, act boldly, for fear that his incompetent force would all be destroyed ; while on the other hand, he dared not refuse to act, for fear his militia, already uneasy, would utterly desert him. Thus embarrassed, he proclaimed freedom, and the need of submission to the Canadians; held out inducements for the British militia to desert, and to the Indians to keep quiet, and sat still at Sandwich, striving to pacify his blood-thirsty backwoodsmen, who itched to be at Malden. To amuse his own army, and keep them from trying dangerous experiments, he found cannon needful to the assault of the British posts, and spent three weeks making carriages for five guns. While these were under way, Colonel Cass and Colonel Miller, by an attack upon advanced parties of the enemy, demonstrated the willingness and power of their men to push their conquests, if the chance were given, but Hull refused the opportunity ; and when, at length, the cannon were prepared, the ammunition placed in wagons, and the moment for assault agreed on, the General, upon hearing that a proposed attack on the Niagara frontier had not been made, and that troops from that quarter were moving westward, suddenlY abandoned the enterprise, and, with most of the army, on the 7th of August, returned to Detroit, having effected nothing except the Complaint of Army Contractors - 129 destruction of all confidence in himself on the part of the whole force under his control, officers and privates. Meantime, upon the 29th of July, Colonel Proctor had reached Malden, and perceiving instantly the power which the position of that post gave him over the supplies of the army of the United States, he commenced a series of operations, the object of which was to cut off the communications of Hull from Ohio, and thus not merely neutralize all active operations on his part, but starve him into surrender, or force him to detail his whole army, in order to keep open his way to the only point from which supplies could reach him. The following letters from army contractors, now first published in these pages, will show the straits to which Hull's command had been so easily driven : DETROIT, July 28th; 1812. Sir :—I have a contract with the Government of the United States for the supply of all rations which may be required by the army at Chicago, Michillimakinac, Fort Wayne and this place, and also all other places in the State of Ohio and Indiana Territory, 'north of the forty-first degree of latitude, and also in the Territory of Michigan. This contract was entered into by me in time and with a view to a state of peace, and with an expectation that the supplies might be furnished as they have heretofore been, and transported in vessels over the lakes. Previous to the declaration of war, I had made large purchases of provisions along the shores of Lake Erie, within the States of Ohio and Pennsylvania, and had just commenced removing them to this place when war was declared. The navigation of that lake is now shut against us by the enemy, and of course it is impossible for me to furnish the army by water. There then remains no other means than to forward supplies from the State of Ohio through the wilderness for one hundred and fifty or two hundred miles, where the roads are so bad that it is almost impossible for wagons to travel, and where, no doubt, the cheapest mode will be to transport by packing on horses. In addition to these embarrassments, is that of the hostile disposition of the Indians, who are daily committing depredations on travelers on their route, and will, no doubt, do all in their power to prevent supplies from passing. Under these circumstances you will see at once, Sir, that the efforts of an individual can produce but little effect, and that nothing short of the energies of government can furnish necessary supplies. Some time ago I wrote to the Secretary of War on this subject, and requested that he would devise means to overcome these difficulties, but have not received his answer. Understanding that General Hull was about to address you on the - 10 - 130 - Difficulties in Transporting Supplies. subject of an additional force to his army, and supplies for that an the force already here, I am induced to make this communication. There is one circumstance relating to these supplies which I w mention ; that is that the army which came on with General Hu very soon after their arrival, passed into Canada without the limit of my contract ; but notwithstanding have been supplied by me since, as a matter of necessity, should an additional force come o I conclude they would also pass into Canada, and of course placed out of the reach of any government contract for supplies. I leave to-morrow to proceed eastward along the southern shore of Lake Erie, with a view of sending on some supplies in boats fro New Connecticut; but the success of this attempt must be doubtf and not to be relied on. I should wish that your Excellency mig adopt such measures to furnish supplies as your better judgme may direct, without considering me as the contractor. I am, sir, with great respect, Your obedient servant, AUGUSTUS PORTER. To His Excellency Governor Meigs. URBANA, 20th Aug., 1812. His Excellency, R. J. Meigs, Governor of Ohio : SIR: On the 10th of July I was appointed by the Hon. Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull, an agent to supply the Northwestern army with provisions, in the Michigan Territory and State of Ohio north of the 41st degree of N. Lat., under the contract of Augustus Porter, Esq., the said contractor having failed to furnish agreeable to his contract. Gen. Hull having only advanced me a sufficiency of funds to purchase two hundred thousand rations, and to furnish them at the Detroit post. The additional force now going on from this State and Kentucky, makes it necessary that a large quantity should be sent on. Communication being cut off with the army precludes the possibility of procuring funds from General Hull. I therefore have to request your excellency to advance me ten thousand dollars to enable me to furnish the army now going on. With respect, I am your obedient servant, JOHN H. PIATT. A proper force on Lake Erie, or the capture of Malden, would have prevented these annoying and fatal embarrassments, but the imbecility of the government and that of the General combined to favor the plans of Proctor. Having, by his measures, stopped the stores on their way to Detroit, at the river Raisin, he next defeated the insufficient band of two hundred men under Van Horne, sent by Hull to escort them ; and so far withstood that of five hundred under Miller, as to cause Hull to recall the remnant of that victo- Terms of Hall's Surrender - 131 rious and gallant band, though it had completely routed