176 - Defiance Threatened. Captain McCune was sent out a second time, with the intelligence to Harrison, that about eight hundred Indians had been seen from the fort, passing up the Maumee, designing, it was supposed to attack Fort Winchester, at Defiance. The General, however' believed that it was a ruse of the enemy to cover their design upon Upper Sandusky, Lower Sandusky, or Cleveland ; and accordingly kept out a reconnoitering party to watch. On the afternoon of the 25th, Captain McCune was ordered by Harrison to return to the fort and inform General Clay of his situation and intentions. He arrived near the fort .about day break on the following morning, having lost his way in the night, accompanied by James Doolan, a French Canadian. They were just upon the point of leaving the forest and entering upon the cleared ground around the fort, when they were intercepted by a party of Indians. They immediately took to the high bank with their horses, and retreated at full gallop up the river for several miles, pursued by the Indians, also mounted, until they came to a deep ravine, putting up from the river in a southerly direction, when they turned upon the river bottom and continued a short distance, until they found their further progress in that direction stopped by an impassable swamp. The Indians, foreseeing their dilemma, from their knowledge of the country, and expecting they would naturally follow up the ravine, galloped thither to head them off. McCune guessed their intention, and he and his companion turned back upon their own track for the fort, gaining, by this maneuvre, several hun- dred yards upon their pursuers. The Indians gave a yell of chagrin, and followed at their utmost speed. Just as they neared the fort; McCune dashed into a thicket across his course, on the opposite side of which other Indians had huddled, awaiting their prey. When this body of Indians had thought them all but in their possession, again was the presence of mind of McCune signally displayed. He wheeled his horse, followed by Doolan, made his way out of the thicket by the passage he had entered, and galloped around into the open space between them and the river, where the pursuers were checked by the fire from the block-house at the western angle of the fort. In a few minutes after their arrival their horses dropped from fatigue. The Indians probably- had orders to take them alive, as they had not fired until just as they entered the fort; but in the chase McCune had great difficulty in persuading Fort Meigs served from a Great Peril - 177 Doolan to reserve his fire until the last extremity, and they there fore brought in their pieces loaded. The opportune arrival of McCune, no doubt, saved the fort, as the intelligence he brought was the means of preserving them from an ingeniously devised stratagem of Tecumseh, which was put into execution that day, and which we here relate. Towards evening, the British infantry were secreted in the ravine below the fort, and the cavalry in the woods above, while the Indians were stationed in the forest, on the Sandusky road, not far from the fort. About an hour before dark, they commenced a sham battle among themselves, to deceive the Americans into the belief that a battle was going on between them and a reinforcement for the fort, in the hopes of enticing the garrison to the aid of their comrades. It was managed with so much skill, that the garrison instantly flew to arms, impressed by the Indian yells, intermingled with the roar of musketry, that a severe battle was being fought. The officers, even of the highest grades, were of that opinion, and some of them insisted on being suffered to march out to the rescue. General Clay, although unable to account for the firing, could not believe that the General had so soon altered his intention, as expressed to Captain McCune, not to send or come with any troops to Fort Meigs, until there should appear further necessity for it. This intelligence in a great measure satisfied the officers, but not the men, who were extremely indignant at being prevented from going to share the danger of their Commander-in-Chief and brother soldiers ; and perhaps had it not been for the interposition of a shower of rain, which soon put an end to the battle, the General might have been persuaded to march out, when a terrible massacre of the troops would have ensued. The enemy remained around the fort but one day after this, and on the 28th embarked with their stores and proceeded down the lake. A volunteer aid of General Clay makes the statement that preparations were made to fire the magazine, in case the enemy succeeded in an attempt to storm the fort, and thus involve all, friend and foe, in one common fate. This terrible alternative was deemed better than to perish under the tomahawks and scalping knives of the savages. [GENERAL ORDERS.] HEADQUARTERS, LOWER SANDUSKY, 14th May, 1813 The troops which now form the garrison of Lower Sandusky, will - 13 - 178 - Affairs at Lower Sandusky. be relieved to-day by a detachment furnished by his Excellency General Meigs, to the senior officer of which Colonel Stevenson 14 deliver the post, and the public property in his possession. The militia belonging to General Wadsworth's division, now at this place, will, as soon as relieved, commence their march for Cleveland, where they will remain for the protection of that town, Colonel Stevenson will furnish the senior officer of this detachment with a copy of this order, and the Quartermaster here will provide the means of a transport for them. By order R. GRAHAM, Aid-de-Camp. FORT STEPHENSON, May 22, 181, May it Please Your Excellency : Sir : Agreeably to your orders, sent by Mr. Bishop, I have forwarded all the articles specified therein. The carriages on which they are to be mounted, have not yet arrived, but are daily expected, as teams have been sent from this place under an escort from the garrison. If you deem it necessary that one of the carriages should be forwarded on to Cleveland, the same will be done on your order. Considerable manual labor has been done to the garrison since you left this, and improvements are daily making. The troops in general in the garrison are afflicted with bad colds. No epidemic or contagious disorder prevails. One person has been buried since you left this. He came from Fort Meigs with part of the baggage of Major Todd. No news, or any apprehension of danger. By order of the Major commanding. R. E. POST, Adjutant R. J. Meigs, Esq,, Governor State of Ohio. [GENERAL ORDERS.] HEADQUARTERS, CLEVELAND, May 22, 1813. The Governor of Ohio finds that the safety of the frontier of the State requires capacity, discretion and vigilance in the officers commanding at the different garrisons- Major Harper, now commanding at Lower Sandusky, will surrender the command of that garrison to Captain Vance. Captain Vance will immediately repair to Lower Sandusky, and assume command of that garrison. He will exercise all his faculties in establishing order among the troops. Such repairs as he may think necessary for the security and convenience of his command, he will cause to be made. Captain Vance will discharge two Captains and two Lieutenants, and comform as nearly as possible to the War Office Regulations of March 19, 1813. R. J. MEWS. Governor