550 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY Among the latter were Captains Hickman, Matson and Ballard. The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained. They left fifteen dead on the ground where the action commenced; but the principal slaughter took place in the woods, from which in the night they carried off all their dead. From the obstinacy with which they contended so long against a force somewhat superior, from the appearances next day in the woods, and from the reports of persons who saw them after the battle, it is believed that their loss was extremely severe. They were commanded by Major Reynolds of the British army, who had about 100 British troops in the battle, and about 400 Indians. On the night after the battle, an express was sent to carry intelligence of the success to General Winchester, at whose camp he arrived before daylight; and another was then immediately sent from that place to General Harrison by the way of Lower Sandusky, to apprise him of the event. On the morning after the battle Colonel Lewis determined with the advice of his officers, to hold the place and await a reinforcement. His first orders from Winchester had been "to attack the enemy, beat them, and take possession of Frenchtown and hold it." He was authorized, in a dispatch sent after him, however, to exercise some discretion with respect to holding the position. As soon as the intelligence of this success was known at the Maumee Rapids, it produced a complete ferment in camp. All were anxious to proceed to Frenchtown in support of the advanced corps. It was evident that corps was in a critical situation. They were but eighteen miles from Malden, where the British had their whole force; and it was not to be doubted that an effort would be made by them to regain the ground they had lost, or to defeat this advance of our army which at first was inconsiderable and was now much reduced by the killed and wounded. Preparations were, therefore, made to reinforce Colonel Lewis, and on the evening of the 19th, General Winchester marched himself with 250 men, which was all that could be spared from the post at the Rapids. He arrived at the River Raisin in the night on the 20th, and encamped in an open lot of ground on the right of the former detachment. Colonel Lewis had encamped in a place where he was defended by garden pickets, which were sufficiently close and strong to protect his men against an attack of small arms. Colonel Wells commanded the reinforcement, and to, him the general named, but did not positively order, a breastwork for the protection of his camp. The TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 551 general himself established his quarters in the comfortable home of Colonel Navarre on the south side of the river, almost 300 yards from the lines! On the 21st, a place was selected for the whole detachment to encamp in good order, with a determination to fortify it on the next day. About sunset Colonel Wells solicited and obtained leave to return to the Rapids. Certain information had been received that the British were preparing to make an attack, and that they would make it with the utmost dispatch in their power was a matter of course. Colonel Wells reached the Rapids that night, at which place General Harrison had arrived on the 20th, and had made every exertion in his power to hasten the reinforcements. Before proceeding to the tragedy of the 22nd, it is necessary to review the operations and exertions which in the meantime had been made in the rear. When General Winchester marched from his camp below Defiance for the Rapids on the 30th of December, he sent an express to advise General Harrison of that movement; but in consequence of a snow storm which delayed the bearer, the general did not receive the intelligence at Upper Sandusky before the 11th of January. He then immediately ordered on some droves of hogs and held the artillery in readiness to march as soon as he should be advised of Winchester's arrival at the Rapids. But no further intelligence was received until the evening of the 16th, when a letter from General Perkins at Lower Sandusky, enclosing one he had received from General Winchester of the 15th, at last informed Harrison that Winchester had arrived at the Rapids, that he meditated some movement against the enemy, and that he wanted Perkins to send him a battalion from Lower Sandusky. This intelligence alarmed General Harrison, and he immediately gave orders for the artillery to advance by the way of Portage River (from Upper Sandusky down the Sandusky River to now Fort Seneca, thence direct to the Maumee River, crossing the Portage River where is now Pemberville, Wood County, Ohio—Editor); accompanied by a guard of 300 men commanded by Major Orr. Escorts of provisions were also ordered to follow on the same route; but owing to the extreme badness of the road, very little progress could be made. Even the lighter pieces of artillery could not be forwarded with any degree of expedition. At the same time an express 'was dispatched to the Rapids by General Harrison for information with orders to return and meet him at Lower Sandusky, for which place he set out the next morning himself, and 552 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY arrived there on the following night. He found that General Perkins had prepared a battalion, with a piece of artillery, to be commanded by Major Cotgrove, which was ordered to march on the 18th; and the general now determined to follow it himself, and have a personal consultation with General Winchester. At 4 :00 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, he received the letter in which Winchester informed him of the advance of Colonel Lewis to the River Raisin, together with the objects and prospects of the expedition. He immediately ordered the remaining regiment of Perkins' brigade to march to the Rapids (Winchester's camp above Fallen Timber battle ground), and proceeded there himself. On his way he met an express from Winchester, with intelligence of the success of Lewis in the battle of the 18th. On the morning of the 20th he arrived at the Rapids and found that General Winchester had proceeded the evening before to the River Raisin, having left General Payne in his camp with 300 men. Major Cotgrove with the piece of artillery in his train, was so retarded by a swamp on the road and other obstacles to his