Indian Policy of the United States - 75 severity. It will be left to your discretion whether to employ, attainable, any Indians of the six nations, and the Chickasaws or other northern nations. Most probably the employment of about fifty of each, under the direction of some discreet and able chief, would be advantageous, but these ought not to be assembled before the line of march was taken up, because they are soon tired and will not be detained. The force contemplated for the garrison of the Miami village and the communications has been from a thousand to twelve hundred non-commissioned officers and privates. This is mentioned as a general idea, to which you will adhere, or from which you will deviate, as circumstances may require. The garrison stationed at the Miami village, and its communications, must have in store at least six months' good salted 'meat, and flour in proportion. " It is hardly possible, if the Indians continue hostile, that you will be suffered quietly to establish a post at the Miami village ; conflicts, therefore, may be expected ; and it is to be presumed that disciplined valor will triumph over the undisciplined Indians. " In this event it is probable that the Indians will sue for peace. If this should be the case, the dignity of the United States will require that the terms should be liberal. In order to avoid future wars, it might be proper to make the Wabash, and thence over to the "Miami, and down the same to its mouth, at Lake Erie, the boundary, excepting so far as the same should relate to the Wyandots and Delawares, on the supposition of their continuing faithful to the treaties. But if they should join in the war against the United States, and your army be victorious, the said tribes ought to be removed without the boundary mentioned. You will also judge whether it would be proper to extend the boundary, from the mouth of the River au Pause of the Wabash, in a due west line to the Mississippi. Few Indians, besides the Kickapoos, would he affected by such a line ; this ought to be tenderly managed. The modification of the boundary must be confided to your discretion, with this single observation, that the policy and interest of the United States dictate their being at peace with the Indians. This is of more value than millions of uncultivated acres, the right to which may be conceded by some. and disputed by others. The establishment of a post at the Miami village, will probably be regarded, by the British officers on the frontier, as a circumstance of jealousy. It may, therefore, be necessary that you should, at a proper time, make such intimations as may remove all such dispositions, This intimation 76 - St. Clair's Army in Motion. had better follow than precede the possession of the post, unless circumstances dictate otherwise. As it is not the inclination or interest of the United States to enter into a contest with Gre Britain, every measure tending to any discussion or alternation mus be prevented. The delicate situation of affairs may, therefor render it improper at present to make any naval arrangement upo Lake Erie. After you shall have effected all the injury to the hostil Indians of which your force may be capable, and after having established the posts and garrisons at the Miami village and its communications, and placing the same under the orders of an offic worthy of such high trust, you will return to Fort Washington, o the Ohio." Thus entrusted and commissioned, St. Clair proceeded with al possible celerity to execute instructions, reaching Pittsburg, wher troops, horses and supplies were gathering, late in April; but th fulfillment of his mission and the designs of the government suffered unexpected delay. Arriving at .Fort Washington, May 15th he found himself stronger in " instructions " than in the means fo carrying them into effect. He had only two hundred and sixty-four available non-commissioned officers and privates. July 15th, th first regiment of two hundred and ninety-nine men joined him, an General Butler's recruits added to his forces; but there was deficiency of money, provisions and stores. Knapsacks, pack saddles, tents, kettles, were defective, while damaged powder, arms and accouterments, and almost entire lack of tools to make th necessary repairs, contributed to the difficulties. Another source of anxiety arose, through the demoralization of the soldiers, in their intemperance, compelling St. Clair, as a reformatory measure, to remove the army to Lndlow's Station, some six mile from Fort Washington, which more than doubled the contracted cost of provision for the troops. September 17th, the army, numbering two thousand three hundred, moved forward and erected, at a point on the Great Miami, the first in the line of forts, and named it Fort Hamilton. October 12th, Fort Jefferson was begun, forty miles distant (about six miles south of Greenville, Darke county.) From the 24th, the army marched through the wilderness, under the most discouraging circumstances of almost impassable roads, insufficient rations, sickness And desertion in great 'lumbers, until November 3d, when St. Clair's Report - 77 they reached a branch of the Wabash, a little south of the St. Mary's, for which St. Clair mistook the stream. The details of the encampment here, and the disastrous defeat of November 4th, are extracted from the commanding general's letter to the Secretary of War, on his return to Fort Washington. " The right wing, composed of Butler's, Clark's, and Patterson's battalions, commanded by Major General Butler, formed the first line ; and the left wing, consisting of Bedinger's and Gaither's battalions, and the second regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Darke, formed the second line, with an interval between them of about seventy yards, which was all the ground would allow. The right flank was pretty well secured by the creek; a steep bank and Faulkner's corps, some of the cavalry, and their picquets, covered the left flank. The militia were thrown over the creek, and advanced about a quarter of a mile, and encamped in the same order. There were a few Indians who appeared on the opposite side of the creek, but fled with the utmost precipitation, on the advance of the militia: At this place, which I judged to be about fifteen miles from the Miami village, I determined to throw up a slight work, the plan of which was concerted that evening with Major Ferguson, wherein to have deposited the men's knapsacks, and everything else that was not of absolute necessity, and to have moved on to attack the enemy as soon as the first regiment was come up. But they did not permit me to execute either ; for, on the 4th, about half an hour before sunrise, and when the men had just been dismissed from parade, (for it was a constant practice to have them all under arms a considerable time before daylight,) an attack was made upon the militia. These gave way in a very little time, and rushed into camp through Major Butler's battalion, (which, together with a part of Clark's, they threw into considerable disorder, and which, notwithstanding the exertions of both those officers, was never altogether remedied) the Indians following close at their heels. The fire, however, of the front line checked them ; but almost instantly a very heavy attack began upon that line; and in a few minutes it was extended to the second likewise. The great Weight of it was directed against the center of each, where the artillery was placed, and from which the men were repeatedly driven With great slaughter. Finding no great effect from our fire, and confusion beginning to spread from the great number of men who Were falling in all quarters, it became necessary to try what could 78 - Explanations of the Disaster. be done by the bayonet. Lieutenant Colonel Darke was accordingly ordered to make a charge with part of the second line, and to turn the left flank of the enemy. This was executed with great spirit. The Indians instantly gave way, and were driven back three or four hundred yards ; but for want Of a sufficient number of riflemen to pursue this advantage, they soon returned, and the troops were obliged to give back in their turn. At this moment they had entered our