the British and Indians. By these means Proctor amused the Americans until General Brock reached Malden, which he did upon the 13th of August, and prepared to attempt the conquest of Detroit itself. And here again occurred a most singular want of skill on the part of the Americans. In order to prevent the forces in Upper Canada from being combined against Hull, General Dearborn had been ordered to make a diversion in his favor at Niagara and Kingston, but in place of doing this, he made an armistice with the British commanders, which enabled them to turn their attention entirely to the more distant West, and left Hull to shift for himself. On the 14th of August, therefore, while a third party, under McArthur, was dispatched by Hull to open his communications with the river Raisin, though by a new and impracticable road, General Brock appeared at Sandwich and began to erect batteries to protect his further operations. These batteries Hull would not suffer 'any to molest, saying that if the enemy would not fire on him he would not on them; and though when summoned to surrender on the 15th, he absolutely refused, yet upon the 16th, without a blow struck, the Governor and General crowned his course of indecision and unmanly fear by surrendering the town of Detroit and territory of Michigan, together with fourteen hundred brave men, longing for battle, to three hundred English soldiers, four hundred Canadian militia disguised in red coats, and a band of Indian allies. The following were the terms of General Hull's capitulation: CAMP AT DETROIT, 16th August, 1812. Capitulation for the surrender of Fort Detroit, entered into between Major General Brock, commanding His Britanic Majesty's Forces on the one part, and Brigadier General Hull, commanding the Northwestern Army of the United States, on the other part. 1st. Fort Detroit, with all the troops, regulars as well as militia, will be immediately surrendered to the British forces, under the command of Major General Brock, and will be considered prisoners of war, with the exception of such of the militia of the Michigan Territory who have not joined the army. 2d. All public stores, arms, and all public documents, including everything else of a public nature, will be immediately given up. 3d. Private persons and property of. every description will be respected. 132 - Hull Convicted of Cowardice. 4th. His excellency, Brigadier General Hull, having expressed a desire that a' detachment from the State of Ohio, on its way to join his army, as well as one sent from Fort Detroit, under the command of Colonel McArthur, shall be inclnded in the above capitulation,— it is accordingly agreed to. It is, however, to be understood that such part of the Ohio militia as have not joined, the army, will be permitted to return to their homes on condition that they will not serve during the war. Their arms, however, will be delivered up, if belonging to the public. 5th. The Governor will march out at the hour of twelve o'clock this day, and the British forces will take immediate possession of the fort. [Signed,] J. MCDONNELL, Lt. Col- Militia, P. A. D. C.; J. B. GLEGG, Major A. D. C.; JAMES MILLER, Lt. Col. 5th U. S. Infantry; E. BRUSH, Col. 1st Regt. Mich. Militia. Approved: WILLIAM HULL, Brig- Gen. Coma' g the 117: W. Army. Approved: ISAAC BROCK, Major General. For this conduct he was accused of treason and cowardice, and found guilty of the latter. Nor can we doubt the justice of the Sentence. However brave he may have been personally, he was, as a commander, a coward; and, moreover, he was influenced, confessedly, by his fears as a father, lest his daughter and her children should fall into the bands of the Indians. His faculties had become paralyzed by the intemperate use of alcoholic stimulants, which produced a cowardly fear—fear that he should fail, fear that his troops, whose confidence and respect he could not fail to discover he had lost, would prove untrue to him ; fear that the savages would spare no one, if opposed with vigor; fear of some undefined and horrid evil impending. His conduct throughout was such as might have been reasonably expected from a man who had reached premature dotage and physical decay by the excessive use of spirituous liquors. But the fall of Detroit, though the leading calamity of this unfortunate summer, was not the only one. The misfortune did not come singly. Word had been sent through the kindness of some Fort Wayne Escapes the General Misfortune - 133 friend under a frank from the American Secretary of the Treasury, informing the British commander at St. Joseph, a post about forty miles from Mackinac, of the declaration of war ; while Lieutenant Hanks, commanding the American fortress itself, received no notice from any source. The consequence was, an attack upon the key of the Northwestern lakes, on the 17th of July, by a force of British, Canadians, and savages, numbering in all one thousand and twenty-one. The garrison, amounting to but fifty-seven effective men, felt unable to withstand so formidable a body, and to avoid the constantly threatened Indian massacre, surrendered as prisoners of war, and were dismissed on parole. Less fortunate in its fate was the garrison of Fort Dearborn at Chicago. General Hull sent word to the commander at the fortress (Captain Heald) of the loss of Mackinac, and directed him to distribute his stores among the Indians, and retire to Fort Wayne. Heald, as heretofore explained, proceeded to do this, but it was soon evident that the neighboring savages were not to be trusted, and he in consequence determined not to give them, what they most of all wanted, the spirits and the powder in the fortress. This they learned, and this it was, as Blackhawk asserted, which led to the catastrophe. On the 15th of August, all being ready, the troops left the fort, but before they had proceeded more than a mile and a half, they were attacked by the Indians, and two-thirds of them (from fifty to sixty) massacred at once. Thus, by the middle of August, the whole Northwest, with the exception of Fort Wayne and Fort Harrison, was again in the hands of the British and Indians. Early in September, these two posts were also attacked, and the latter, had it not been defended with the greatest vigor, would have been taken. Its defence was entrusted to Captain Z. Taylor, who subsequently won distinguished honors in the war. with Mexico, and in 1848 was elected President, of the United States. Captain Rhea, who, subsequent to Wayne's campaign, was commandant of the post below Swan creek, but who, during the succeeding war, held the garrison at Fort Wayne, addressed a letter to Governor Meigs, of which the following is a copy. He ,had not then been advised of the surrender of