progress, that he had reached no further than the Maumee Bay on the night of the 21st. By marching early next morning he arrived within 15 miles of the River Raisin, before he was met by the fugitives from the massacre. When Harrison arrived at the Rapids on the 20th, he dispatched Captain Hart, the inspector general, to Winchester at Frenchtown, with intelligence of the movements in the rear, and with instructions to the general "to maintain the position at the River Raisin at any rate." On the next day, the 21st, a dispatch was received from General Winchester in which he stated that if his force were increased to the amount of 1,000 or 1,200 it would be sufficient to maintain the ground he had gained. On the evening of the same day the regiment of Perkins' brigade arrived at the Rapids, and the remaining Kentuckians under Payne were then ordered to march to General Winchester, which they did the next morning. The corps thus advancing under Cotgrove and Payne would make the force under Winchester considerably stronger than the number deemed by him sufficient. But they were one day too late. On the 22nd, about 10 o'clock, the news of the attack on General Winchester's camp was received at the Rapids. ̊General Harrison immediately ordered the regiment of General Perkins' brigade to march with all possible expedition, and proceeded him- TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 553 self after the reinforcement under Payne, which he soon overtook. Some men were presently met who had escaped from the battle, and who stated that Winchester's forces were totally defeated, and that the British and Indians were pursuing them towards the Rapids. This report only induced the General to urge on his men with more rapidity; but several other fugitives were soon afterwards met, from whom. it was ascertained beyond a doubt that the defeat was total and irretrievable, and that all resistance had ceased early in the day on the part of the Americans. A council of the general and field officers was then held, by whom it was decided to be imprudent and unnecessary to proceed any further. Some parties of the most active and enterprising men were now sent forward to assist and bring in those who might escape, and the rest of the reinforcements then returned to the Rapids. The tragical events which occurred on the 22nd and 23rd to the advanced detachment at Frenchtown are as follows: Late in the evening, after Colonel Wells had left the camp, a Frenchman (Peter Navarre) came to General Winchester from the neighborhood of Malden, with information that a large force of British and Indians, which he supposed to be near 3,000, were about to march from that place shortly after he had left it. This intelligence, however, must have been discredited alike by the officers and men, for no preparations were made by the one, nor apprehensions exhibited by the other. The most fatal security prevailed; many of the troops even wandered about the town till late in the night. Colonel Lewis and Major Madison seemed alone to be on the alert; they cautioned their men to be prepared at all times for an attack. Guards were placed out this night as usual; but as it was extremely cold, no picket guard was placed on the road on which the enemy was to be expected. The night passed away without any alarm, and the reveille began to beat at daybreak on the morning of the 22nd. A few minutes afterwards three guns were fired in quick succession by the sentinels. The troops were instantly formed, and the British opened a heavy fire on the camp from several pieces of artillery loaded with bombs, balls, and grape shot, at the distance of 300 yards. This was quickly followed by a charge made by the British regulars and by a general fire of small arms, and the Indian yell on the right and left. The British had approached in the night with the most profound silence and stationed their cannon behind a small ravine, which 554 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY ran across the open fields on the right. As soon as the regulars approached within the reach of small arms, a well-directed fire from the pickets 'round Lewis' camp soon repulsed them on the left and center; but on the right the reinforcement which had arrived with Winchester, and which was unprotected by any breastwork, after maintaining the contest a short time, was overpowered and fell back. About this time General Winchester arrived and ordered the retreating troops to rally behind a fence and second bank of the river, and to incline towards the center and take refuge behind the pickets. These orders were either not heard or properly understood, and the British continuing to press on. the retiring line, whilst a large body of Indians had gained their right flank, the troops were completely thrown into confusion and retreated in disorder over the river. A detachment in the meantime had been sent from the pickets to reinforce the right wing, which was carried with it in the retreat; and Colonels Lewis and Allen both followed it with a view to assist in rallying the men. Attempts were made to rally them on the south side of the river behind the houses and pickets of the gardens, but all the efforts of General Winchester, aided by the two colonels, were in vain. The Indians had gained their left flank and had also taken possession of the woods in their rear. In their confusion and dismay the Americans attempted to pass a long, narrow lane, through which the road passes from the village. The Indians were on both sides, and shot them down in every direction. A large party which had gained the wood on the right, were surrounded and massacred without distinction, nearly one hundred men being tomahawked within the distance of 100 yards. The most horrible destruction overwhelmed the fugitives in every direction. Captain Simpson was shot and tomahawked at the edge of the woods near the mouth of the lane. Colonel Allen, though wounded in his thigh, attempted several times to rally his men, entreating them to halt and sell their lives as dearly as possible. He had escaped about two miles, when at length wearied and exhausted, and disdaining perhaps to survive the defeat, he sat down on a log determined to meet his fate. An Indian chief observing him to be an officer of distinction was anxious to take him prisoner. As soon as he came near the colonel he threw his gun across his lap and told him in the Indian