of Ohio. Camp Life at Fort Meigs - 119 The following extracts from " Samuel Bayless' Book of General Orders," will exhibit the manner in which, following the siege, the tedium of the camp was relieved. The original manuscript is in the hands of Mrs. Thompson, wife of the Sheriff of Franklin county, Ohio, to whom the writer would express his obligations for its use : [REGIMENTAL COURT MARTIAL]  CAMP MEIGS, May 15, 1813. The United Slates vs. Samuel Stewart : Captain Patrick Shaw, Captain Nathan Hatfield, Captain Theophilus Simonton appeared as members of said court martial and were sworn. Adjt Samuel Bayless, acting Judge Advocate, was sworn. Charge laid in by Major Anthony Pitzer, for putting fire to a bombshell containing powder. The charge being read to the defendant by the Judge Advocate, and the question do you plead guilty ornot guilty put, he answers not guilty. Testimony on behalf of the United States : Alexander Tucker sworn, deposeth and saith that he thought Stewart was the man* that did the crime, but did not see him set fire to the bombshell, and further saith not. Testimony on behalf of the defendant : J. Boggs, sworn, deposeth and saith that for ten hours previous to the report of the bombshell on the 11th inst., and for some two after, said Stewart was writing on a drumhead in the tent with the deponent, and was not out of the tent, and further saith not. Testimony continued on behalf of defendant : E. Sprig, sworn, deposeth and saith that he stood by when fire was set to the bombshell, and that said Stewart was not the man who set fire thereof, and further saith not. Testimony closed: The court martial, after seeing the charges and hearing the testimony against and for the said Stewart, do adjudge that Samuel nat13. u81Stewart is not guilty. Given under my hand this 15th of  PATRICK SHAW, President. Attest : Samuel Bayless, Judge Advocate. Approved: James Mills,  Colonel First Regiment Third Dept. Ohio Militia. [REGIMENTAL ORDER.] CAMP MEIGS, May 24, 1813. Samuel Bayless, Adjutant: You are commanded to summon a regimental court martial for the trial of James Kelley, Corporal in Captain Simonton's company. JAMES MILLS, Colonel. Agreeable to the above order the following officers were summoned and appeared and took their seats : 180 - Camp Life at Port Meigs. Major J. Loduick, Captain P. Shane, Captain N. Hatfield, sworn. Samuel Bayless, Acting Judge Advocate, sworn. Charge laid against said Kelley by William Oliver, Assistant Commissary, with having suffered public whisky to be used from the barrel under his charge on the night of the 22d inst. Testimony on behalf of the State : J. Davis, sworn, deposeth and saith that on the morning of the 23d the barrel, which we drew whisky from, had had whisky drawn from. it during the night, the spigot being about an inch and a half further out than when left, and the bung appeared to have been out. Question—Was there more whisky in the barrel at night than in the morning ? He believed there was, and further saith not. The court martial, after seeing the charges and hearing the testi- mony against said Kelley, do adjudge that said James Kelley, Corporal, was not guilty. Given under my hand this 24th of May, 1813. JOHN LODUICK, Presdent Attest : Samuel Bayless, Acting Judge Advocate. Approved: James Mills, Colonel Fifth Regiment Third Dept. 0. M. [GARRISON ORDER.] CAMP MEIGS, May 24, 1813. The commandants of the different corps at this place will make out and deliver to Major Pondell, Acting Adjutant General, complete returns of their respective commands on the oth day of June ensuing, for the month of May, instant. Fighting is especially forbidden after this date unless authorized. Every soldier shall be entitled to one gill of whisky for every cannon ball or bomb he may find and deliver to Captain Cushing or Lieutenant Hawkins. JOHN MILLER Colonel Nineteenth Regiment Lift. Commandant. [REGIMENTAL COURT MARTIAL.] CAMP MEIGS, June 4, 1813. United Stales of America vs. Enoch Galloway; Captains Patrick Shaw, Nathan Holfield and Robert Irwin summoned, and appeared at two o'clock and sworn. Adjutant Samuel Bayless was sworn Judge Advocate. The charge with abusing and threatening his First Sergeant Iva read, and the question asked, guilty or not guilty. Answer, guilty and ask mercy of court. Evidence—John Haines, sworn, deposeth and saith that before that time said Galloway had uniformly done his duty when able, and never given any abusive language. The court martial, after hearing the prisoner's confession and the testimony of John Haines, do adjudge ..that the said .Galloway may Camp Life at Fort Meigs - 181 return to his company, and parade with the general fatigue on the 5th and 6th inst., and do that duty faithfully these two days. Attst: Samuel Bayless, Judge Advocate. Approved: James Mills Colonel First Regiment Third Div. O. M. [GENERAL ORDER.] HEADQUARTERS FRANKLINTON, June 13, 1813. The commanding General, with great satisfaction, communicates the following extract from a letter of the honorable Secretary of War, viz: “The President has been pleased to direct that I should. commuicate to you, and through you to the troops composing the garrison of Fort Nleigs, his thanks for the valor and patriotism they displayed in the defense of that post. And particularly to the different corps employed in sorties made on the 5th of May." The General is persuaded that the gallant troops which served at Fort Meigs will duly appreciate the approbation of the Chief Magistrate of their country, and that it will prove a stimulus to future exertion. ROBERT BUTLER, Captain 24th Beg. Taft., A. A. A. G. for Z. Bailey. [REGIMENTAL COURT MARTIAL.] FORT MEIGS, June 26, 1813. I herewith commit Thomas Gregory, who is charged with abusing and threatening me as First Sergeant of Captain Hamilton's company. JOHN HAINES, First Sergeant. Captains Shane and Holfield, and Ensign McMaken, sworn. Samuel Bayless, Judge Advocate, sworn. Question—Do you plead guilty or not guilty ? Answer—Not quilty. Adam Stonebraker, sworn, deposeth and saith that the evening said Gregory was sent to provost guard, he said he would threaten and abuse said Haines until saith until he sent him to the provost-guard, and further saith not. Robert Jordon, sworn, deposeth and saith that he did not hear paid Gregory threaten or abuse said, Sergeant Haines on the 26th of June, and further saith not. On being re-summoned, saith that before that time said Gregory had threatened said Haines, and shook his fist at him, and said that he would break his cabbage head. The court martial, after seeing the charge and hearing the testimony, do adjudge that the said Thomas Gregory was guilty of .the ",Large against him, and we do sentence him to acknowledge his fault to and ask forgiveness of his Orderly Sergeant in presence of 182 - The American Naval Vessels Threatened. the battalion, or be compelled to go on fatigue for three days, and put in the. guard house each night; at his option; and that this sea fence shall be read on batallion parade by the Adjutant this evening PATRICK SHAW, President. Attest : Samuel Bayless, Judge Advocate. Approved : James Mills, Colonel First Req. Third Dept. 0. M. [GENERAL ORDER.] CAMP MEIGS, July 4, 1818. The General commanding announces to the troops under his