Hull's army, which had occurred four days prior to the date of his letter: 134 - General Cass on the Situation. FORT WAYNE, August 20th, 1812. Honored Sir :—I am requested by Chingwinthah, or the Little Turtle's nephew, the present chief of the Miamies, who has just returned with part of the escort, lately under the command of Captain Wells, to assist in the evacuation of Fort Dearborn, to inform you that as soon as he can collect his men, women and children together, they will repair to the great council at Piqua with all possible dispatch. Both they and the Pottawottamies of this country would have been at the council before this period, had not the necessity of assisting Captain Heald intervened. I have no doubt of the attachment of this young chief to the American interest. Any information you can give us of the success of General Hull and his army will afford us much satisfaction. I have the honor to be, with respect, sir, Your obedient servant, J. RHEA, Capt. Comd'g. To his Excellency Governor Meigs. In reference to the trial of General Hull, General Jessup address the following letter to Governor Ethan Allen Brown : ALBANY, N. Y., 6th February, 1814. Dear Sir : I arrived in this city on the 3rd inst., after a most tiresome and disagreeable journey. The trial of General Hull progresses slowly. The court has been a month in session, and not more than eight or ten witnesses are examined. The General's guilt, however, is so apparent from the testimony already adduced, that even his own counsel, I understand, have abandoned the idea of disproving the fact contained in the charges. They will attempt to show, it is said, that his conduct was the consequence, not o cowardice or treason, but of extreme fatigue and anxiety of mind When such is the defence, how hopeless must be the cause. Sincerely yours, TH. J. JESSUP. Hon. E. A. Brown. The following letters from distinguished sources illustrate im- portant movements occurring at the time, and may here be properly introduced, as none of them have hitherto been made public : IN CAMP, URBANA, June 8, 1812. Dear Sir : We reached this place yesterday. On arriving at Staunton, and making inquiry respecting the route down the Auglaize, it was found that at this season of the year that stream was useless for any purpose of navigation, and that a road along it would The Enemy Cut of Communication - 135 be difficult and circuitous. It was concluded to change our direction, to proceed to this place, and from here on the best ground to the foot of the rapids. In this determination I concurred. A road from here to the rapids would open to Detroit the centre of the State ; and in the event of a war with England our supplies must be drawn from here. It is indisputably the shortest and probably the best route. Boyd’s regiment morning joins us to-morrow. Things go on well in camp. This morning four companies marched for Manary's Block-House to open the road. We have had a council with the Indians. They have agreed to permit us to open the road, and to establish along it a line of blockhouses. You well know the situation of the men who compose this detachment. They were generally in respectable standing and of good prospects. They have made great sacrifices. They did not come for money, because all the money they can receive will be but a poor compensation. [And here follows an appeal urging the necessity of a more prompt payment of the troops, and the letter concludes :] Rely upon it, it must be done. And still further rely, that you are the man who must see it done. Your standing, influence and the confidence your fellow-citizens place in you, all justify them in looking to you. I know they will not be disappointed. Sincerely ever yours,  LEW. CASS. RIVER RAISIN, August 11, 1812. Sir : I improve the first opportunity by the bearer, Major Taylor, to inform you that I arrived at the rapids of the Miami on the morning of the 9th inst , but have been delayed on the road for want of grain for the horses. I came here yesterday accompanied by twenty-one rangers from Manary's Block-House, who volunteered as an escort for the purpose mentioned in your letter addressed to Captain Manary. I regret that I cannot send you an accurate detail from headquarters, but this is now impossible. The communication with the army is entirely obstructed by the enemy. On Wednesday last the mail was escorted by between two hundred and three hundred men. A severe engagement ensued on the way. Our troops retreated, formed, and fought valiantly for a time, until overpowered by the enemy, which consisted of both Indians and British. Twenty-five of the escort went from this place, and but seven of them have returned, and some of them are wounded. From the best information we have, about one-half of the escort were killed and missing. It seems to have been a dreadful havoc. The road was strewed with the mangled bodies of the. dead ! A prisoner escaped from Malden, and 136 - Preparation for the came in here yesterday, who states on oath that he saw the mail opened in the British garrison, which was supposed to have been taken in the battle of Wednesday last, and that there was much sport in Malden in consequence of arresting the public papers, which were examined by the enemy. I have also to state that a severe engagement took place day before yesterday three or four miles the other side of Brownstown, very near the place of the battle ground of Wednesday, and it is confirmed by two Frenchmen who fled from a boat (being there prisoners,) that our troops were victorious, and the enemy experienced a total defeat. Such are the reports here; and such the general opinion relative to the battles of Wednesday and Sunday. But, sir, we are all in doubt and anxiety about the details of the two last engagements. As many as five different expresses have been sent from this place to General Hull to get tidings from the army, and not one has been heard of or returned- The expresses sent were confidential men and persons well acquainted with the woods. An express man is here now waiting from Buffalo, in the State of New York, who says the British have started three vessels to reinforce Malden ; and one of the Frenchmen from Malden states that the three vessels have arrived at Malden with reinforcements. A rejoicing ensued at the fort, and the guns were heard at this place. Captain Brush's company arrived here on the 9th, all in good health and good spirits. There are now about one hundred and sixty troops here (exclusive of the militia, which cannot 'be relied on.) Great suspicion is attached to the Frenchmen living in and about this place. The people are flocking into the stockade for protection, and the town and country around are alarmed. I cannot inform you, sir, what