language to surrender, and he should be safe. Another savage having at the same time advanced with a hostile appearance, Colonel Allen by TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 555 one stroke with his sword laid him dead at his feet. A third Indian who was near him, had then the honor of shooting one of the first and greatest citizens of Kentucky. Captain Meade, of the regular army, who had fought by the side of Colonel Daviess when he fell in the battle of Tippecanoe, was killed where the action commenced. Finding that the situation of the corps was rendered desperate by the approach of the enemy, he gave order to his men, "My brave fellows, charge upon them," and a moment afterwards he was no more. A party with Lieutenant Garrett, consisting of fifteen or twenty men, after retreating about a mile and a half, were compelled to surrender and were then all massacred but the lieutenant himself. Another force of about thirty men had escaped nearly three miles, when they were overtaken by the savages, and having surrendered, about one-half of them were shot and tomahawked. In short, the greater part of those who were in the retreat fell a sacrifice to the fury of the Indians. The snow was so deep, and the cold so intense, that they were soon exhausted and unable to elude their pursuers. General Winchester and Colonel Lewis, with a few more, were captured at a bridge about three-quarters of a mile from the village. Their coats being taken from them, they were carried back to the British lines, where Colonel Proctor commanded. The troops within the picketing, under Majors Graves and Madison, had with Spartan valor maintained their position, though powerfully assailed by Proctor and his savage allies. The British had posted a six-pounder behind a small house about 200 yards down the river, which considerably annoyed the camp till its supplies of ammunition, which were brought in a sleigh, were arrested by killing the horse and his driver. Major Graves in passing 'round the lines was wounded in the knee. He sat down and bound it up himself, observing to his men, "Never mind me, but fight on." About 10 o'clock Colonel Proctor, finding it useless to sacrifice his men in vain attempts to dislodge this little band of heroes, withdrew his forces to the woods, intending either to abandon the contest or to wait the return of the Indians, who had pursued the retreating party. The loss sustained by our men was inconsiderable; and when Proctor withdrew, they employed the leisure it afforded them to take breakfast at their posts. As soon as Proctor was informed that General Winchester was taken, he basely determined to take advantage of his situa- 556 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY tion to procure the surrender of the party in the picketing. He represented to the General that nothing but an immediate surrender would save the Americans from an indiscriminate massacre by the Indians. A flag was then seen advancing from the British lines, carried by Major Overton, one of the general's aides, and accompanied by Colonel Proctor himself and several other officers. Having halted at a respectful distance, Major Madison, with Brigade Major Garrard, proceeded to meet them, expecting that the object of the flag was to obtain a cessation of hostilities for the British to bear off their dead. They were much mortified to find that Major Overton was the bearer of an order from General Winchester, directing officer commanding the American forces to surrender them prisoners of war. This was the first intimation they had that their General had been taken. Colonel Proctor, with great haughtiness, demanded an immediate surrender, or he would set the town on fire, and the Indians would not be restrained in committing an indiscriminate massacre. Major Madison observed "that it had been customary for the Indians to massacre the wounded and prisoners after a surrender, and that he would not agree to any capitulation which General Winchester might direct, unless the safety and protection of his men were stipulated:" Colonel Proctor then said, "Sir, do you mean to dictate to me?" "No," replied Madison, "I mean to dictate for myself, and we prefer selling our lives as dear as possible, rather than be massacred in cold blood." Proctor then agreed to receive a surrender on the following terms: That all private property should be respected, that sleds should be sent next morning to remove the sick and wounded to Amherstburg on the island opposite Malden, that in the meantime they should be protected by a guard, and that the side arms of the officers should be restored to them at Malden. Major Madison, after consulting with Garrard, thought it most prudent to capitulate on these terms. Half the original force was already lost; the balance would have to contend with more than three times their number; there was no possible chance of a retreat, nor any hope of a reinforcement to save them; and worst of all, their ammunition was nearly exhausted, not more than one-third of a small keg of cartridges being left. Before the men had given up their arms, the Indians came among them and began to plunder them. Information being TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 557 given to Major Madison of this conduct, he ordered his men not to suffer an Indian to come into the lines, and that if they persisted in doing it, or in plundering, to fire upon them and bayonet them. This decided conduct restrained the savages, and none of the men who were marched with him to Malden, were robbed or injured by the Indians. The inhabitants of the town, being much alarmed for the safety of their persons and property, united with General Winchester in soliciting safety and protection from the British. Soon after the British forces were withdrawn, Major Reynolds (British) began to exhibit symptoms of uneasiness, often walking about and looking towards the road leading to the Rapids, and no doubt expecting the approach of General Harrison with reinforcements, which would have been a most auspicious event for the wounded. The greater part of the Indians went with the British to Stoney Creek, six miles on the road towards Malden, where they were promised a frolic by their employers. A few stragglers remained, who went from house to house in search of plunder. Some of them remained in town till late in the night; and before day the interpreters who had been