command the return of this day, which gave. liberty and independence to the United States of America; and orders that a national salute be fired under the superintendence of Captains Gratiot and Cushing All the troops reported fit for duty shall receive an extra gill of whisky. And those in confinement and those under sentence attached to, their corps, be forthwith released and ordered to join their respective corps. The General is induced to use this lenience alone from consideration of the ever memorable day, and flatters himself that in future, the soldiers under his command will better appreciate their liberty by a steady adherence to duty and prompt compliance with the orders of their officers, by which alone they are worthy to enjoy the blessings of that liberty and independence, the only real legacy left us by our fathers. All courts martial now constituted in this camp are hereby dissolved. There will be fatigue this day. ROBERT BUTLER, A. Adjt. Gen. [GENERAL ORDER.] CAMP MEIGS, July 8, 1813. The commanding General directs that the old guard, on being released, will march out of camp and discharge their arms at a target placed in some secure position, and as a reward for those who may excel in shooting, eight gills of whisky will be given to the nearest shot, and four gills to the second. The officer of the guard will cause a return, signed for that purpose, signifying the names of the men entitled to the reward. By order of G. CLAY, Gen. Coin. Robert Butler, A. Adjt. Gen. The ship building going on at. Erie had not, meanwhile, been unknown to, or disregarded by the English, who proposed all in good time to destroy the vessels upon which so much depended and to appropriate the stores of the Americans. "The ordnance and naval stores you require,'' said. Sir George Prevost to General Captain Barclay's Arrangements - 183 Proctor, “must be taken from the enemy, whose resources on Lake Erie must become yours. I am much mistaken, if you do not, find Captain Barclay disposed to play that game." Captain Barclay was an experienced, brave, and able seaman, and was waiting anxiously for a sufficient body of troops to be spared him, in order to attack Erie with success. A sufficient force was promised him on the 18th of July, at which time the British fleet went down the lake to reconnoitre, and, if it were wise, to make the proposed attempt upon the Americans at Erie. None, however, was made. Finding no progress made, Proctor next moved to Lower Sandusky, into the neighborhood of the Commander-in-Chief. The principal stores of Harrison were at Upper Sandusky, while he himself was at Seneca, and Major Croghan at Fort Stephenson or Lower Sandusky. This latter post being deemed indefensible against heavy cannon, and it being supposed that Proctor would of course bring heavy cannon if he attacked it, the General, and a council of war called by him, thought it wisest to abandon it ; but before this could be done, after the final determination of the matter, the appearance of the enemy upon the 31st of July, made it impossible. The garrison of the little fort was composed of one hundred and fifty men, under a commander just past his twenty-first year, and with a single piece of cannon, while the investing force, including Tecumseh's Indians. was, it is said, three thousand strong, and with six pieces of artillery, all of them, fortunately, light ones. Several days before the British had invested Fort Meigs, General Harrison, with Major Croghan and some other officers, had examined the heights which surround Fort Stephenson ; and as the hill on the opposite or southeast side of the river was found to be the most commanding eminence, the General had some thoughts of removing the fort to that place, and Major Croghan declared his readiness to undertake the work. But the General did not authorize him to do it, as he believed that if the enemy intended to invade our territory again, they would do it before the removal could be completed. It Was then finally concluded that the fort, which was calculated for a garrison of only 200 men, could not be defended against the heavy artillery of the enemy; and that if the British should approach it by Water, which would cause a presumption that they had brought their heavy artillery, the fort must be abandoned and burnt, provided 3 retreat could be effected with safety, In the orders left with Major 184 - Military Inspection of Fort Stephenson Croghan, it was stated—" Should the British troops approach you in force with cannon, and you can discover them in time to effect a retreat, you will do so immediately, destroying all the public stores. " You must be aware that the attempt to retreat in the face of an Indian force, would be in vain. Against such an enemy your garri- son would be safe, however great the number." On the evening of the 29th, General Harrison received intelligence by express, from General Clay; that the enemy had abandoned the siege of Fort Meigs; and as the Indians on that day had swarmed in the woods round his camp, he entertained no doubt b1.4 that au immediate attack was intended either on Sandusky or Seneca. Ile therefore immediately called a council of war, consisting of M'Arthur, Cass, Ball, Paul, Wood, Hukill. Holmes and Graham, who were unanimously of the opinion that Fort Stephenson was untenable against heavy artillery, and that as the enemy could bring with facility any quantity of battering cannon against it, by which it must inevitably fall, and as it was an unimportant post, containing nothing the loss of which would be felt by us, that the garrison should therefore not be reinforced, but withdrawn, and the place destroyed. In pursuance of this decision, the General immediately dispatched the order to Major Croghan, directing him immediately to abandon Fort Stephenson, to set it on fire and repair with his command to headquarters—cross the river and come up on the opposite side, and if he should find it impracticable to reach the General's quarters, to take the road to Huron, and pursue it with the utmost circumspection and dispatch. This order was sent by Mr. Conner and two Indians, who lost their way in the dark, and did not reach Fort Stephenson till 11 o'clock the next day. When Major Croghan received it, he was of opinion that he could not then retreat with safety, as the Indians were hovering around the fort in considerable force. He called a council of his officers, a majority of whom coincided with him in opinion that a retreat would be unsafe, and that the post could be maintained against the enemy, at least till further; instructions could be received from headquarters. The Major there fore immediately returned the following answer: " SIR—, I have just received yours of yesterday, 10 o'clock P. M., ordering me to destroy this place and make good my retreat, which was received too late to be carried into execution. We have determined to maintain this place, and by heavens we can." Heroic Defence of Fort Stephenson - 185 Fort Sandusky and Environs : scale, 200 yards to the inch.   