course will be pursued here. If there is even a probable chance of seeing Detroit without incurring the reputation of rashness, I shall proceed to headquarters. If not, I shall wait with the rest of the troops till I can hear from General Hull. I have but little time to write. The bearer now waits. I must, however, be permitted to suggest that I think our army is in a precarious situation. There are many sick or unable to do duty—several have been killed or wounded ; and it is possible the whole corps may dissolve for reasons known to your excellency, unless encouraged by immediate reinforcement. Would not the volunteers from Gallia and Athens counties march without delay to this place, with orders to report themselves to the commandant here ? With deference I submit to your excellency this hasty summary, and meanwhile am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, JESSUP N. COUCH. His Excellency, Return J. Meigs. Before the surrender of Hull took place, extensive preparations had been made in Ohio, Kentucky, Virginia and Pennsylvania, to Defence of the Maumee Valley - 137 bring into service a large and efficient army. Three points needed defence, Fort Wayne and the Maumee Valley, and the Wabash and Illinois country. The troops destined for the Maumee were to be under the command of General Winchester, a Revolutionary officer resident in Tennessee, and but little known to the frontier men. Reaching Cincinnati, he addressed Governor Meigs the following letter : CINCINNATI, 9th September, 1812. Sir :—I am thus far on my way to assume the command of the army on your Northwestern frontier. I shall leave this place to-morrow for Piqua, where I shall be extremely glad to see you, in order to consult with you relative to the best possible means of protecting the exposed frontier of the State of Ohio, without losing sight, at the same time, of Upper Canada. I am authorized by the Secretary of War to call on your excellency for reinforcements of militia. On this subject, also, a personal interview is desirable. Should it, however, be inconvenient to you, sir, to meet me at Piqua, or at some other place on my route, you will be good enough to communicate to me in writing your ideas on the subject of the protection of your frontier inhabitants, as well as the extent of militia you can furnish upon my requisition. I have the honor to be, with high consideration, Your obedient servant, J. WINCHESTER, Brigadier General U. S. Army. To His Excellency R. J. Meigs, Governor of the State of Ohio. And from his headquarters at Fort Wayne the following : HEADQUARTERS, FORT WAYNE, 22d September, 1812. Sir :—I had the honor last night of receiving your excellency's dispatch of the 16th instant, coveting a communication from General Wadsworth, for which I beg you will accept my sincere thanks. With you, I rejoice at the prospect of regaining lost territory, and at the determination of the President on a vigorous course of measures ; and I still hope to winter in Detroit or its vicinity the ensuing season. To enable me, in part, to effect this purpose, I avail myself of the authority given me by the Secretary of War, to call upon your excellency for such reinforcements as I may deem necessary. You will please to furnish two regiments of infantry to join me at the Rapids of the Miami of the lake, about the 10th or 15th of October 138 - General Winchester at Defiance next, well clothed for a fall campaign. Arms and ammunition can be drawn from Newport, Kentucky. It is extremely desirous to me that no time may be lost in supplying this requisition. The cold season is fast approaching, and the stain on the American character at Detroit not yet wiped away. If you could furnish one other regiment to rendezvous at Piqua, and proceed to open and improve the road, by causeways, etc., to Defiance, it would greatly facilitate the transportation of snpplies to this army, which is imperatively requisite to its welfare. This latter regiment might then return, or proceed on after the army, as circumstances should dictate. I have the honor to be, with high respect, Your obedient servant, J. WINCHESTER, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army, To His Excellency Return J. Meigs, Governor of the State of Ohio. And on the 15th of October, 1812, not having been informed of the appointment of General Harrison, on the previous month, to the chief command of the Northwestern army, General Winchester addressed Governor Meigs the following letter : CAMP DEFIANCE, MOUTH OF THE AUGLAIZE, 15th October, 1812. Sir :—Captain Wood, commanding a small party of spies. came into this camp yesterday, and reports that he was detached from Urbana to visit the rapids, etc. ; that he fell in with other spies who had just returned from that place, and had obtained all the information that he possibly could. I therefore have directed him to return and report, deeming it unnecessary that he should proceed, as the information required had been obtained, and being delirious; too, to communicate to your excellency that this army could immediately march and take possession of the rapids, if supplies of provisions, &c., could certainly reach us in a few days after our arrival- Many days provisions could not be carried with us, because it is not here. Neither have we the means of transportation, and it is important that the corn at that place should be saved if it could be done. At this place a picketed post with four block-houses, two stone houses and a house for the sick, will be finished this day. Then I shall turn my attention to building pirogues for the purpose of transporting heavy baggage and provisions 'down' the river, and anxiously wait your answer with relation to supplies. I shall remain in readiness to march as soon as it is received. General Harrison Commander-in-Chief - 139 If General Harrison is at Urbana, you will communicate the contents of this letter to him. If I knew where he could be found, I should address a letter to him on the same subject. I have the honor to be, with great respect, Your Excellency's obedient servant, J. WINCHESTER, Brigadier General U. S. Army. To His Excellency Return J. Meigs, Urbana. The appointment of Harrison to the post of Commander-in-Chief over all the forces in the West and Northwest was made on the 17th of September. 