left with them abandoned the houses in which they lay. Their anticipations were now gloomy; the whole night indeed was spent with feeling vibrating between hope and despair. Daylight at last appeared and their hopes began to brighten; but in a very short time they experienced a sad reversal. About sunrise, instead of sleds arriving to convey them to Malden, a large body of Indians, perhaps 200 in number, came into the town painted black and red. Their chiefs held a council in which they soon determined to kill the wounded who were unable to march, in revenge for the warriors they had lost in battle. Soon afterwards they began to yell and to exhibit in their frantic conduct, the most diabolical dispositions. They began first to plunder the houses of the inhabitants, and then broke into those where the wounded prisoners were lying, some of whom they abused and stripped of their clothes and blankets and then tomahawked them without mercy. Captain Hickman was dragged to the door where he was tomahawked and then thrown back into the house. This appeared to be the signal for consummating their destruction. The houses of Jean B. Jerome and Gabriel Godfrey which contained most of the prisoners, were immediately set on fire and the greater part of the wounded consumed in the conflagration. Many of them who were able to crawl about endeavored to get 558 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY out at the windows, but as fast as they appeared they were tomahawked and pushed back. Some who were not in those houses were killed and thrown into the flames; while others were tomahawked, inhumanly mangled, and left in the streets and highways. The few who were judged able to march, were saved and taken off towards Malden, but as often as any of them gave out on the way, they were tomahawked and left lying in the road. Major Woolfolk, secretary to General Winchester, had found an asylum in the house of a French citizen, but he was discovered by the Indians who placed him on a horse and were carrying him away. They took him by the house of Lasalle, a fellow who had been suspected for giving intelligence to the British before the battle, to whom Woolfolk promised a large sum of money if he would purchase him from the Indians. Lasalle replied that it was out of his power, but that probably his brother would, who lived in the next house. The Indian who had taken him, being willing to sell him, had turned to go there, when another savage shot him through the head. He was then tomahawked and scalped, and left to the hogs for two days, by which he was partly devoured before the inhabitants removed him. The fate of Major Graves has never been correctly ascertained. It is believed that he was put into a cariole at the River Raisin, and taken towards Detroit; but whether he was murdered on the way to that place, or reserved for greater sufferings, is not distinctly known. Captain Hart was later killed by two Indians who divided his clothes and money. The American army in this affair lost upwards of 290 in killed, massacred, and missing. Only thirty-three escaped to the Rapids. The British took 547 prisoners, and the Indians about forty-five. The loss of the enemy, as the Americans had no chance to ascertain it, was of course never correctly known by the public. From the best information that could be obtained, it is believed to have been, killed and wounded, between three and four hundred. The Indians suffered greatly, and the 41st British Regiment was very much cut up. Their whole force in the battle was about 2,000, one-half regulars and Canadians, commanded by Colonels Proctor and St. George; the other, composed of Indians, commanded by Round-Head and Walk-in-the-Water. Tecumseh was not there. He was still on the Wabash collecting the warriors in that quarter. Colonel Proctor arrived at Amherstburg with his prisoners TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 559 on the 23rd, and crowded them into a small muddy woodyard, where they were exposed all night in a heavy rain, without tents or blankets, and with scarcely fire enough to keep them from freezing, many of them being very indifferently clothed. Such treatment was very severe on men who at home enjoyed all the comforts and luxuries of life, and whose humanity would have disdained to treat any conquered foe in this manner. Proctor, after he had left the battle ground, never named the guard nor sleds which he had promised for the wounded Americans; nor would he pay any attention to the subject when repeatedly reminded of it by General Winchester and Major Madison. Captain Elliott once replied to their solicitations that "the Indians were very excellent surgeons." From the whole tenor of Proctor's conduct it is evident that he was determined from the first to abandon the wounded to their fate. "What a contrast between this base perfidy of the British officers, in exposing their prisoners to massacre, after stipulating to protect them; and the noble humanity of the American tars, in sacrificing their own lives to save their foes who had surrendered unconditionally!" says McAfee. The prisoners were detained at Amherstburg till the 26th, when they were divided into two parties; the first of which was marched on that day, and the other on the day following. Some who were badly wounded were left behind with surgeons to attend them. They proceeded up the rivers Detroit and Thames, through the interior of Upper Canada to Fort George on the Niagara strait. On this journey they suffered many hardships and indignities from the severity of the weather, the want of provisions, and from the inhumanity of their guards. At Fort George they were paroled and returned home by the way of Erie and Pittsburgh, and thence down the Ohio River. The condition of the parole was: Not to bear arms against His Majesty or his allies during the present war, until regularly exchanged. When some of the Kentuckians inquired who. were His Majesty's allies, they were answered that "His Majesty's allies were known;" from which it appears that some of these tools of British base-ness were ashamed of the association which their sovereign had formed. General Winchester, Colonel Lewis, and Major Madi-son were detained and sent by Montreal to Quebec, at which place, and at Beaufort in its vicinity, they were confined till the spring of 1814, when a general exchange of prisoners took place, and they returned home. 