In writing this note, Major Croghan had a view to the probability of its falling into the hands of the enemy, and on that account made use of stronger language than would otherwise have been consistent with propriety. It reached the General on the same day, wile did not fully understand the circumstances and motives under which it had been dictated. The following order was therefore immediately prepared, and sent with Colonel Wells in the morning, escorted by Colonel Ball, with his corps of dragoons: "July 30, 1813. SIR—The General has just received your letter of this date, informing him that you had thought proper to disobey the order 186 - Satisfactory a Explanations of Croghan. issued from this office, and delivered to you this morning. It appears that the information which dictated the order was incorrect and 4.8 you did not receive it in the night, as was expected, it might have been proper that you should have reported the circumstance and your situation, before you proceeded to its execution. This might have been passed over; but I am directed to say to you, that an officer who presumes to aver that he has made his resolution, and that he will act in direct opposition to the orders of his general, can no longer be entrusted with a separate command. Colonel Wells is sent to relieve you. You will deliver the command to him, and repair with Colonel Ball's squadron to this place. By command, &c., " A. H. HOLMES, As*. Adj't. General."  Colonel Wells being left in the command of Fort Stephenson, Major Croghan returned with the squadron to headquarters. He there explained his motives for writing such a note, which were deemed satisfactory; and having remained all night with the General, who treated him politely, he was permitted to return to his command in the morning, with written orders similar to those he had received before. A reconnoitering party which had been sent from headquarters to the shore of the lake, about twenty miles distant from Fort Stephenson, discovered the approach of the enemy, by water, on the evening of the 31st of July. They returned by the fort after 12 o'clock the next day, and had passed it but a few hours, when the enemy made their appearance before it. The Indians showed themselves first on the hill over the river, and were saluted by a six-pounder, the only piece of artillery in the fort, which soon caused them to retire. In half an hour the British gun-boats came in sight, and the Indian forces displayed themselves in every direction, with a view to intercept the garrison, should a retreat be attempted. The six-pounder was fired a few times at the gun-boats, which was returned by the artillery of the enemy. A landing of their troops with a five-and-a- half inch howitzer, was effected about a mile below the fort ; and Major Chambers, accompanied by Dixon, was dispatched towards the fort with a flag, and was met on the part of Major Croghan by Ensign Shipp, of the 17th Regiment. After the usual ceremonies, Major Chambers observed to Ensign Shipp, that he was instructed by General Proctor to demand the surrender of the fort, as he was anxious to spare the effusion of human blood, which he could not do, should he be under Ensign, Shipp—Remarkable Interview - 187 the necessity of reducing it by the powerful force of artillery, regulars and Indians under his command. Shipp replied that the commandant of the fort and its garrison. were determined to defend it to the last extremity ; that no force, however great, could induce them to surrender, as they were resolved to maintain their post, or to bury themselves in its ruins. Dickson then said that their immense body of Indians could not be restrained from murdering the whole garrison in case of success, of which we have no doubt, rejoined Chambers, as we are amply prepared. Dickson then proceeded to remark, that it vas a great pity so fine a young man should fall into the hands of the savages—" Sir, for God's sake, surrender, and prevent the dreadful massacre that will be caused by your resistance." Mr. Shipp replied, that when the fort was taken, there would be uone to massacre. It will not be given up while a man is able to resist. An Indian at this moment came out of an adjoining ravine, amid advancing to the Ensign, took hold of his sword and attempted to wrest it from him. Dickson interfered; and having restrained the Indian, affected great anxiety to get him safe into the fort. The enemy now opened their fire from their six-pounders in the gun-boats and the howitzer on shore, which they continued through the night with but little intermission, and with very. little effect. The forces of the enemy consisted. of 500 regulars, and about 800 Indians commanded by Dickson, the whole being commanded by General Proctor in person. Tecumseh was stationed on the road to Fort Meigs with a body of 2,000 Indians, expecting to intercept a reiuforcement on that route. Major Croghan through the evening occasionally fired his six-pounder, at the same time changing its place occasionally to induce fire against that he had more than one piece. As it produced very little execution on the enemy, and lie was desirous of saving his ammu- nition, he soon discontinued his fire. The enemy had directed their tire against the northwest angle of the fort, which induced the commander to believe that an attempt to storm his works would be made at that point. In the night, Captain Hunter was directed to remove the six-pounder to a block-house, from which it would rake that angle. By great industry and personal exertion, Captain Hunter Soon accomplished this object in secrecy; The embrasure was masked, and the piece loaded with a half charge of powder, and a double charge of slugs and grape-shot. Early in the morning of the 2nd the enemy opened their fire from their howitzer and three 188 - A Night's Work- Swift Justice. six-pounders, which they had landed in the night, and planted in a point of woods about 250 yards from the fort. In the evening, about 4 o'clock, they concentrated the fire of all their guns on their north- west angle, which convinced Major Croghan that they would en. deavor to make a breach and storm the works at that point; he therefore immediately had that place strengthened as much as possible with bags of flour and sand, which were so effectual that the picketing in that place sustained no material injury. Sergeant Weaver, with five or six gentlemen of the Petersburgh Volunteers and Pittsburgh Blues, who happened to be in the fort-, was entrusted with the management of the six-pounder. Late in the evening, when the smoke of the firing had completely enveloped the fort, the enemy proceeded to- make the assault. Two feints were made towards the southern angle, where Captain Hunter's lines were formed ; and at the same time a column of 350 men was discovered advancing through the smoke; within twenty paces of the northwestern angle. A heavy, galling fire of musketry was now opened upon them from the fort, which threw them into some confusion. Colonel Short, who headed the principal column, soon rallied his men, and led them with great bravery to the brink of the ditch. After a momentary pause he leaped into the ditch, calling to his men to follow him, and in a few minutes it was full. The masked port-hole was now opened, and the six-pounder, at the distance of thirty feet, poured such destruction among them that but few who had entered the ditch were fortunate enough to escape. A precipitate and confused retreat was the immediate consequence, although some of the