camp by the left flank, having pushed back the troops that were posted there. Another charge was made here by the second regiment, Butler's and Clark's battalions, with equal effect, and it was repeated several times, and always with success ; but in all of them many men were lost, and particularly the officers, which, with so raw troops, was a loss altogether irremediable. In that I just spoke of, made by the second regiment and Butler's .battalion, Major Butler was dangerously wounded, and every officer of the second regiment fell except three, one of which, Mr. Greaton, was shot through the body. " Our artillery being now silenced, and all the officers killed except Captain Ford, who was very badly wounded, and more than half of the army fallen, being cut off from the road it became necessary to attempt the regaining it, and to make a retreat impossible. To this purpose the remains of the army was formed as well as circumstances would admit, towards the right of the encampment, from which, by the way of the second line, another charge was made upon the enemy, as if with the design to turn their right flank, but in fact to gain the road. This was effected, and as soon as it was open, the militia took along it, followed by the troops ; Major Clarke, with his battalion, covering the rear. " The retreat in those circumstances, was, you may be sure, a very precipitate one. It was, in fact, a flight. The camp and artillery were abandoned ; but that was unavoidable ; for not a horse was left alive to have drawn it off; had it otherwise been possible. But the most disgraceful part of the business is, that the greater part of the men threw away their arms and accoutrements, even after the pursuit, which continued about four miles, had ceased. I found the road strewed with them for many miles, but was not able to remedy it ; for, having had all my horses killed, and being mounted upon one that could not be pricked out of a walk, could not get forward myself; and the orders I sent forward either to halt the front, or to prevent the men from parting with their arms, were The Defeat Explained - 79 unattended to. The rout continued quite to Fort Jefferson, twenty-nine miles, which was reached a little after sun-setting. The action began about half an hour before sunrise, and the retreat was attempted at half an hour after nine o'clock. I have not yet been able to get returns of the killed and wounded ; but Major General Butler, Lieutenant Colonel Oldham, of the militia, Major Ferguson, Major Hart, and Major Clarke are among the former; Colonel Sargeant, my Adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel Darke, Lieutenant Colonel Gibson, Major Butler, and the Viscount Malartie, who served me as an Aid-de-camp, are among- the latter ; and a great number of captains and subalterns in both. " I have now, sir, finished my melancholy tale—a tale that will be felt sensibly by every one who has sympathy for private distress, or for public misfortune. I have nothing, sir, to lay to the charge of the troops, but their want of discipline, which, from the short time they had been in service, it was impossible they should have acquired, and which rendered it very difficult, when they were thrown into confusion, to reduce them again to order, and is one reason why the loss has fallen so heavy on the officers, who did every thing in their power to effect it. Neither were my own exertions wanting ; but, worn down with illness, and suffering under a painful disease, unable either to mount or dismount a horse without assistance, they were not so great as they otherwise would, and perhaps ought to have been. We were overpowered by numbers; but it is no more than justice to observe, that, though composed of so many different species of troops, the utmost harmony prevailed through the army during the campaign. At Fort Jefferson found the first regiment, which had returned from the service they had been sent upon, without either overtaking the deserters, or meeting the convoy of provisions. I am not certain, sir, whether I ought to consider the absence of this regiment from the field of action, as fortunate or otherwise. I incline to think it was fortunate, for, I very much doubt whether, had it been in the action, the fortune of the day had been turned; and, if it had not, the triumph of the enemy would have been more complete, and the country would have been destitute of every means of defence. Taking a view of the situation of our broken troops at Fort Jefferson, and that there was no provision in the fort, I called upon the field officers, viz Lieutenant Colonel Darke, Major Hamtramck, Major Zeigler and Major Gaither, together with the Adjutant General, (Winthrop Sargent) for their advice what would 80 - The Defeat Explained. be proper further to be done; and it was their unanimous opinion, that the addition of the first regiment, unbroken as it was, did not put the army on so respectable a foot as it was in the morning, because a great part of it was now unarmed ; that it had been then found unequal to the enemy, and should they come on, which vas possible, would be found so again ; that the troops could not be thrown into the fort, both because it was too small, and that there were no provisions in it ; that provisions were known to he upon the road, at the distance of one, or at most, two marches ; that therefore, it would be more proper to move without loss of time, to meet the provisions, when the men might the sooner have an opportunity of some refreshment, and that a proper detachment might be sent back with it to have it safely deposited in the fort. This advice was accepted and the army was put in motion at ten o'clock, and marched all night, and the succeeding day met a quantity of flour. Part of it was distributed immediately, part taken back to supply the army on the "parch to Fort Hamilton, and the remainder, about fifty horse loads, sent forward to Fort Jefferson. The next day a drove of cattle was met with for the some place, and I have information that both got in. The wounded, who had been left at that place, were ordered to be brought to Fort Washington by the return horses. " I have said, sir, in a former part of this letter that we were overpowered by numbers. Of that, however, I have no other evidence but the weight of the fire, which was always a most deadly one, and generally delivered from the ground—few of the enemy showing themselves afoot except when they were charged ; and that in a few minutes our whole camp, which extended above three hundred and fifty yards in length, was entirely surrounded and attacked on all quarters. The loss, sir, the public has sustained by the fall of so many officers, particularly General Butler, and Major Ferguson, cannot be too much regretted ; but it is a circumstance that will alleviate the misfortune in some measure, that all of them fell most gallantly doing their duty. I have had very particular obligations to many of them, as well as to the survivors, but to none more than Colonel Sargent. He has discharged the various duties of his office with zeal, with exactness, and with intelligence, and on all occasions afforded me every assistance in his power, which I have also experienced from my Aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Denny, and the Viscount Malartie, who served with me in the station as a volunteer." Explanations Continued - 81 General Knox assigned as reasons for St. Clair's defeat,-1st the deficiency of good troops; 2d, the want of appropriate training among those he had ; 3d, the lateness of the season. The Committee of the House of Representatives appointed to investigate the matter, reported the causes : 1st, the delay in preparing estimates, &c., for the defence of the frontiers, and the late passage of the Act (March 3d) for that purpose ; 2d, the delay caused by the neglects in the Quartermaster's department ; 3d, the lateness of the season when the expedition was commenced; 4th, the want of discipline and experience in the troops ; and especially exonerated General St. Clair from all blame in connection with the disaster. J. H. Perkins in his Western Annals calls attention to two causes of the defeat, unnoticed by the Secretary