1812, and officially ratified on the 24th of that month. The following judicious instructions, liberal in their spirit, and just to the administration and to General Harrison, were forwarded from the War Department : WAR DEPARTMENT, September 17, 1812. Sir : The President is pleased to assign to you the command of the Northwestern army which, in addition to the regular troops and rangers in those quarters, will consist of the volunteers and militia of Kentucky, Ohio and three thousand detached militia from Virginia and Pennsylvania, making your whole force consist of ten thousand men. Having proceeded for the protection of the western frontier, you will retake Detroit and with a view to the conquest of Upper Canada, you will penetrate that country as soon as the force under your command will justify. Every exertion is making to give you a train of artillery from Pittsburgh, to effect which, you must be sensible, requires time. Major Stoddard, the senior officer of artillery at that place, will advise you of his arrangements and projects, and receive your instructions. Captain Gratiot, of the engineers, will report himself to you from Pittsburgh. He will receive your orders and join you with the first pieces of artillery which can be prepared, or receive such orders as you may direct. Major Ball of the Second Regiment of Dragoons will also report himself and join you immediately. Such staff officers as you may appoint, conformably to law, will be approved by the President. Copies of all the contracts for supplying provisions have been transmitted. Mr. Denny, the contractor at Pittsburgh, is instructed to furnish magazines of provisions at such points as you may direct. The Deputy Quartermaster at Pittsburgh will continue to forward stores and munitions of every kind, and will meet your requisitions. 140 - General Harrison's Plan. Colonel Buford, Deputy Commissioner at Lexington, is furnished with funds and is subject to your orders. Should an additional par" chasing commissary become necessary, you will appoint one, am authorize him to draw and sell bills on this department. It seems desirable to keep the local contractors in requisition as far as they can supply. With these objects in view you will command such, means as may be practicable. Exercise your own discretion and act in all cases according to your own judgment. Very respectfully, I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant, W. EUSTIS. To General Wm.. H- Harrison, Commanding the N. W. Army. Meantime Fort Wayne had been relieved, and the line of the Maumee secured ; so that, when Harrison found himself placed at the head of military affairs in the West, his main objects were, as will have been noted, first, to drive the hostile Indians from the western side of the Detroit river ; second, to take Malden ; and third, having thus secured his communications, to recapture the Michigan territory and its dependencies. The plan adopted by General Harrison to meet the duties incumbent upon him was, to collect the troops at four points, Wooster, Urbana, Fort Defiance and St. Mary's. From these places the object for concentration for his troops was the rapids of the Maumee. The forced expedition at first adopted against Detroit was now abandoned, because the infantry could not be in readiness to secure and retain the acquisition, should it be made. The base line of the new campaign was one drawn from Upper Sandusky along the southerly side of the swampy district to St. Mary's- These two places, with Fort McArthur between them, were intended as the depots for provisions, artillery and military stores. The troops at Defiance were intended to act as a corps of observation, and when the artillery should be brought to Upper Sandusky, they were to advance to the rapids. At Lower Sandusky a corps of observation was also stationed, which, with that at Defiance, would form the extremities of the new military base, when the army should have reached the advanced position mentioned on the Maumee. These arrangements covered the frontiers by the different corps, and kept the troops within the bounds of the ordinary contractors; while the quartermasters were accumulating provisions Fort Jennings Erected - 141 farther in advance, and procuring means of transportation across farther in the difficult district of country so well termed the Black Swamp. General Winchester was in command of the troops at Fort Wayne, Ger General n eral Harrison had proceeded to St. Mary's, where about three thousand men were collected for the purpose of the expedition against Detroit already alluded to. This expedition had been abandoned by the commanding General, for reasons which have been already assigned. While in this position, information was received by Quartermaster Thomas D. Carneal, that a large force of British and Indians, with artillery, was passing up the left bank of the Maumee, towards Fort Wayne. General Harrison immediately determined by a rapid march upon the confluence of the Auglaize with the Maumee, to try and intercept the return of this detachment, knowing it would be met in front by the return of Winchester. The force under the immediate command of the General at this time consisted of some troops of cavalry from Ohio and Kentucky ; the mounted corps of Finley of the former State, and of R. M. Johnson belonging to the latter ; together with the infantry regiments of Poague, Barbee and Jennings. The latter officer with his regiment had previously been detached to erect an intermediate post between St. Mary's and Defiance, called Fort Jennings. On the 30th of September,* General Harrison set out on the proposed expedition. Apprehensive that the infantry would too much retard his progress, after the first day's march, the two regiments were ordered to return ; and the General, at the head of the cavalry, continued his march. No weather, or condition of a country, could be more trying to the feelings and the subordination of irregular troops, than during this forced expedition of General Harrison. The rain fell in torrents ; the flat beech woods were covered with water, and they were so swampy that the horses sank half leg deep at every step. On the close of the second day's march, the troops encamped in a bottom of the Auglaize. "A description of the bivouac of this night might well serve for that 0f many similar ones which were passed by the General and his troops daring this campaign, with the exception of the increase of suffer- * Here is an error in date, made by Mr. Butler, in his History of Kentucky, authority is generally regarded, and justly, too, of the highest character. It must have been several days later than September 30th; for, on the 15th of October, General Winchester writes to Governor Meigs that he was desirous of communicating with General Harrison, but did not " know where he could be found." 