officers attempted to rally their men. The other column, which was led by Colonel Warburton and Major Chambers, was also routed in confusion by a destructive fire fro m the line commanded by Captain Hunter. The whole of them fled into the adjoining wood, beyond the reach of our fire-arms. During the assault, which lasted half an hour, the enemy kept up an incessant fire from their howitzer and five six-pounders. They left Col. Short,* a lieutenant and twenty-five privates dead, in the ditch ; and the total number of prisoners taken was twenty-six, most of them badly wounded. Major Muir was knocked down in the ditch, and * Colonel Short, who commanded the regulars composing the Forlorn Hope, was ordering his men to leap the ditch, cut down the pickets, an I give the Americans no quarters, when he fell mortally wounded into the ditch, hoisted his white handkerchief on the end of his sword, and begged for that mercy which ho had moment before ordered to be denied to his enemy. The American Victory Complete - 189 lay among the dead, till the darkness of the night enabled him to escape in safety. The loss of the garrison was one killed and seven slightly wounded. The total loss of the enemy could not be less than 150 killed and wounded. When night came on, which was soon after the assault, the wounded in the ditch were in a desperate situation. Complete relief could not be brought to them by either side with any degree of safety. Major Croghan, how, relieved them as much as possible—he contrived to convey them water over the picketing in buckets, and a ditch was opened under the pickets, through which those who were able and willing, were encouraged to crawl into the fort. All who were able, preferred, of course, to follow their defeated comrades, and many others were carried from the vicinity of the fort by the Indians, particularly their own killed and wounded ; and in the night, about 3 o'clock, the whole British and Indian force commenced a disorderly retreat. So great was their precipitation thaf they left a sail-boat containing Some clothing and a considerable quantity of military stores, and on the next day, seventy stand of arms and some braces of pistols were picked up around the fort. Their hurry and confusion were caused by the apprehension of an attack from General Harrison, of whose position and force they had probably received an exaggerated account. It was the intention of General Harrison, should the enemy succeed against Fort Stephenson, or should they endeavor to turn his left and fall on Upper Sandusky, to leave his camp at Seneca and fall back for the protection of that place. But he discovered by the firing on the evening of the 1st, that the enemy had nothing but light artillery, which could make no impression on the fort; and he knew that an attempt to storm it without making a breach, could be successfully repelled by the garrison. He therefore determined to wait for the arrival of 250 mounted volunteers under Colonel Rennick, being the advance of 700 who were approaching by the Way of Upper Sandusky, and then to march against the enemy and raise the siege, if their force was not still too great for his. On the 2d, he sent several scouts to ascertain their situation and force; but the woods were so infested with Indians, that none of them could proceed sufficiently near the fort to make the necessary discoveries. In the night the messenger arrived at headquarters with intelligence that the enemy were preparing to retreat. About 9 o'clock, Major 190 - “General Proctor's Mortifications." Croghan had ascertained from their collecting about their boats, that they were preparing to embark, and had immediately sent an express to the Commander-in-chief with this information. The General now determined to wait no longer for the reinforcements, and immediately set out with the dragoons, with which he reached the fort early in the morning, having ordered Generals McArthur and Cass, who had arrived at Seneca several days before, to follow him with all the disposable infantry at that place, and which at this time was abont 700 men, after the numerous sick, and the force necessary to maintain the position, were left behind. Finding that the enemy had fled entirely from the fort, so as not to be reached by him, and learning that Tecumseh was somewhere in the direction of Fort Meigs, with 2,000 warriors, he immediately ordered the infantry to fall back to Seneca, lest Tecumseh should make an attack on fhat place, or .intercept the small reinforcements advancing from Ohio. In his official report of this affair, General Harrison observes that “It will not be among the least of General Proctor's mortifications, that he has been baffled by a youth, who has just passed his twenty-first year. lie is, however, a hero worthy of his gallant uncle, General George R. Clarke." Captain Hunter, of the 17th Regiment, the second in command, conducted himself with great Propriety; and never was there a set. of finer young fellows than the subalterns, viz.: Lieutenants Johnson and Baylor of the 17th, Meeks of the 7th, and Ensigns Shipp aud Duncan of the 17th. Lieutenant Anderson of the 24th, was also noted fin his good conduct. Being without a command, he solicited Major Croghan for a musket and a post to fight at, which he did with the greatest bravery. " Too much praise," says Major Croghan, " cannot be bestowed on the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates under my command, for their gallantry and good conduct during the siege." The brevet rank of Lieutenant Colonel was immediately conferred on Major Croghan, by the President of the United States, for 108 gallantry on this occasion. The ladies of Chillicothe also presented him an elegant sword, accompanied by a suitable address. We take the above from Dawson's Life of Harrison, where it is quoted from some other source. In defending General Harrison from the charges of cowardice and incompetency in not marching to the aid of the garrison previous to the attack, Dawson says : Justice to General Harrison - 191 The conduct of the .gallant Croghan and his garrison received from every quarter the the plaudits of their countrymen. This was what they most richly deserved. There was, however, some jealous spirits  took it into their heads to be dissatisfied with the course pursued by the commanding general. The order which was given to Colonel Croghan to evacuate and destroy the garrison previously to the attack, was loudly condemned, as well as the decision of the council of war, to fall back with the troops then at Seneca, to a position twelve miles in the rear. Both these measures, it has been said, were determined on by the unanimous advice of the council of war. It is not to be presumed that such men as composed that board, would have given advice which was in any way derogatory to the honor of the American arms. Every individual among them either had, before or afterwards, distinguished himself by acts of daring courage and intrepidity. We do not profess to be much acquainted with military matters, but the subject appears to us so plain as only to require a small portion of common sense perfectly to comprehend it. At the time that the determination was made to withdraw the garrison from Sandusky, it must be recollected that the General