of War and the Committee of Congress ; viz., the surprise by the Indians, who were in no degree expected: by the army ; and the confusion introduced at the outset by the flying militia. Had the attack been expected, the troops prepared, all chance of confusion avoided, and had the very able officers who commanded been obeyed,—with all the disadvantages of raw troops, the event might have been, probably would have been, wholly different. We are then led to ask, how it happened that the troops were surprised ? Were proper measures taken to guard against surprise ? The militia as St. Clair says, were a quarter of a mile in advance of the main army, and beyond the creek ; still farther in advance, was Captain Slough, who, with a volunteer party of regulars, went out to reconnoitre; and orders had been given Colonel Oldham, who commanded the militia, to have the woods thoroughly examined by the scouts and patrols, as Indians were known to be swarming through the forests, and to be hanging about the outskirts of the army. In all this St. Clair seems to have done his entire duty as far as sickness would permit him ; could he have seen in Person to the essential steps it would have been better. During the night Captain Slough, who was a mile beyond the militia, found so large a body of savages gathered about him, that he fell back and reported his observations to General Butler. But the General, for reasons unexplained, made no dispositions in consequence of this information, and did not report it to the Commander-in-chief. Colonel Oldham also obeyed his orders, the woods were searched, and the presence of the enemy detected, but he too reported through Captain Slough, to General Butler, beyond whom the information did not go. The consequence was that in the morning the army was - 7 - 82 - The Terrified Frontier. taken unawares and unprepared. But even thus taken there was a great chance of victory for the United States troops, had they not been thrown into disorder at the outset by the flight of the militia; and this leads us to notice the coincidence of common-sense unin. formed by technical knowledge, with practical military skill, for both (after Harmar's experience of 1790 with the western militia,) would wave forbidden the step taken by St. Clair when he posted his militia in a body in front of the other troops. The experience of Hardin under Harmar, had demonstrated that militia could not be trusted as a military force opposed to Indians, however brave the individuals; as in the war of the Revolution their untrustworthiness as troops, when opposed to regulars, had been experimentally proved; and common sense, if free, unfettered by technical rules, would we think have prevented St. Clair placing his militia as he did. * * * There was nothing, absolutely nothing to excuse the abuse and persecution to which he was afterwards subjected ; but there was, 1st, apparent neglect on the part of General Butler and Colonel Oldham, leading to a surprise ; 2d, a mistaken position assigned the militia by St. Clair, in accordance with the maxims of most officers of the day ; and 3d, a needless adherence to military rules on the part of the Commander-in-chief, which made his force a target for the Indians to shoot at." The final scenes in the melancholy drama of this gallant soldier's and accomplished gentleman's life, are noted under the " Sketch of the old Bench and Bar," in another chapter of this work. The destructive expedition of Generals Scott and Wilkinson into the lower Wabash region during the summer of 1791, added to the efforts of General Harmar in 1790, had inspired the Northwestern Indians with the belief, stimulated by the British, that the government policy was to exterminate the race and seize their lands. This belief was now fully confirmed by the campaign of St. Clair. Inflamed with jealousy and hatred, and elated by the result of their last fierce victory, Indian depredations and barbarities threatened the terrified frontier settlers. The inhabitants proceeded to provide every possible means of defence, while the government adopted the earliest practicable measures for recruiting a military force adequate to the successful encounter of any possible combined Indian force, and sufficient for the establishment of the proposed military stronghold at the Miami villages. General Wame's Campaign - 1794 - 83 After deliberately balancing the peculiar military qualifications necessary in such an expedition, and the abilities of General Wayne, Washington assigned him the command. In June, 1792, General Wayne proceeded to Pittsburg to organize his army; and in December, " Legion of the United States" was assembled at Legionville about twenty miles below Pittsburg. Here they encamped till April, 1793, when, passing down the Ohio, it landed at " Hobson's Choice," (the only point possible in consequence of high waters,) near. Fort Washington, where, remaining until the 7th of October, the legion left Cincinnati. Below is given, with the editor's comments, a journal of the march, taken from Cist's Cincinnati Miscellany. Aside from the freshness of this species of narration, written down on the spur of the moment, which, in the hands of an intelligent waiter, is sure to interest, there are some points worthy of notice. The first is, that distances are described by the "five-mile spring," "seventeen-mile," and " twenty-nine-mile tree," which serves to point out the little improvement which the Miami country at that period afforded, as way-marks on the march. But the letter is especially valuable, as a testimony from beginning to end of the untiring vigilance, and press-forward spirit of Anthony Wayne, which afforded a presage from the first day's march of his peculiar fitness for the hazardous and responsible service on which he was detached by government. CAMP, SOUTHWEST BRANCH MIAMI, October, 22d, 1793. Dear Sir :—Agreeably to promise, I have seized the first opportunity of writing you, and to be methodical in the business, I shall give it to you -by way of journal. 7th October.—Our first day's march was great, considering that the army had not got properly in their gears. I think it was about ten miles. Our second, the 8th, was greater—it reached Fort Hamilton. Many of the men were exceedingly fatigued, and it was pretty generally believed hard marching, though the General thought otherwise, and it must be so. 9th.---Our third day's march was to the five-mile spring, advance of Hamilton. Observe, we fortified our camp every night, and were very vigilant, or ought to be so. 10th.—Our fourth day's march we encamped about the seventeen-mile tree, and nothing nothing extraordinary happened, excepting that our line of march extended for near five miles, owing to the rapidity of the marching and the badness of the roads for our transportation, superadding the straggling soldiers, worn down with fatigue 84 - General Wayne’s Victorious and sickness, brought up by the rear guard, whom they retarded considerably. 11th.— We proceeded on to the twenty-nine-mile tree, fortified as usual, and occupied a fine commanding ground ; and nothing 07 consequence happened here. 12th.—The roads were very bad, and some of our wagons broke down ; but as the General's orders declared there should be n6 interstices, the line of march was not impeded, and we made, say ten miles this day. 13th.—We advanced by tolerably quick movements until we came within a mile or so of Fort Jefferson, and this day furnished a good deal of sport; for as the devil would have it, Colonel Hamtramck was maneuvering his troops, and had a sham fight, which was construed by the whole army, as an attack upon our advance guards or flankers. It really frightened a good many; but we all said, let them come; or, we are ready for them. We had marched hard this day, and I think not so well prepared. However, it was at length discovered to be a sham fight, and every body knew it then. Oh, it was Hamtramck's usual practice ! said they. But it was all in my eye--they never thought of Hamtramck ! 14th.—We marched past Fort Jefferson without even desiring to look at it ; indeed, some of us turned our heads the other way with disdain; and it has been threatened (as report says) to be demolished entirely. This day's march brought us to where I am now sitting, writing to my friend. We fortified our encampment very strong, and feel very secure. 