142 - A Night Bivouac on the Auglaize. ing from the severe cold of winter. The troops being on a forced march, were not suffered to encamp as long as there was light enough to march. They were formed as well as possible in an order of encampment, and guards placed out. The ground of the encampment here spoken of, was on the side of the Auglaize river, in a flat beech bottom, which was nearly covered by the water from the rain, which fell in torrents during the whole night. The troops were without axes, and their tomahawks could effect nothing with the large green beech trees. Happy were they who could find a dry log in which a fire could be kindled. Those who had not this good fortune were obliged to content themselves with passing the night sitting on their saddles at the roots of the trees, against which they leaned and procured a little 'sleep. Being separated from the baggage, there were few who had anything to eat, or spirits to drink. In a situation of this kind, men are peevish and ill-natured, in the venting of which a thousand circumstances continually occur. To prevent ebullitions of this kind, and to produce more pleasant feelings, the General, seated round a small fire with his staff, wrapped in his cloak, and taking the rain as it fell, directed one of his officers to sing an Irish glee. The humor of this song, and the determination which seemed to exist at headquarters to put circumstances at defiance, soon produced cheerfulness and good humor throughout the camp." By day-break of the next morning, the march was resumed, the troops being required to be in readiness to mount by reveille. In the course of the next day, the General was met by an officer from General Winchester, who informed him of the latter officer's arrival at Fort Defiance, and the united body of British and Indians had retired down the Maumee. He then prosecuted his march, with a small escort, to Winchester's camp, leaving his detachment to come up more at their leisure. He arrived late at night. At Fort Defiance a revolt in the Kentucky regiment of Colonel Allen took place, which, for its honorable termination, as well as from motives of historical fidelity, requires to be mentioned. It has been but obscurely alluded to by General McAfee and Mr Dawson. Soon after General Harrison's arrival at camp, and after he bad retired to enjoy some little repose, so welcome to any one who had been exposed on the preceding comfortless and forced expedition, Defiance—Revolt in a Kentucky Regiment - 143 he found that himself self suddenly awakened by Colonel Allen and Major M. D. Hardin. These officers were the bearers of the mortifying news that Allen's regiment, exhausted by the hard fare of the campaign, and disappointed in the expectation of an immediate engagement with the enemy, had, in defiance of their duty to their country, and all the earnest, impassioned remonstrances of their officers, determined to return home. These officers assured General Harrison that they could do nothing with their men ; that their representations were answered by insults alone. They begged the General to rise and interfere, as the only officer who had any prospect of bringing the mutineers back to their duty. He refused to interfere at that time, but assured the gentlemen that he would attend to the serious object of their request in his own way, and at his own time. The officers retired. In the meantime, General Harrison sent one of his aids to direct General Winchester to order the alarm, or point of war, to be beat on the following morning, instead of the reveille. This adroit expedient brought all the troops to their arms the first thing in the morning. It diverted the spirits of the discontented troops into a new channel of feeling, and prepared them for the subsequent events. On the parading of the troops at their posts, General Winchester was ordered to form them into a hollow square. General Harrison now appeared upon parade, much to the surprise of the troops, who, from his late arrival in camp, were unapprised of his presence. If the sudden and unexpected arrival of their favorite commander had so visible an effect upon the men, his immediate address to them fully preserved the impression. He began by lamenting that there were, as he was informed, considerable discontent in one of the Kentucky regiments : this, although a source of mortification to himself, on their account, was happily of little consequence to the government. He had more troops than he knew well what to do with at the present stage of the campaign ; he was expecting daily the arrival of the Pennsylvania and Virginia quotas. It is fortunate, said this officer, with the ready oratory for which his native Virginia is SO famed, that he had found out this dissatisfaction before the campaign was farther advanced, when the discovery might have been mischievous to the public interests, as well as disgraceful to the parties concerned. Now, so far as the government was interested, the discontented troops, who had come into the woods with the expectation of finding all the luxuries of home and of peace, had 144 - Defiance—Revolt in a Kentucky Regiment. full liberty to return. He would, he continued, order facilities to be furnished for their immediate accommodation. But he could not retrain from expressing the mortification he anticipated for the reception they would meet from the old and the young, who had greeted them on their march to the scene of war, as their gallant neighbors. What must be their feelings, said the General,, to see those whom they had hailed as their generous defenders, now returning without striking a blow, and before their term of plighted service had ex. pired ? But if this would be the state of public sentiment in Ohio, what would it be in Kentucky ? If their fathers did not drive their degenerate sons back to the field of battle to recover their wounded honor, their mothers and sisters would hiss them from their presence. If, however, the discontented men were disposed to put up with all the taunts and disdain which awaited them wherever they went, they were, General Harrison again assured them, at full liberty to go back. The influence of this animated address was instantaneous. This was eyinced in a manner most flattering to the tact and management of the commander. Colonel J. M. Scott, the senior Colonel of Kentucky, and who had seryed in the armies of Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne, in the medical staff, now addressed his men. These were well known in the army as the " Iron Works," from the neighborhood from which they had come. " You, my boys," said the generous veteran, " will prove your attachment for the service of your country, and your General, by giving him three cheers." The address was attended with immediate success, and the air resounded with the shouts of both officers and men. Colonel Lewis next took up the same course, and with the same effect. It now became the turn of the noble Allen again to try the temper of his men. He begged leave of the General to address them : but excess of emotion