had only with him at Seneca about 400 infantry and 130 or 140 dragoons. The enemy, as he was informed by General Clay in the letter brought by Captain M'Cune, amounted to at least 5,000 With such a disparity of force, would it have been proper to have risked an action to preserve the post of Lower Sandusky, which of itself was of little or no importance, and which, the garrison being withdrawn, contained nothing of any value ? The posts of Fort Meigs and Upper Sandusky were of the utmost' importance ; the former was amply provided with the means of defence, and was in no danger; but the latter, weak in its defences, and with a feeble garrison, containing many thousands of barrels of flour and other provisions, the sole resource of the army for the coming campaign, was to be preserved at any risk. The position at Seneca was not in the direct line from Fort Meigs to Upper Sandusky. The enemy, by taking the direct route, would certainly reach it before General Harrison, as several hours must have elapsed before he could have been informed of their movement, even if it had been discovered the moment it had been commenced, a circumstance not very likely to 'happen. It therefore became necessary for the security of Upper Sandusky, that a position better adapted to that purpose should be assumed. There was another and most important reason for this 192 - Justice to General Harrison. movement; twelve miles in the rear of Seneca, towards Upper Sandusky, the prairie or open country commences. The infantry, which the Commander-in-chief had with him were raw recruits; on the contrary, the squadron of dragoons were well disciplined, and had seen much service. In the country about Seneca, this important corps could have been of little service ; in the open country to the rear, they would have defeated five times their number of Indians. It was for these reasons that it was determined by the council of war to change the position of the .troops at Seneca. If this move. .merit did take place, the propriety of withdrawing the garrison of Lower Sandusky was obvious. The place was extremely weak, and in a bad position. It was not intended originally for a fort. Before the war it was used as the United States Indian factory, and had a small stockade around it, merely for the purpose of keeping out drunken Indians. It was, moreover, commanded by a hill, within point-blank shot, on the opposite side of the river. To those who suppose that General Harrison should have advanced upon the enemy, the moment he discovered that Sandusky was attacked, we must, in the language of the general and field officers who were present on the occasion, " leave them to correct their opinions in the school of experience." General Harrison had been reinforced a day or two before the siege of Sandusky, by the 28th Regiment, raised in Kentucky. After having received this corps, he could, not have marched more than 800 effective men without risking his stores, and, what was of still more consequence, 150 sick at Seneca, to be taken by the smallest party of Indiana. The scouts of the 'twiny brought information that the Indians were very numerous in the direction of Fort Meigs. The General conjectured that a large portion of the Indians were then ready to fall on his flank or rear, or the defenseless camp at Seneca, should he advance. The information he received from the British prisoners confirmed this opinion ; a body of 2,000 being there under the command of Tecumseh. At the moment of which we are speaking, the volunteers of Ohio were rapidly approaching. Now, under these circumstances, does any reasonable man believe that General Harrison should have advanced with his 800 raw recruits, against a force in front which he knew to be so much superior in numbers, and with the probability of having one equally large hanging on, his flank ? What would have been thought of his abilities as general, even if he had been successful against General Proctor, (of which, with his small force, there was The Naval Victory on, Erie - 193 if in his absence Tecumseh, with his 2,000 warriors, had rushed upon Camp Seneca, destroyed his stores, tomahawked his sick soldiers, and pursuing his route towards Upper Sandusky, defeated the Ohio volunteers, scattered as they were in small bodies, and finally ending his career with the destruction of the grand magazine of his army, upon the preservation of which all his hopes of future success depended ? In all human probability this would have been the result, had General Harrison advanced to the relief of Fort Stephenson sooner than he did. It was certainly better to risk for a while the defence of that fort to the talents and valor of Croghan, and the gallant spirits who were with him, than to jeopardise the whole prospects of the campaign. The next event in the history of this war which claims attention, is the naval victory upon Lake Erie, achieved by Commodore Perry, a description of which is annexed from Perkins' Late War : At Erie, Commodore Perry was directed' to repair and superintend a naval establishment, the object of which was to create a superior force on the lake. The difficulties of building a navy in the wilderness can only be conceived by those who have experienced them. There was nothing at this spot out of which it could be built, but the timber of the forest. Ship builders, sailors, naval stores, guns and ammunition, were to be transported by land, over bad roads, a distance of four hundred miles, either from Albany by the way of Buffalo, or from Philadelphia by the way of P ittsburgh Under all these embarrassments, by the first of August, 1813, Commodore Perry had provided a flotilla, consisting of the ships Lawrence and Niagara, of twenty guns each, and seven smaller vessels, to wit, one of four guns, one of three, two of two, and three of one ; in the whole fifty-four guns. While the ships were building, the enemy frequently appeared off the harbor and threatened their destruction; but the shallowness of the water on the bar—there being but five feet—prevented their approach. The same cause which insured the safety of the ships while building, seemed to prevent their being of any service. The two largest drew several feet more water than there was on the bar. The inventive genius of Commodore Perry, however, soon surmounted the difficulty. He placed large SCOWS on each side of the two largest ships, filled them so as to sink to the water's edge, then attached them to the ships by strong pieces of timber, and pumped out the water. The scows then buoyed up the ships so as to pass the bar in safety. This operation - 14 - 194 - The Naval Victory On Erie was performed on bath the large ships in the presence of a superior enemy. Having gotten his fleet in readiness, Commodore Perry proceeded to the head of the lake, and anchored in Put-in-Bay opposite to, and distant thirty miles from Malden, where the British: fleet lay under the guns of the fort. He lay at anchor here several days watching the motions of the enemy, determined to give him battle the first favorable opportunity the 10th of September, at sunrise, the British fleet, consisting of one ship of nineteen guns, one of seventeen, one of thirteen, one of ten, one of three, and one of one, amounting to sixty-four, and exceeding the Americans