15th.—The wagons were sent back to Fort St. Clair for stores, provisions, etc., with an escort of two subaltern and between eighty and ninety men. And nothing happened extra this day. 16th.—The devil to pay ; Colonel Blue, with near twenty o cavalry, went out to graze the horses of the troops, and after some time Blue discovered something crawling in the grass, which he at first thought was turkeys, but immediately found them to be two Indians, and ordered a charge; himself, two sergeants, and a private charged, the rest ran away, the consequence was, the two Indians killed the two sargeants—Blue and the private escaped. The leafier of the rascals who behaved so cowardly was immediately tried and condemned, but pardoned the next day. 17th.—Lt. Lowry, Ensign, formerly Dr. Boyd, with the escort of ninety men guarding the wagons, were attacked by a party of thirty or forty Indians, who rushed on with savage fury and yells, which panic struck the whole party, (excepting the two officers and fifteen or twenty men, who fell a sacrifice to savage barbarity,) and they all fled, and have been coming into Fort St. Clair by twos and threes every since. The Indians plundered the wagons, and carried off with them sixty-four of the best wagon horses in the army, killing six horses at the wagons in the defeat. Mr. Hunt has been a considerable Campaign - 1794 - 85 loser; his wagon was plundered also. Colonel Adair pursued the Indians, and found several horses dead, which he supposed had been tired and they killed them, a proof that their flight was very rapid. In this attack we have lost two promising, worthy and brave officers, and about twenty men, mostly of Captain Shaylor's company ; for his and Captain Prior's formed the escort, and are both now rather in disgrace. We have been led to believe that this place could have been made the grand deposit, until this day; we now learn that there will be a forward move in the course of ten days, nine miles further into the Indian country place called Still Water ; the reason I can't surmise, but they say, they are very cogent ones. I have no business to pry, but if I should accidentally find it out, you shall be informed. In the meantime believe me to be very sincerely your friend. JNO. M. SCOTT. Late in October, General Wayne .established his winter headquarters, about six miles north of Fort Jefferson, and there erected Fort Greenville, the present site of the town of that name in Darke County. Christmas day, 1793, a detachment re-occupied the ground which had been rendered memorable by the disastrous defeat of St. Clair, three years before, and there built a stockade work, which was significantly called Fort Recovery. During the progress of this work he offered a reward for every human skull found on the battle ground. Six hundred of these relics of carnage were collected and entombed beneath one of the block houses. Says one of the legion, " when we went to lay down in our tents at night, we had to scrape the bones together, and carry them out to make. our beds." [See chapter on Mercer county.] Providing an adequate garrison, General Wayne placed the fort in charge of Captain Alexander Gibson, and during the early months of 1794 actively engaged in preparations for the anticipated blow. Re had already been admonished by incidents of the. march, and the Vigilance of his numerous spies, that an active, dexterous and powerful enemy were in the wilderness surrounding him. The government, always anxious to avoid the carnage of war, had exhausted every means to obtain an amicable adjustment of the difticuities ; although the fact that five different embassies were sent, offering most generous terms of peace to the hostile tribes, attests sincerity of the expressed design on the part of the United States authorities to render full justice to the aborigines. But the Indian successes, with promised British and Spanish assistance, 86 - General Wayne's Victorious rendered them insensible to pacific overtures,—all of which more or less directly rejected, and three of the ambassadors,- men, Trueman and Colonel Hardin—were murdered. In June 1794, before the enemy had left winter quarters, a detac went which had acted as escort of provisions from Fort Recovery fell into an ambush of Indians about a mile from the fort, and we driven back with great loss, the victors continuing the pursuit to the very gates, which they endeavored to enter with the fugitive The siege continued nearly two days, and from General Wayne, despatch we learn that " there was a considerable number of arm white men in the rear, who they frequently heard talk in of language, and encouraging the savages to persevere in the assault; their faces generally blacked." Adds General Wayne, " another strong corroborating fact that .there were British, or British militia in the assault, is, that a number of ounce balls and buck shot were lodged in the block houses and stockades of the fort. It would also appear that the British and savages expected to find the artillery that was lost on the 4th of November 1791, and hid by the Indians in the beds of old fallen timber, or logs which they turned over and laid the cannon in, and then turned the logs back, in their former berth. It was in this artful manner that we found them generally deposited. The hostile Indians turned over a great number of logs, during the assault, in search of these cannon, and other plunder, which they had probably hid in this manner, after the action of November 4th, 1791. I therefore have reason to believe that the British and Indians depended much upon this artillery to assist in the reduction of the fort; fortunately they served in its defence." July 26th, Scott joined Wayne at Greenville with 1,600 mounted, Kentuckians, and on the 28th, the legion took up the track of the' Indians, who had left it obviously marked in their rear, either from the haste in which they made it, or, what is more probable, because they were desirous of luring the army still farther into the recesses of the wilderness. He halted at Girty's town, at the crossing of the St. Mary's, twenty-four miles in advance of Greenville, a sufficient length of time to build Fort Adams, on the bank of that stream. He was enabled to complete his march unobserved, till he arrived almost in sight of An Glaize, the great emporium of the enemy, of which he took possession on the 8th of August, without the loss of a single mail, Campaign-1794 - 87 On the preceding evening the enemy abandoned their settlements and villages, with such apparent marks of surprise and precipitation, as convinced everybody that the approach of the legion was not discovered until a few hours before its arrival, when the fact w aS communicated by Newman, who deserted from the army at St. Mary's. It was manifest that the defection of that villain enabled the Indians to save their persons by a rapid flight; leaving all their property to fall into the hands of the Federal forces. The extensive and highly cultivated fields and gardens, which appeared on every side, exhibited the work of many hands. The margins of the beautiful rivers, Au Glaise and Miami, [of the Lake,] had the semblance of a continued village, for several miles above and below that junction. The first duty of the General, after taking possession of the country, was to erect a strong stockade fort, with four block houses, by way of bastions, at the confluence of the rivers, which he named Fort Defiance. The annexed ,plan and description of Fort Defiance, is found in the memoranda of Benj. Van Cleve, communicated by his son, John W. Van Cleve, of Dayton, to the American Pioneer. At each angle of the fort was a block-house. The one next the Maumee is marked A, having port-holes B, on the three exterior sides, and door D and chimney C on the side facing to the interior. There was a line of pickets on each side of the fort, connecting the block-houses by  their nearest angles. Outside of the pickets and around the block-houses was a glacis, a wall of S earth eight feet thick, sloping upwards and