560 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY In the River Raisin defeat, though the detachment cut off was not large, the American cause sustained a great injury; and on the state of Kentucky the stroke was peculiarly severe. Colonel Wells immediately returned to that state, with all the information that had been collected respecting the battle and massacre. The effect on the feelings of the community was truly deplorable. Almost every family in the state had some friend or intimate acquaintance in the army, for whose fate the most anxious and distressing apprehensions were excited. The accounts given by the fugitives, on which alone the public had to depend, were altogether indefinite and extremely exaggerated. It was weeks and even months before much information was received on which a perfect reliance could be placed. The return of the prisoners at last relieved the anxious uncertainty of the greater part of the people; but some were still left in doubt, and forever were to remain in doubt, respecting the fate of their best friends and most intimate connections. Some idea of the public anxiety and distress may be formed from the facts that the army thus barbarously destroyed was composed of the most interesting and respectable citizens of the state; and that from the previous intelligence from it, the highest expectations were .formed of its success and glory. A disaster so calamitous would necessarily excite much discussion with respect to its cause; and much blame was thrown upon those who committed no error, and who were not instrumental in causing the defeat of Winchester, which proved to be the great defeat of Harrison's campaign. General Harrison was blamed by his enemies for the advance of the detachment to the River Raisin; for not reinforcing it in time; or finding that impracticable for not ordering a retreat; besides many other matters of less importance. It is evident from the statement of facts already made, that Harrison was not answerable for the advance of the detachment, It was sent by General Winchester without the knowledge and consent of Harrison and contrary to his views and plans for the future conduct of the campaign, and to the instructions communicated with his plans through Ensign Tod before the left wing had marched for the Rapids. If the advance was improper, the blame does not lie upon Harrison; if it was proper, General Winchester is entitled to the credit of having ordered it. The following extract is made at headquarters, by the first intelligence of the advance received at that place: "This news for a moment paralyzed the army, or at least the TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 561 thinking part of it, for no one could imagine that it was possible for him (Winchester) to be guilty of such a hazardous step. General Harrison was astonished at the imprudence and inconsistency of such a measure, which, if carried into execution, could be viewed in no other light than as attended with certain and inevitable destruction to the left wing. Nor was it a difficult matter for any one to foresee and predict the terrible consequences, which were sure to mark the result of a scheme no less rash in its conception than hazardous in its execution." With respect to reinforcing the detachment, a recurrence to facts equally proves that Harrison is not blamable, as he made every exertion in his power to support it. It was not until the night of the 16th that he received the information, indirectly through General Perkins, that Winchester had arrived at the Rapids. By the same express he was advised that Winchester meditated some unknown movement against the enemy. Alarmed at this information, he immediately made every exertion which the situation of his affairs required. He was then at Upper Sandusky, his principal deposit of provisions and munitions of war, which is sixty miles from the Rapids by the way of the Portage River (by way of later Fort Seneca and now Pemberville, to the Maumee River in nearly a bee line), and seventy-six by the way of Lower Sandusky; and about thirty-eight more from the River Raisin. He immediately sent an express direct to the Maumee Rapids, for information ; gave orders for a corps of 300 men to advance with the artillery, and escorts to proceed with provisions; and in the morning he proceeded himself to Lower Sandusky, at which place he arrived in the night following, a distance of forty miles, which he travelled in seven hours and a half over roads requiring such exertion that the horse of his aide, Major Hukill, fell dead on their arrival at the fort (Fremont). He found there that General Perkins had prepared to send a battalion to the Rapids, in conformity with a request from General Winchester. This battalion was dispatched the next morning, the 18th, with a piece of artillery; but the roads were so bad that it was unable by its utmost exertion, to reach the River Raisin, a distance of seventy-five miles, before the fatal disaster. General Harrison then determined to proceed to the Rapids himself, to learn personally from General Winchester what was his situation and views. At 4 :00 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, while he still remained at Lower Sandusky, he received the information that Colonel Lewis had been sent with a detachment 562 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY to secure the provisions on the River Raisin and to occupy, with the intention of holding, the village of Frenchtown. There was then but one regiment and a battalion at Lower Sandusky, and the regiment was immediately put in motion, with orders to make forced marches for the Rapids; and General Harrison himself immediately proceeded for the same place. On his way he met an express with intelligence of the successful battle which had been fought on the preceding day. The anxiety of General Harrison to push forward and either prevent or remedy any misfortune which might occur, as soon as he was apprised of the advance to the River Raisin, was manifested by the great personal exertions which he made in this instance. He started in a sleigh with General Perkins to overtake the battalion under Cotgrove, attended by a single servant. As the sleigh went very slow from the roughness of the road, he took the horse of his servant and pushed on alone. Night came upon him in the midst of the swamp, which was so imperfectly frozen that the