choked his utterance ; at length he gave vent to the contending feelings of his heart, in a broken, but forcible address, breathing the fire which ever burned so ardently in his breast. At the close of it, howeyer, he conjured the soldiers of his regiment to give the General the same manifestation of their patriotism and returning sense of duty, which the other Kentucky regiments had so freely done. The wishes of their high spirited officer were complied with; and a mutiny was nipped in its bud, which might, if persisted Defiance—Revolt in a Kentucky Regiment - 145 in, have spread disaffection through the Kentucky troops, to the disgrace of that gallant State, and the lasting injury of the public cause. No troops, however, behaved more faithfully or zealously through the remainder of their service, till the greater part of them offered up their lives in defence of their country on the fatal field of Raisin. General Harrison having quelled this unhappy disturbance, in the subordination of the troops, now made his arrangements with General Winchester, for the full command of the left wing. To this officer were committed the regulars under Colonel Wells, the regiments of Scott, Lewis and Allen, already mentioned, and the additional regiments under Colonels Poague, Barbee, and Jennings. Colonel Bodley, the quartermaster of this wing, an efficient and zealous officer of Kentucky, was fully empowered by General Harrison to draw upon the treasury for the carrying into effect all orders which he might receive from General Winchester for the supply of his command. It now became necessary for the commanding General to direct his attention to the arrangements for the accommodation of the troops, which were marching to his reinforcement from Pennsylvania and Virginia. These, together with the brigade of General Perkins, of the Ohio militia, constituted the right wing of the army. Not only provisions were to be collected for this body of men, but all the materiel of war, ammunition and artillery, were \yet to be obtained. It will hardly be believed in the future history of America, that when but two pieces of disposable artillery of small calibre had, by the disgraceful surrender of Hull, been left in the Western country, and which the commanding General informed the Secretary of War he had rather be without, cannon should have been sent to Pittsburgh without their. carriages. Yet such was the fact; and when the whole country supposed General Harrison was rthoroughly supplied with all the munitions of war, which the government was so able to furnish, the trees were still growing about Pittsburgh, out of which the carriages of the artillery were to be manufactured. This was the state of protracted destitution of the army, in regard to a most important military arm. Colonel Morrison, an old Revolutionary officer, and Colonel William Piatt, had been appointed deputy Quartermasters-General in the service, to act at the head of their department in the Northwestern army. These officers were placed under the command of - 11 - 146 - General Tupper to Governor Meigs. General Winchester ; and he was fully informed of the general Plan of the campaign by General Harrison, and thus became responsible for the part assigned him, in the general operations of the military service. General E. W. Tupper, commanding the central column, addressed to Governor Meigs the following letter : CAMP, NEAR MC ARTHUR'S BLOCK-HOUSE, November 9th, 1812. Sir :—I have for some time thought a prisoner from near the Maumee .Rapids would at this time be of much service, and highly acceptable to General Harrison. For this purpose I ordered Captain Hinkton to the Rapids. with his company of spies, with orders to take a prisoner, if possible. He has just returned, and brought in with him Captain A. Clark, a British subject, who resides two miles above Malden, and was out with a party of about five hundred Indians and fifty British, with two gunboats, six bateaux, and one small schooner at the foot of the Rapids, to gather in and carry over to Malden the corn. Captain Clark had but just arrived with the van of the detachment. The vessels and boats had not yet anchored when the spies surprised him as he advanced a few rods from the shore to reconnoitre, and brought him off undiscovered; and this from a number of Indians, who were killing hogs and beginning to gather corn. At the same time, several of Captain Hinkton's spies lay concealed on the bank within five rods of the place where some of the first boats were landing. Captain Hinkton has conducted this business with great skill and address. Captain Clark was taken prisoner on the 7th instant, a little before sun setting. He informs me that the force now at the Rapids contemplated remaining there from ten to fifteen days, in order to convey the whole of the corn in that neighborhood to Malden. I know not, sir, whether it will meet your approbation, or that of our commander-in-chief; but I have ordered every man in the brigade who does not fear the fatigues of a rapid march, and is in a condition to perform it, to draw five days' provisions, and march with me for the Rapids in the morning, taking nothing with them but their provisions, knapsacks and blankets. Although the force will not exceed six hundred and fifty, I am convinced it is sufficient to rout the force now at the Rapids, and save the greater part of the corn, which is all-important to us. A moment is not to be lost. We shall be at the Rapids in three days. I have also sent an express to General Winchester, advising him of the situation of the enemy, and of march ; but as we can reach the Rapids one day sooner than General Winchester'  waiting for my express, I could not think of losing one day, and thereby suffer the enemy to escape with the forage. British Officer Captured - 147 captain Clark informs me that there are but few Indians now at Malden ; that they have principally been in and received their annuities and returned to their families. The Brownstown Indians are now at the Rapids with the foraging party—amounting to about sixty mounted warriors. The other Indians now at the Rapids are Chippeways, Ottawas and Pottawotamies, who came up in the vessels and canoes. Detroit is now garrisoned with fifty men of the forty-first regiment, under the command of General Proctor. They have made no improvement on the fort. The battery opposite to Detroit is demolished. Eight large pieces of cannon taken at Detroit, now lie on the wharf at Malden. Captain Clark cannot say what number of cannon are mounted at Detroit ;-he thinks but few, and those small. Malden is garrisoned with about five hundred regular troops of the forty-first regiment, and about two hundred militia. It mounts four heavy cannon in