outwards from the feet of the pickets, supported by a log wall on the side of the ditch and by facines, a wall of faggots, on the side next the Auglaize. The ditch, fifteen feet wide and eight feet deep, surrounded the whole work except on the side toward the Auglaize ; and diagonal pickets, eleven feet long and one foot apart, were secured to the log wall and projected over the ditch. E and E were gateways. F was a bank of Fort .Defiance. earth, four feet wide, left for a passage across the ditch. G was a falling gate or drawbridge, which was raised and lowered by pullies, across the ditch, covering it or leaving it uncovered at pleasure. The officers' quarters were at 1i, and the storehouses at I. At K, two lines of pickets converged towards L, which was a ditch eight feet deep, by which water was procured from the river without exposing the carrier to the enemy. M was a small sandbar at the point, 88 - General Wayne's Victorious It had been ascertained by the most recent intelligence, that t enemy were collected in great force—that they had been joined the Detroit militia, and a portion of the regular army—and th they had selected, for the contest, an elevated plain, above the for of the Rapids, on the left bank of the river, over which a tornado had recently passed, and covered the ground with fallen timber, by which it was rendered unfavorable for the action of cavalry. This information, unpleasant as it was, did not excite any serious appr hension, or in the least degree cool the spirit and ardor, of the troops. On the contrary, among the officers and privates, both o the legion and the mounted volunteers, there was but one aspiratio heard, and that was to meet the enemy. Captain Wells, the wily, sagacious, and intrepid warrior of th woods, led his party within so short a distance of the British works as to ascertain that the Indians were encamped under their protec tion. He took one or two prisoners, and made a bold, thoug unsuccessful attempt on a camp of warriors in the night, in which he was wounded. Soon after his return, the army moved slowly and cautiously down the left bank of the Maumee, (or " Miami of the Lake," and sometimes " Omee," as the river was then called.) On the 13th of August, true to the spirit of peace, advised by Washington, General Wayne sent Christian Miller, who had been naturalized among the Shawaneese, as a special messenger to offer terms of friendship. Impatient of delay, he moved forward, and on the 16th, met Miller on his return with the message, that if the Americans would wait ten days at Grand Glaize (Fort Defiance,) they—the Indians—would decide for peace or war. On the 18th, the army arrived at Roche de Boeuf, just south of the site of Waterville, where they erected some light works as a place of deposit for their heavy baggage, which was named Fort Deposit. During the 19th, the army labored at their works, and about eight o'clock on the morning of the 20th, moved forward to attack the Indians, who were encamped at the fallen timbers, on the bank of the Maumee, at and around a hill called "Presque Isle," about two miles south of the site of Maumee city, and four south of the British Fort Miami. This British post had been occupied by a garrison sent from Detroit the previous spring. There could be no misapprehension of the motives which led to this occupation—taking place, as it did, eleven years after the country had been ceded to the United States; and at a time, too, when the angry and protracted negotiation of Campaign - 1794 - 89 veral years relating to it, was supposed to be about terminating in an open rupture. The Indians were all decidedly in favor of the British. With the jealousy natural to weakness, they were always prone to array themselves against the power which most directly pressed upon their destinies, and which they thought most likely to affect them injuriously. The British were fully aware of this feeling, which their agents were zealously active to excite and foster. They saw in it the means of crippling the growth of a young rival, who was stretching out into the West with giant strides, trampling down the forest, and introducing Christianity and civilization. The country had been ceded by a treaty still in force; but new negotiations were then in progress, under the influence of several disastrous defeats, and as the Indians demanded an independent dominion over the country in dispute, the British Government might expect that a surrender, so desirable to them, would at last be granted. A proposition of a similar character was made by the same government towards the close of the second war with Great Britain. The entire independence of the Indians occupying a wide belt on our northwestern frontiers, was formally and seriously demanded, as one of the conditions of peace. As long as the formidable coalition of tribes which General Wayne found in arms, should continue united and hostile, it was evident that the British pretensions and hopes would remain. It was, therefore, of great moment with General Wayne, and with his country, that his present steps should be taken with the utmost prudence. A new defeat, like that which had terminated almost every previous campaign, commencing with the colonial period, about the middle of the last century, would have proved not only destructive to his army, so far advanced in the wilderness, but probably decided the British to openly espouse the cause of the Indians. General Wayne, in the present case, could feel no assurance that this cause would not then be sustained by such co-operation as the fort and garrison could afford. Indeed, the position of the Indians, under the walls of the fort, rendered it probable that such a course had been determined on. General Wayne had about three thousand men under his command, and the Indians are computed to have been equally numerous. This is not improbable, as the hostile league embraced the whole Northwestern frontier. As he approached the position of the enemy, 90 - General Wayne's Victorious he sent forward a battalion of mounted riflemen, which was ordered in case of an attack, to make a retreat in feigned confusion, in order to draw the Indians on more disadvantageous ground. As was anticipated, this advance soon met the enemy, and being fired on, fell back, and was warmly pursued towards the main body. The morning was rainy, and the drums could not communicate the concerted signals with sufficient distinctness. A plan of turning the right flank of the Indians, was not, therefore, fulfilled. But the victory was complete, the whole Indian line, after a severe contest, giving way and flying in disorder. About one hundred savages were killed. During the action, and subsequently, while General Wayne remained in the vicinity of the British, there did not appear to be any intercourse between the garrison and the savages. The gates were kept shut against them, and their rout and slaughter were witnessed from the walls with apparent unconcern, and without offering any interposition or assistance. After the battle, General Wayne devastated all the fields, and burnt all the dwellings around the fort, some of them immediately under the walls. The house of Colonel McKee, an Indian trader, who was supposed to have exercised great influence over the Indians, was reduced to ashes in the general conflagration. "It is too important. to omit," says Mr. Mann Butler, in his history of Kentucky, " that General Wayne had positive authority from President Washington to attack and demolish the British Fort of Miami. But on reconnoitering it closely, and discovering its strength, added to his own weakness in artillery, the General, with a prudence not al ways accorded him, most judiciously declined an attack." In this daring reconnoitre, the General was near falling a victim to his gallantry. He had rode within eighty yards of the fort, accompanied by his aid, Lieutenant William H. Harrison, and within point blank shot of his guns, when a considerable disturbance was perceived on the platform of the parapet. The intelligence of a deserter the next day explained the whole affair. It appeared that a Captain of marines, who happened to be in the garrison when General Wayne made his