by ten guns, under command of Commodore Barclay, appeared off Put-in- Bay distant about ten miles. Commodore Perry immediately got under weigh, with a light breeze at southwest. At 10 o'clock the wind hauled to the southeast, which brought the American squadron to the windward and gave them the weather age. Commodore Perry, on board the Lawrence, then hoisted his union jack, having for a motto .the dying wows of Captain Lawrence, " Don't give up the ship," which was received with repeated cheers by the crew. He then formed the line of battle and bore up for the enemy, who at the same time hauled his courses and prepared for action. The lightness of the wind occasioned the hostile squadrons to approach each other but slowly, and prolonged for two hours the solemn interval of suspense and anxiety which precedes a battle. The order and regularity of naval discipline heightened the dreadful quiet of the moment noise, no bustle prevailed to distract the mind, except at intervals the shrill pipings of the boatswain's whistle or a murmuring whisper among the men, who stood around their guns with lighted matches narrowly watching the movements of the foe, and sometimes stealing a glance at the countenances of their commanders this manner the hostile fleets neared each other in awful silence. At fifteen minutes after eleven a bugle was sounded on board the enemy's headmost ship, Detroit, loud cheers burst from all her crews, and a tremendous fire opened upon the Lawrence from the British long guns, which, from the shortness of the Lawrence's, she was obliged to sustain for forty minutes Without being able to return a shot. Commodore Perry, without waiting for the other ships, kept on his course in such gallant and determined style, that the enemy supposed he meant immediately to board. At five minutes before twelve, having gained a nearer position, the Lawrence opened her The Naval Victory on Erie - 195 fire, but the long guns of the British still gave them greatly the advantage and the Lawrence was exceedingly cut up without being able to do but very little damage in return. Their shot pierced her sides in all directions, killing the wounded in the berth-deck and steerage, where they had been carried to be dressed. One shot had nearly produced a fatal explosion ; passing through the light room it knocked the snuff of a candle into the magazine ; fortunately, the gunner saw it and had the coolness to instantly extinguish it. It appeared to be the enemy's plan at all events to destroy the Commodore's ship ; their heaviest fire was directed against the Lawrence, and blazed incessantly from all their largest vessels. Commodore Perry, finding the hazard of his situation, made all sail and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose of closing with the enemy. The tremendous fire, however, to which he was exposed, soon cut away every brace and bowline of the Lawrence, and she became unmanageable. The other vessels were unable to get up ; and in this disastrous situation she sustained the main force of the enemy's fire for upwards of two hours, within cannister distance, though a considerable part of the time not more than two or three of her guns could be brought to bear on her antagonist. The utmost order and regularity prevailed during this scene of horror; as fast as the men at the guns were wounded they were carried below, and others stepped into their places ; the dead remained where they fell until after the action. At this juncture the enemy believed the battle to be won. The Lawrence was reduced to a mere wreck ; her deck was streaming with blood and covered with mangled limbs and bodies of the slain; nearly the whole of her crew were either killed or wounded ; her guns were dismounted, and the Commodore and his officers helped to work the last that was capable of service. At two, Captain Elliot was enabled by the aid of a fresh breeze, to bring his ship into close action in gallant style ; and the Commodore immediately determined to shift his flag on board that ship; and giving his Own in charge to Lieutenant Yarnell, he hauled down his union jack, and taking it under his arm, ordered a boat to put him on board the Niagara. Broadsides were levelled at his boat, and a shower of musketry from three of the enemy's ships. He arrived safe and hoisted his union jack, with its animating motto, on board the Niagara. Captain Elliott, by direction of the Commodore, immediately put off in a boat to bring up the schooners, which had been kept back by the lightness of the wind. At this moment the 196 - The Naval Victory on Erie. flag of the Lawrence was hauled down. She had sustained the principal force of the enemy'§ fire for two hours, and was rendered incapable of defence. Any further show of resistance would have been a useless sacrifice of the relics of her brave and mangled crew. The enemy were at the same time so crippled that they were usrl. able to take possession of her, and circumstances soon enabled her crew to again hoist her flag. Commodore Perry now gave the signal to all the vessels for close action. The small vessels under the direction of Captain Elliott, got out their sweeps and made all sail. Finding the Niagara but little injured, the Commodore determined upon the bold and desperate expedient of breaking the enemy's line ; he accordingly bore up and passed the head of the two ships and brig, giving them a raking fire from his starboard guns, and also a raking fire upon a large schooner and sloop from his larboard quarter, at half pistol shot. Having gotten the whole squadron into action, he lulled and laid his ship alongside the British Commodore. The small vessels having now got up within good grape and cannister distance on the other quarter, enclosed the enemy between them and the Niagara, and in this position kept up a most destructive fire on both quarters of the British, until every ship struck her colors. The engagement lasted about three hours, and never was victory more decisive and complete. More prisoners were taken than there were men on board the American squadron at the close of the action. The principal loss in killed and wounded was on board the. Lawrence, before the other vessels were brought into action. Of her crew, twenty-two were killed and sixty wounded, When her flag was struck, but twenty men remained on deck fit for duty- The loss on board of all the other vessels; was only five killed and thirty-six wounded. rube British loss must have been much more considerable. Commodore Barclay was dangerously wounded. He had lost one arm at the battle of Trafalgar. The other was now rendered useless by the loss of a part of his shoulder-blade; he received also a severe wound in the hip. Commodore Perry, in his official dispatch, speaks in the highest terms of respect and commisseration for his wounded antagonist, and asks leave to grant him an immediate parole. Of Captain Elliott, his second in command, he says, " that he is already so well known to the government that it would be almost superfluous to speak. In this action he evinced his characteristic bravery and The Naval Victory on Erie - 197 judgment, and since the close of it has given me the most able and essential assistance." The bold and desperate measure of pressing d nto action with the Lawrence