horse sunk to his belly at every step. He had no recourse but to dismount and lead his horse, jumping himself from one sod to another which was solid enough to support him. When almost exhausted, he met one of Cotgrove's men coming back to look for his bayonet, which he said he had left at a place where he had stopped, and for which he would have a dollar stopped from his pay unless he recovered it. The general told him he would not only pardon him for the loss but supply him with another if he would assist him to get his horse through the swamp. By his aid the general was enabled to reach the camp of the battalion. Very early on the morning of the 20th, he arrived at the Rapids, from which place General Winchester had gone on the preceding evening, with all his disposable force to the River Raisin. Nothing more could now be done but wait the arrival of the reinforcements from Lower Sandusky. The original force of General Winchester at his camp at the Rapids had been about 1,300, and all but 300 were now gone in advance. The battalion from Lower Sandusky was hurried on as fast as possible; and as soon as the regiment arrived, 350 strong, on the evening of the 21st, the balance of Winchester's army was ordered to proceed, which they did the next morning, under General Payne. The force now advancing exceeded by 300 the force deemed sufficient by General Winchester to maintain his position. But whether sufficient or not, it is evident from the preceding statement of facts, that no more could be sent and that greater exertions could not have been made to send TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 563 it in time. Instead of censure being due to General Harrison, he merits praise for his prudent exertions, from the moment he was apprised of Winchester's arrival at the Rapids. "What human means," says Colonel Wood, "within the control of General Harrison, could prevent the anticipated disaster, and save that corps which was already looked upon as lost, as doomed to inevitable destruction? Certainly none — because neither orders to halt, nor troops to succor him, could be received in time, or at least that was the expectation. He was already in motion and General Harrison still at Upper Sandusky, seventy miles in his rear. The weather was inclement, the snow was deep, and a large portion of the black swamp was yet open. What could a Turenne or an Eugene have done under such a pressure of embarrassing circumstances, more than Harrison did?" If it should be asked why detachments from the center and right wing were not sent sooner to the Rapids to form a junction with and to strengthen the advance under Winchester, the answer is obvious. The object of the advance to that place was to guard the provisions, artillery, and military stores, to be accumulated there for the main expedition, for which purpose Winchester's command, as it would daily be strengthened by the arrival of escorts, was amply sufficient; and it was important that a force unnecessarily large should not be sent there, to consume the accumulating provisions, before the main expedition was ready to move. After the success of the detachment on the 18th, there were powerful reasons why the position it occupied should not be abandoned. The protection of the French inhabitants was now an imperative duty. The advance to their town had been made at their solicitation; and when the battle had commenced, many of them joined the American forces and fought with great gallantry; and afterwards they attacked and killed the straggling Indians, wherever they met them. Their houses were opened to our men, and they offered to give up the whole of the provisions, which yet remained to them, upon condition that they should not again be abandoned to the fury of the savages, or subjected for what they had done, to be immured in the prisons of Malden. The amount of provisions to be secured was believed to be very considerable. The duty of protecting the faithful inhabitants, however, had been so strongly impressed by their conduct, on the minds of General Winchester and his men, that an order to retreat would perhaps not have been very promptly obeyed. They proved their fidelity again, by engaging in the battle of the 22nd. CHAPTER XLIII TERMINATION OF CAMPAIGN FOR 1812 HARRISON RETIRES TO PORTAGE RIVER-HIS CAMP NEAR PRESENT PEMBERVILLE, OHIO-RETURNS TO MAUMEE AND LOCATES FORT MEIGSPREPARATIONS FOR OPENING OF YEAR 1813. On the night of January 22, 1813, after all possible information had been gathered concerning the disaster that day to the army of General Winchester at Frenchtown on the River Raisin (site of now Monroe, Mich.) a council of the general and field officers was held at Winchester's camp at the Maumee Rapids, by General Harrison. As has been stated this camp was on the high elevation just above Presque Isle hill, where is Turkey Foot Rock and overlooking below on the left or west bank of the Maumee, the battle ground of Fallen Timbers. Directly opposite on the present Wood County side of the stream was where General Hull's army reached the river, the ford being between the two points. The question up for consideration at the council was whether it was probable that the British and Indians would now attack the 900 men with a single piece of artillery at the camp under Harrison, and if so, would Harrison's force be able to make a successful resistance. Major M'Clanahan of the Kentucky Volunteers, who had escaped from the action at the River Raisin and who was present at the council, was of the opinion that the force of the enemy in the battle had been from 1,600 to 2,000 British and Indians, with six pieces of artillery—mostly howitzers. After mature deliberation it was the unanimous opinion of the council that it would be proper to retire a short distance toward the Sandusky River on the road upon which artillery and reinforcements were approaching. For should the position at the Maumee Rapids be maintained, yet by getting in its rear, the enemy would be able to defeat the reinforcements in detail, and capture the all important convoys of artillery, military stores and provisions coming from the Sandusky. Although the enemy might not advance with his whole force against the camp at the Rapids, yet it was deemed highly probable that the Indians at least would cross the river on - 564 - TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 565 the ice below that