approach, resented it so highly, that he immediately seized a port fire, and was going to apply it to the gun. At this moment, Major Campbell, the commandant, drew his sword and threatened to cut the Captain clown instantly, if he did. not desist, Campaign-1794 - 91 He then ordered him to be arrested. This high-minded forbearance, in all probability, saved the life of General Wayne, with his suite, and possibly the peace of the United States. Major Campbell then opened the following correspondence : MIAMI (MAUMEE) RIVER, August 21st, 1794. sir :—An army of the United States of America, said to be under your command, having taken post on the banks of the Miami (Maumee) for upwards of the last twenty-four hours, almost within the reach of the guns of this fort, being a post belonging to His Majesty the King of Great Britain, occupied by Majesty's troops, and which I have the honor to command, it becomes my duty to inform myself, as speedily as possible, in what light I am to view your making such near approaches to this garrison. I have no hesitation, on my part, to say, that I know of no war existing between Great Britain and America. I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, Your most obedient and very humble servant, WILLIAM CAMPBELL, Major 24th Reg't, Comd'g a British post on the banks of the Mimi. To Major General Wayne, etc. CAMP, ON THE BANKS OF THE MIAMI, (MAUMEE,) August 21st, 1794. Sir :—I have received your letter of this date, requiring from me the motives which have moved the army under my command to the position they at present occupy, far within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the United States of America. Without questioning the authority, or the propriety, sir, of your interrogatory, I think I may, without breach of decorum, observe to you, that were you entitled to an answer, the most full and satisfactory one was announced to you from the muzzles of my small arms, yesterday morning, in the action against the horde of savages in the vicinity of your post, which terminated gloriously to the American arms ; but, had it continued until the Indians, etc., were driven under the influence of the post and guns you mention, they would not have much impeded the progress of the victorious army under my command, as no such post was established at the commencement of the present War, between the Indians and the United States. I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, Your most obedient and very humble servant, ANTHONY WAYNE, Major General, and Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Army. To Major William Campbell, etc. 92 - General Wayne’s Victorious FORT MIAMI, August 22d, 1794. Sir :—Although your letter of yesterday's date fully authorizes me to any act of hostility against the army of the United States in this neighborhood, under your command, yet, still anxious to prevent that dreadful decision which, perhaps, is not intended to be appealed to by either of our countries, I have forborne, for these two days past, to resent those insults you have offered to the British flag flying at this fort, by approaching it within pistol shot of my works, not only singly, but in numbers with arms in their hands. Neither is it my wish to wage war with individuals; but should you, after this, continue to approach my post in the threatening manner you are this moment doing, my indispensable duty to my King and country, and the honor of my profession, will oblige me to have recourse to those measures, which thousands of either nation may hereafter have cause to regret, and which I solemnly appeal t God, I have used my utmost endeavors to arrest. I have the honor to be, sir, with much respect, Your most obedient and very humble servant, WILLIAM CAMPBELL, Major 24th Beet, Comd'g at Fort Miami. To Major General Wayne, etc. CAMP, BANKS OF THE MIAMI, 22d August, 1794. Sir :—In your letter of the 21st instant, you declare : "I have no hesitation on my part, to say, that I know of no war existing between Great Britain and America." I, on my part, declare th same, and the only cause I have, to entertain a contrary idea at present, is the hostile act you are now in commission of, i. e., by recently taking post far within the well known and acknowledged limits of the United States, and erecting a fortification in the hear of the settlements of the Indian tribes now at war with the United States. This, sir, appears to be an act of the highest aggression, and destructive to the peace and interest of the Union. Hence it becomes my duty to desire, and I do hereby desire and demand, in the name of the President of the United St& es, that you immediately desist from any further act of hostility or aggression, by forbearing to fortify, and by withdrawing the troops, artillery, and stores, under your orders and direction, forthwith, and removing to the nearest post occupied by his Britannic Majesty's troops at the peace of 1783, and which you will be permitted to do unmolested by the troops under my command. I am, with very great respect, sir, Your most obedient and very humble servant, ANTHONY WAYNE, To Major William Campbell, etc. Campaign - 1794 - 93 FORT MIAMI, 22d August, 1794. Sir :—I have this moment to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date; in answer to which I have only to say, that being placed here in the command of a British post, and acting in a military capacity only, I cannot enter into any discussion either on the right or impropriety of my occupying my present position. These are matters that I conceive will be best left to the ambassadors of our different nations. Having said this much, permit me to inform you that I certainly will not abandon this post at the summons of any power whatever, until I receive orders for that purpose from those 1 have the honor to serve under, or the fortune of war should oblige me. I must still adhere, sir, to the purport of my letter this morning, to desire that your army, or individuals belonging to it, will not approach within reach of my cannon, without expecting the consequences attending it. Although I have said, in the former part of my letter, that my situation here is totally military, yet, let me add, sir, that I am much deceived, if His Majesty, the King of Great Britain, had not a post on this river, at and prior to the period you mention. I have the honor to be, sir, with the greatest respect, Your most obedient and very humble servant, WILLIAM CAMPBELL, Major 24th Reg't, Comd'g at Fort Miami. To Major General Wayne, etc. Before General Wayne retired from the Valley, his foresight suggested to him that the erection of a military post near the confluence of Swan creek with the Maumee river, would secure to his government more than all the advantages which could be derived by the possession of the British fort Miami. Under his orders, therefore, a stockade was built below the mouth of Swan creek, and placed in charge of Captain J. Rhea, who held it until after the evacuation of all the British posts in the Northwest, which occurred in pursuance of Jay's treaty. The remains of this fortification were examined by General John E. Hunt, in his early years, when they were in good condition and preservation ; and they were not entirely obliterated as late as 1836, when Richard Mott made his first visit to Toledo. Samuel Andrews, now of the Toledo "Blade," and Charles A. Crane, now of East Toledo, and many others, have distinct recollections of this fort, which, in the natural features of 94 - General Wayne’s Death the country, occupied a prominent position on the bluff, on the site near the south side of Summit, between Jefferson and Monroe streets. That a conflict had occurred at Toledo during Wayne's visit to the Maumee, appears probable, from the fact that early settlers procured harvests of bullets on the ground above described, and also other antiquities in the vicinity of the Trinity Church building. In the work of grading the streets, human bones, and remains of garments, to which buttons were attached, were exhumed in considerable quantities ; thus affording evidence that a sanguinary conflict had occurred on the plateau now in possession of the busy throng who have established a commercial empire