alone, and exposing her to forwars into the whole fire of the enemy's fleet for two hours, before the other ships could be got up, has been censured as rash and not warranted by the rules of naval war ; but there are seasons when the commander must rely more on the daring promptness of his measures than on nice calculations of comparative strength. Neither Bonaparte nor Nelson ever stopped to measure accurately the strength of the respective combatants. The result is the acknowledged and generally the best criterion of merit ; and it should not detract from the eclat of the successful commander, that his measures were bold and decisive. Two days after the battle, two Indian chiefs, who had been selected for their skill as marksmen, and stationed in the tops of the Detroit for the purpose of picking off the American officers, were found snugly stowed away in the hold of the Detroit. These savages, who had been accustomed to ships of no greater magnitude than what they could sling on their backs, when the action became warm were so panic-struck at the terrors of the scene and the strange perils that surrounded them, that, looking at each other with amazement, they vociferated their significant "quonh," and precipitately descended to the hold. In their British uniforms hanging in bags upon their famished bodies, they were brought before Commodore Perry, fed, and discharged ; no further parole being necessary to prevent their afterwards engaging in the contest. The slain of the crews both of squadrons were committed to the lake immediately after the action. The next day the funeral obsequies of the American and British officers who had fallen, were performed at an opening on the margin of the bay, in an appropriate and affecting manner. The crews of both fleets united in the ceremony. The stillness of the weather—the procession of boats—the music—the slow and regular motion of the oars, striking in exact time with the notes of the solemn dirge—the mournful waving of the flags—the sound of the minute-guns from all the ships—the wild and solitary aspect of the place—gave to these funeral rites a most impressive influence, and forming an affecting contrast with the terrible conflict of the preceding day. Then the people of the two squadrons were engaged in the deadly strife of, arms ; now they were associated as brothers to pay the last tribute of respect to the slain of both nations. 198 - Arrangements for invading Canada. Two American officers. Lieutenant Brooks and Midshipman Laub of the Lawrence ; and three British, Captain Finnis and Lieutenant Stoke, of the Charlotte, and Lieutenant Garland, of the Detroit, lie interred by the side of each other in this lonely place on the margin of the lake, a few paces from the beach. This interesting battle was fought midway of the lake, between the two hostile armies, who lay on the opposite shores, waiting in anxious expectation its result. The allied British and Indian forces to the amount of four thousand five hundred, under Proctor and Tecumseh, were at Malden, ready, in case of successful issue, to renew their ravages on the American borders. Meanwhile, the American army had received its reinforcements, and was only waiting the expected victory of the fleet to embark. On the 27th of September, it set sail for the shore of Canada, and in a few hours stood around the ruins of the deserted and wasted Malden, from which Proctor had retreated to Sandwich, intending to ' make his way to the heart of Canada, by the valley of the Thames. Previous to his departure, however, General Harrison addressed Governor Meigs as follows : FRANKLINTON, September 22d, 1813. Be pleased to send a company of one hundred men to Fort Meigs. Thirty or forty will do for Lower Sandusky. I am informed that the term of the garrison at Fort Findlay will expire on the 22d instant. Will you be pleased to order there twenty or thirty men ? Yours respectfully, WM. HENRY HARRISON. To His Excellency Governor R. J.J-eigs. On the 29th, Harrison was at Sandwich, and McArthur took possession of Detroit and the territory of Michigan. At this point Colonel Johnson's mounted rifle regiment, which had, gone up the west side of the river, rejoined the main army on the 2d of October, the Americans began their march in pursuit of Proctor, whom they overtook upon the 5th. He had posted his army with its left resting upon the river, while the right flank was defended by a marsh ; the ground between the river and the marsh was divided lengthwise by a smaller swamp, so as to make two distinct fields in which the troops were to oparate. The British were in two lines, occupying the field between the river and small swamp ; the Indians extended Americans Follow their Victory - 199 from small to the large morass, the ground being suitable to their mode of warfare, warfare, and unfavorable for cavalry. Harrison at first ordered the mounted Kentuckians to the left of the American army, that is, to the field farthest from the river, in order to act against the Indians, while with his infantry formed in three lines, and strongly protected on the left flank to secure it against the savages, he proposed to meet the British troops themselves. Before the battle commenced, however, he learned two facts, which induced him to change his plans ; one was the bad nature of the ground on his left for the operations of horse; the other was the open order of the English regulars, which made them liable to a fatal attack by cavalry. Learning these things, Harrison, but whether upon his own suggestion or not, we cannot say, ordered Colonel Johnson with his mounted men to charge, and try to break the regular troops, by passing through their ranks and forming in their rear. In arranging to do this, Johnson found his space between the river and small swamp too narrow for all his men to act in with effect ; so, dividing them, he gave the right hand body opposite the regulars in charge to his brother James, while crossing the swamp with the remainder, he himself led the way against Tecumseh and his savage followers. The charge of James Johnson was perfectly successful ; the Kentuckians received the fire of the British, broke through their ranks, and forming beyond them, produced such a panic by the novelty of the attack, that the whole body of troops yielded at once. On the left the Indians fought more obstinately, and the horsemen were forced to dismount, but in ten minutes Tecumseh was dead, and his followers, who had learned the fate of their allies, soon gave up the contest. In half an hour all was over, except the pursuit of Proctor, who had fled at the onset. The whole number in both armies was about five thousand ; the whole number killed, less than forty, so entirely was the affair decided by panic. We have thus, says Mr. Perkins in his Western Annals, given an outline of the battle of the Thames, which practically closed the war in the Northwest ; and to our own we add part of Harrison's official statement. "The troops at my disposal consisted of about one hundred and twenty regulars of the 27th regiment, five brigades of Kentucky volunteer militia infantry, under his excellency Governor Shelby, averaging less than five hundred men, and Colonel Johnson's regiment of mounted infantry, making in the whole an aggregate some-