place, and endeavor to intercept the convoys, of the approach of which they must have received information. The place which had been selected, and the camp which had been formed by General Winchester at the Rapids elevation, were also very injudicious and untenable against any formidable force. The position was on the wrong side of the river; for it frequently happened in the winter that heavy rains suddenly swelled the current and broke up the ice, so as to render the stream wholly impassable for many days together. This would prevent the convoys from reaching the camp, whilst the enemy might cross on the ice at the mouth of the bay and destroy them without opposition. The attempt to fortify the position had also destroyed all its natural advantages. The camp was a parallelogram with its longest side on the river, corresponding to the form of the hill on which it was placed, the abrupt declivity of which afforded the enemy a better fortification at point-blank shot in the rear, than the breastwork of logs by which the lines were protected. The flanks were also at a convenient distance from the ends of the hill to be annoyed from them by the enemy. By reversing the order and making the flank lines the longest, so as to extend quite across the hill, the rear would have been rendered secure, and the flanks would have been at too great a distance to be annoyed from the extremities of the hill. On the next morning, therefore, the army abandoned the Rapids, having first set fire to the block-houses, in which there was a quantity of provisions that would be useful to the enemy if they advanced to that place. Having retired as far as the Portage River, about eighteen miles distant, the general there established and strongly fortified his camp, to wait for the artillery and a detachment of troops under Leftwich, expecting that he would be enabled by their arrival to return in a few days to the banks of the Maumee. This camp at the Portage River was on the east bank of the right branch of that stream, not far above the junction of the two branches, and within the limits of the present village of Pemberville. This retrograde movement was altogether unnecessary, in the actual state of things, but McAfee observes here that "we are not to judge the commander of an army by the information respecting the enemy which may be found in the pages of the subsequent historian, but by that which at the time was in his possession; and in the present case we may remark that immediately after 20-VOL. 1 566 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY experiencing a defeat for the want of a cautious and strict co formity to military principles, it would have been excusable ll the officers of the army to have carried that virtue to excess." General Harrison was disappointed in his expectation of returning in a few days to the Rapids by an unfortunate rain, which arrested the progress of the artillery and troops under Leftwich, at the distance of twenty-five miles from his camp at the Portage. The rain commenced on the twenty-fourth and continued several days, so that the road was rendered wholly impassable for the artillery, although it was fixed upon sleds. In the meantime spies were sent towards the River Raisin to discover the situation of affairs in that quarter; and on the thirty-first of January, Doctor M'Keehan, of the Ohio militia, volunteered at the request of the general to carry a flag to Malden, to ascertain the condition of the wounded, and to carry them a sum of money in gold to procure accommodations. His fate still further illustrates the character of the enemy. He was accompanied by two men, and furnished with an open letter to General Winchester and another addressed to any British officer, describing the character in which he went, and also with written instructions for his own conduct; all of which he was directed to show to the first British officer he met, He stopped the first night in a cabin at the Rapids, where he fixed his flag in his cariole at the door. In the night he was discovered and attacked by some Indians, who killed one of his men, and having robbed Doctor M'Keehan and the other of all they had, took them prisoners to the British Captain Elliott, who was stationed with some other Indians about twenty miles farther on. Elliott treated him politely, and sent him forward to Proctor. When he came into the presence of that magnanimous Briton, Proctor immediately began to abuse General Harrison, found fault with M'Keehan's instructions, and declared that the flag was only a pretext to cover some bad design. These insinuations were indignantly repelled by the doctor, who was told that he should be sent back, by a different route from that which he came. After some days he was recognized in his official character, and directed to attend the wounded. On the second of March he w arrested by Colonel Proctor, and accused of carrying on a secret correspondence. Without giving him even the form of a trial, her was then sent off to Fort George and thence to Kingston, an finally to Montreal, where he was imprisoned in a dungeon, and all the time, from the period of his arrest, was misused, remarks McAfee, "in the true British style." After lying in the dungeon TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 567 thirty days, he was liberated at the intercession of Lieutenant Dudley of the American navy; and by way of reparation was informed by Adjutant-General Baynes, that the outrages he had suffered were contrary to his orders. Concerning General Harrison's camp at the Portage River (Pemberville site), a private in the ranks wrote in his diary that the rains which detained the army there were extreme and most disagreeable. The water in the river raised so suddenly that the men were obliged to cut down trees along the banks, on the logs and brush of which they pitched their tents to keep them out of the water. The weather turned suddenly cold and the ice formed within a short time of sufficient strength to bear up the ox teams and also afford sport to the army for skating. On the 30th of January, General Leftwich arrived at the camp with his brigade, a regiment of Pennsylvania troops, and the greater part of the artillery; and on the first of February General Harrison marched with his whole force, amounting now to 1,700 men, to the foot of the Rapids and encamped on the southeast side of the river, at a place which he