at Toledo. On the 27th, the troops took up their march, devastating every village and field on the line to Fort Defiance, which they proceeded to render more substantial. September 14th, the legion moved on to the Miami villages, where the long contemplated fort was constructed, and October 22d, 1794, placed under command of Lieutenant Colonel Hamtramck, who, after firing fifteen rounds of cannon, gave the name which the city now bears, of FORT WAYNE. On the 28th of October, having fully achieved the objects of the campaign, General Wayne started on his return with the main body of the regulars, for Fort Greenville, where, in the following year, he rendered himself as conspicuous in statesmanship and diplomacy in war, by a treaty which will be found in its proper place in this volume. Although given the sobriquet of " Mad Anthony," he was as prudent as he was valorous; and if there had been reasonable hope of reducing the British Fort Miami, the attack would undoubtedly have bee made. However, it became his happy privilege to take peaceful possession, by authority of President Washington, of this fort early in 1796, when the British Government surrendered the northern posts including Fort Miami, (built in 1794, by the Canadian Governor Simcoe, at the foot of the Rapids of the Maumee,) in pursuance of the treaty negotiated by Chief Justice Jay, in 1793. General Wayne's reception of this fort was one of his last official military acts, and occurred only a few months prior to his death, near Erie, Pennsylvania, where he was buried, until removed many years after, by his son, to the place of his nativity. Captain William Wells - 95 CAPTAIN WILLIAM WELLS. As the name of this remarkable man is associated with some of the most prominent and thrilling events connected with the history of the Maumee Valley, and his descendants were well known to the pioneers, of the country, a brief sketch of him contained in McBride's Pioneer Biography, is here given : " Of Captain William Wells' birth and parentage, we have no record. He was captured at the age of twelve years, when he was an inmate of the family of Hon. Nathaniel Pope, in Kentucky, by the Miami tribe, and going through the formal adoption, lived to manhood among them. His Indian name was Black Snake. He became quite an influential man among them, and married a sister of the celebrated chief, Little Turtle. He fought by the side of his chief in the contests with General Harmar and St. Clair. Afterward, in times of calm reflection, with dim memories still of his childhood home, of brothers and playmates, he seems to have been harassed with the thought that among the slain, by his own hand, may have been his kindred. The approach of Wayne's army, in 1794, stirred anew conflicting emotions, based upon indistinct recollections of early ties, of country and kindred on the one hand, and existing attachments of wife and children on the other. He resolved to make his history known. With true Indian characteristics, the secret purpose of leaving his adopted nation was, according to reliable tradition, made known in this manner : Taking with him the war-chief, Little Turtle, to a favorite spot on the banks of the Maumee, Wells said : I leave now your nation for my own people. We have long been friends. We are friends yet, until the sun reaches a certain hight (which he indicated). From that time we are enemies. Then, if you wish to kill me, you may. If I want to kill you, I may.' At the appointed hour, crossing the river, Captain Wells disappeared in the forest, taking an easterly direction to strike the trail of Wayne's army. Obtaining an interview with General Wayne, he became ever afterward the faithful friend of the Americans.—Hon. J. L. Williams' Historical Sketch of the First Presbyterian Church of Fort Wayne, p. 17. " He was made captain of the spies connected with Wayne's army. His adventures in that capacity are sufficiently detailed by Mr. McBride. After the treaty of Greenville, and the establishment of peace, he was joined by his wife and family, and settled at the ' old orchard,' a short distance from the confluence of the St. Mary and St. Joseph, on the banks of a small stream there, afterward. called Spy Run,' and which still bears that name. The government subsequently granted him a preemption of some three hundred and twenty acres of land, including his improvement, the old orchard,. etc. Wells afterward also became, by appointment of the govern- 96 - In Command at Fort Wayne. meat, Indian agent here (Fort Wayne), in which capacity be served several years.'—Brice's History of Fort Wayne, p. 148. “Captain Wells, by his first wife, had three daughters and one son. The daughters were Mrs. Judge Wolcott, of Maumee City, Mrs. Turner and Mrs. Hackley, of Fort Wayne. Mr. Williams says of them : Of the first members of this church, two were half Indians, who had before, in 1820, joined the Baptist Church under the labors of Rev. Mr. McCoy, missionary to the Indians at this post . . . . . They were educated in Kentucky, and are vet kindly remembered by some in this church and community, as ladies of refinement and intelligent piety.'—p. 16, 17. The son, Wayne Wells, died when a young man, while crossing Lake Erie, in 1823. Captain Wells afterward married another sister of Little Turtle. They had one daughter, Jane, who married a son of an old Fort Wayne pioneer, Matthew Griggs, and settled at Peru, Indiana. " In the war of 1812, Captain Wells was in command at Fort Wayne. When he heard of General Hull's orders for the evacuation of Fort Dearborn, he made a rapid march to reinforce Captain Heald, and to 'assist in defending the fort, or prevent his exposure to certain destruction by an attempt to reach the head of the Maumee. But he was too late. All means for maintaining a siege had been destroyed a few hours before, and every preparation had been made for leaving the post next day.' On the morning of the 15th of August, the little company, with Captain Wells and his Miamis, evacuated the fort and moved along the shore till they came to Sand Hills, when they were attacked by five hundred 'treacherous and cowardly Pottawatomies.’ ‘The conflict was short, desperate, and bloody. Two-thirds of the white people were slain or wounded, and all the horses, provisions, and baggage lost. Only twenty-eight strong men remained to brave the fury of about five hundred Indians, who had lost but fifteen in the conflict." Captain Wells displayed the greatest coolness and gallantry. He was by the side of his niece (Mrs. Captain Heald), when the conflict began. ' We have not the slightest chance for life,' he said, 'we must part to meet no more in this world—God bless you.' With these words he dashed forward with the rest. In the midst of the fight, he saw a young warrior painted like a demon climb into a wagon in which were twelve children of the white people, and tomahawked them all ! Forgetting his own immediate danger, Wells exclaimed : 'If that is their game, butchering women and children, I'll kill too.' He instantly dashed toward the Indian camp, where they had left their squaws and little ones, hotly pursued by swift-footed young warriors, who sent many a rifle ball after him. He lay close to his horse's neck, and turned and fired occasionally upon his pursuers. When he had got almost beyond the range of their rifles, a ball killed his horse and wounded himself severely in the leg. The young savages rushed forward with a domoniac yell to make Other Incidents in his Life - 97 him a prisoner, and reserve him for torture, for lie was to them an arch offender. His friends, Win-ne-meg and Wau-ban-see, vainly attempted to save him from his fate. He knew the temper and practices of the savages well, and resolved not to be made a captive. Ile taunted them with the most insulting epithets to provoke them to kill him instantly. At length he called one of the fiery young warriors Per-so-turn (a squaw), which so enraged him that he killed Wells instantly with his tomahawk, jumped upon his body, cut out his heart, and ate a portion of the warm and half-palpitating morsel, with savage delight."