each bastion, consisting of 18-pounders and long 9-pounders. The greatest force of militia they have ever been able to raise was about four hundred. The Indian force at the surrender of Detroit did not exceed seven hundred—the British regulars and militia between six and seven hundred. Captain Clark must be a good judge of the force; having been in the battles of Brownstown and Maguaga, and at the surrender. of Detroit. At Malden they are strengthening the fortifications, though they do not calculate on an expedition from the United States this season. They are apprised of General Winchester's force, but understand he is building a fort at Defiance, and is to remain there during the winter. They have no knowledge of any other preparations making in the State of Ohio. This contains the most important part of the information I have gained from Captain Clark. I have given him to understand that his treatment hereafter will depend entirely upon the truth of his relations. I send him off in the morning to General Harrison. I write you, sir, in great haste. The preparations making for our march will employ me the whole night. I take with me one light 6-pounder, drawn by six horses. I am in hopes of finding some of those vessels in the river, and with this piece I can advance thirty miles per day. I am, very respectfully, Your Excellency's most obedient servant, EDWARD W, TUPPER, Brigadier Gen. Ohio Quota. To his Excellency R. J. Meigs, Governor of Ohio. P. S.—I shall not take a man with me but such as volunteer their services. I have assured them that they will have to endure hunger, fatigue, difficulties and dangers. Such as fear to risk their lives, or encounter to the sufferings of a rapid march, on short rations, I leave behind to guard our camp. 148 - The Situation at the close of 1812. The troops commanded by General Tupper were raised chiefly from the county of his residence, (Gallia,) and from Lawrence and Jackson counties. Thus, at the close of the year 1812, nothing effectual had been done towards the re-conquest of Michigan. Winchester, with the left wing of the army, was at Defiance, on his way to the Rapids, his men enfeebled by sickness, want of clothes, and want of food; the right wing at Upper Sandusky, and the centre resting at Fort McArthur. Several smaller operations had taken place, and one of some importance occurred near the close of the year, when General Harrison dispatched a party of six hundred men against the Miami villages upon the Mississinneway, a branch of the Wabash. This body, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, destroyed several villages and fought a severe battle with the Indians, who were defeated; but the severity of the weather, the number of his wounded (forty-eight), the scarcity of provisions, and the fear of an attack from Tecumseh, at the head of six hundred fresh savages, led Colonel Campbell to retreat immediately after the battle, without destroying the principal town of the enemy. The expedition, however, was not without valuable results, as it induced some of the tribes to come openly and wholly under the protection and within the borders of the Republic. On the 10th of January, 1813, Winchester with his troops reached the Rapids. From the 13th to the 16th, messengers arrived at Winchester's camp from the inhabitants of French town on the river Raisin, representing the danger to which that place was exposed from the hostility of the British and Indians, and begging for protection. These representations and petitions excited the feelings of the Americans, and led them, forgetful of the main objects of the campaign, and of military caution, to determine upon the step of sending a strong party to the aid of the sufferers. On the 17th, accordingly, Col. Lewis was despatched with 550 men to the river Raisin, and soon after Col. Allen followed with 110 men. Marching along the frozen borders of the Bay and Lake, on the afternoon of the 18th the Americans reached and attacked the enemy who were posted in the village, and after a severe contest defeated therm Having gained possession of the town, Colonel Lewis wrote for reinforcements and prepared himself to defend the position he had gained. And it was evident that all his means of defence would be Winchester's Mistake - 149 needed, as the place was but eighteen miles from Malden, where the whole British force was collected under Proctor. Winchester, on the 19th, having heard of the action of the previous day, marched with 259 men, which was the most he dared detach from the Rapids, tothe aid of the captor of Frenchtown, which place he reached on the next evening. But instead of placing his men in a secure position, and taking measures to prevent the secret approach of the enemy, Winchester suffered the troops he had brought with him to remain in the open ground, and took no efficient measures to protect himself from surprise, although informed that an attack might be expected at any moment. The consequence was that during the night of the 21st the whole British force approached undiscovered, and erected a battery within 300 yards of the American camp. From this, before the troops were fairly under arms in the morning, a discharge of bombs, balls, and grapeshot, informed the devoted soldiers of Winchester of the folly of their commander, and in a moment more the dreaded Indian yell sounded on every side. The troops under Lewis were protected by the garden pickets behind which their commander, who alone seems to have been upon his guard, had stationed them ; the troops yielded, broke and fled, but fled under a fire which mowed them down like grass ; Winchester and Lewis (who had left his pickets to aid his superior officer), were taken prisoners. Upon the party who fought from behind their slight defences, however, no impression could be made, and it was not till. Winchester was induced to send them what was deemed an order to surrender that they dreamed of doing so. This Proctor persuaded him to do by the old story of an Indian massacre in case of continued resistance, to which he added a promise of help and protection for the wounded, and of a removal at the earliest moment; without which last promise the troops of Lewis refused to yield even when required by their General. But the promise, even if given in good faith, was not redeemed, and the horrors of the Succeeding night and day will long be remembered by the inhabitants of the frontier. Of a portion of those horrors we give a description in the words of an eye-witness : - NICHOLASVILLE, Kentucky, April 24th, 1813. Sir :—Yours of the 5th instant, requesting me to give you a statement respecting the late disaster at Frenchtown, was duly received. Rest assured, sir, that it is with sensations the most