—Lossing's Field Book of the War of 1812, p. 309. . In a sketch in the same volume, contributed by Mr. McDonald, the following is extracted: " General Wayne had a bold, vigilant, and dexterous enemy to contend with. It became indispensable for him to use the utmost caution in his movements, to guard against surprise. To secure his army against the possibility of being ambuscaded, he employed a number of the best woodsmen the frontier afforded, to act as spies or rangers. Captain Ephraim Kibby, one of the first settlers at Columbia, eight miles above Cincinnati, who had distinguished himself as a bold and intrepid soldier, in defending that infant settlement, commanded the principal part of the spies. The writer of this article, and his brother Thomas, were attached to Captain Kibby's company of rangers. This will account for the author's intimate knowledge of the subject of which he is giving a relation. A very effective division of the spies was commanded by Captain William Wells. " Captain Wells had been taken prisoner by the Indians when quite a youth ; he grew to manhood with them, and consequently was well acquainted with all their wiles and stratagems. From causes not now remembered, about eighteen months previous to the time of which I am writing, he left the Indians and returned to his relatives and friends in civilized life. . " Being raised by the Indians, well acquainted with the country which was about to be the theater of action, talking several of their languages fluently, and, withal, desperately brave, such a, soldier Was a real, effective acquisition to the army, Captain Wells was the same gentleman named by the Rev. 0. M. Spencer, in the narrative of his capture by the Indians, and release from captivity. It Was to Captain Wells that Mr. Spencer was primarily indebted for his liberty. (See Spencer's Narrative, page 105.) I am particular in describing this corps of the army, as they performed more real service than any other. " Attached to Captain Wells' command were the following men: Robert McClellan (whose name has been since immortalized by the graphic pen of Washington Irving, in his " Astoria") was one of the most athletic and active men on foot that has appeared on this - 8 - 98 - Other Incidents in his Life globe. On the grand parade at Fort Greenville, where the ground was very little inclined, to show his activity, he leaped over a road wagon with the cover stretched over; the wagon and bows were eight and a half feet high. Next was Henry Miller. He and a younger brother named Christopher had been made captives by the Indians when young, and adopted into an Indian family. Henry Miller lived with them till he was about twenty-four years of age; and, although he had adopted all their manners and customs, he, at that age, began to think of returning to his relatives among the whites. The longer he reflected on the subject the stronger his resolution grew to make an attempt to leave the Indians. He communicated his intention to his brother Christopher, and used every reason he was capable of, to induce his brother to accompany him in his flight. All his arguments were ineffectual. Christopher was young when made captive—he was now a good hunter, an expert woodsman, and, in the full sense of the word, a free and independent Indian. Henry Miller set off alone through the woods, and arrived safe among his friends in Kentucky. Captain Wells was well acquainted with Miller during his captivity, and knew that he possessed that firm intrepidity which would render him a valuable companion in time of need. To these were added a Mr. Hickman and Mr. Thorp, who were men of tried worth in Indian warfare. " Captain Wells and his four companions were confidential and privileged gentlemen in camp, who were only called upon to do duty upon very particular and interesting occasions. They were permitted a, carte blanche among the horses of the dragoons, and when upon duty went well mounted ; whilst the spies commanded by Captain Kibby went on foot, and were kept constantly on the alert, scouring the country in every direction. " The headquarters of the army being at Fort Greenville, in the month of June, 1794, General Wayne despatched Captain Wells and his company, with orders to bring into camp an Indian as a prisoner, in order that he could interrogate him as to the fiiture intentions of the enemy. Captain Wells proceeded with cautious steps through the Indian country. He crossed the river St. Mary, and thence to the river Auglaize, without meeting any straggling party of Indians. In passing up the Auglaize they discovered a smoke; they then dismounted, tied their horses, and proceeded cautiously to reconnoiter the enemy. They found three Indians camped on a high, open piece of ground. clear of brush or any underwood. As it was open woods, they found it would be difficult to approach the camp without being discovered. Whilst they were reconnoitering, they saw not very distant from the camp, a tree which had lately fallen. They returned and went round the camp so as to get the top of the fallen tree between them and the Indians. The tree-top being full of leaves would serve as a shelter to screen them from observation. They went forward upon their hands and Capture of Christopher Miller - 99 knees, with the noiseless movements of the cat, till they reached the tree-top. They were now within seventy or eighty yards of the camp. The Indians were sitting or standing about the fire, roasting their venison, laughing and making other merry antics, little dreaming that death was about stealing a march upon them. Arrived at the fallen tree their purpose of attack was soon settled ; they determined to kill two of the enemy and make the third prisoner. McClellan, who, it will be remembered, was almost as swift on foot as a deer of the forest, was to catch the Indian, whilst to Wells and Miller was confided the duty of shooting the other two. One of them was to shoot the one on the right, the other the one on the left. Their rifles were in prime order, the muzzles of their guns were placed on the log of the fallen tree, the sights were aimed for the Indians' hearts—whiz went the balls, and both Indians fell. Before the smoke of the burnt powder had risen six feet, McClellan was running at full stretch, with tomahawk in hand, for the Indian. The Indian bounded off at the top of his speed, and made down the river; but by continuing in that direction he discovered that McClellan would head him. He turned his course and made for the river. The river here had a bluff bank about twenty feet high. When he came to the bank he sprang down into the river, the bottom of which was a soft mud, into which- he sunk to the middle. While he was endeavoring to extricate himself out of the mud, McClellan came to the top of the high bank, and, without hesitation, sprang upon him as he was wallowing in the mire. The Indian drew his knife—McCllellan raised his tomahawk—told him to throw down his knife, or he would kill him instantly. He threw down his knife, and surrendered without any further effort at resistance. " By the time the scuffle had ceased in the mire, Wells and his companions came to the bank, and discovered McClellan and the Indian quietly sticking in the mire. As their prisoner was now secure, they did not think it prudent to take the fearful leap the others had done. They selected a place where the bank was less precipitous, went down and dragged the captive out of the mud and tied him. He was very sulky, and refused to speak either Indian or English. Some of the party went back for their horses, whilst others washed the mud and paint from the prisoner. When washed he turned out to be a white man, but still refused to speak or give any account of himself. The party scalped the two Indians whom they had shot, and then set off with their prisoner for headquarters. Whilst on their return to Fort Greenville, Henry Miller began to admit the idea that it was possible their prisoner was his brother Christopher, whom he had left with the Indians some years previous. Under this impression he rode alongside of him and called him by his Indian name. At the sound of his name he started, and stared round, and eagerly inquired how he came to know his name. The mystery was soon explained—their prisoner was indeed Chris-