deemed much stronger and more suitable in other respects than that which had been occupied by Winchester and where with Captains Wood and Gratiot, engineers, he selected the site for a fort. He still entertained a belief that he would be able to execute in the present season, the long intended expedition against Malden, and continued to exert himself in preparation. All the troops in the rear were ordered to join him immediately, except some companies which were left in the forts on the Auglaize and St. Marys. He expected he would be able by the eleventh or twelfth of February to advance towards Malden, if not with heavy artillery sufficient to reduce that place, at least with a force that could scour the whole country, disperse the Indians, destroy all the shipping of the enemy, the greater part of their provisions, and establish a post near Brownstown, till the season would permit the advance of the artillery. The Ohio and some of the Kentucky troops soon arrived at the Rapids, which rendered his advance forces 2,000 in number. The accession of all the others, would scarcely, however, raise his effective force to four thousand men, so greatly were the different corps now reduced from their nominal and original amount. The present was the season, in common years, when the most intense frosts prevailed in this country, by which its lakes and swamps were rendered perfectly firm and secure for any kind of conveyance; yet the weather now continued so warm and rainy, 568 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY that the ice rendered it altogether unsafe. A trial of its strength on the border of the lake was effectually made on the evening of the 9th. Intelligence being received that a party of Indians were driving off the cattle from a small French village, about fourteen miles below the Rapids, General Harrison prepared a strong detachment and pursued them that night twenty-six miles on the ice so weak in many places that the horses of several officers who were mounted broke through it; and in one place the six-pounder broke through it and was nearly lost. The Indians were not overtaken ; and in the morning the detachment returned to camp. The eleventh of February, 1813, at last arrived, and still the balance of the troops with the necessary supplies had not been able to reach the Rapids; the roads by this time had also become absolutely impassable for any kind of carriage, it being scarcely possible to traverse them with a single horse. Under these circumstances General Harrison was at length constrained, with much reluctance and mortification, to abandon all thoughts of advancing this season against Malden. And thus terminated, without gaining any decisive advantage over the enemy, a campaign which was prosecuted with incalculable expense to the government, and immense labors and hardships on the part of the general and his men. The great difficulties to be encountered in the prosecution of a winter campaign through the swampy wilderness in the northwestern parts of Ohio, were sufficient to defeat all the exertions and perseverance which could reasonably be expected from human efforts; yet the indefatigable industry of the General, and the unshaken firmness of his brave compatriots, would probably have surmounted every obstacle, had it not been for the mismanagement and misfortunes of General Winchester in conducting the advance of the left wing. The apparently unimportant error of sending the intelligence of his arrival at the Rapids, by the driver of the old pack horses, would seem to have been the determining cause of the failure. The roads were then so well frozen that the artillery and convoys of provisions might have been pushed forward with considerable dispatch; but for want of that intelligence at headquarters, some delay was produced by which the critical moment for advancing was lost. It was certainly unfortunate that a winter campaign was ever attempted, observes McAfee at this point, who writes that when General Harrison was first appointed to the command of the Northwestern Army, the precise season of the year had arrived, which had arrested the progress of the army under General TOLEDO AND. THE SANDUSKY REGION - 569 Wayne in the year 1793. Although eighteen months had then been employed in preparation, and in disciplining the troops, the prudent caution of General Washington preferred a postponement of Wayne's meditated chastisement of the Indians till another year, to the risk of attempting it at a season, which so greatly multiplied the difficulties at all times presented by the nature of the country and the peculiar activity of the enemy to be opposed. It was in compliance with Washington's instructions, that the American Army under Wayne was' cantoned at Greenville in September, 1793, and the auxiliary volunteer force from Kentucky dismissed. The latter had been in part drawn from the most remote counties of Kentucky, and a considerable portion of the whole expense which would have attended their employment had already been incurred. To tread in the footsteps of Washington and Wayne could have been dishonorable to no administration and their commander. Why then was the winter campaign attempted? The orders of the government to General Harrison were indeed not positive on this head; but it is impossible that he could hesitate to believe that their wishes and expectations were decidedly in favor of recovering Detroit and taking Malden during the winter. Their letters afford ample evidence that such were their views; and their having ordered 10,000 men to the field, many of whom were from the Alleghany Mountains, whose terms of service would all expire by the end of winter, was an unquestionable evidence of their intentions. The force was much greater than was necessary merely for the defense of the frontiers. After the most mature reflection the general determined to endeavor to surmount all the difficulties which would oppose the winter campaign. He was fully apprised of their extent, and had even given a decided opinion to the government before his appointment, that in the event of the capture of Hull's army, it would be impracticable to re-establish our affairs in that quarter until the following year. After being invested with the command, he had altered his opinion so far only as to believe that a season favorable to his operations, combined with some address, and with much labor and expense, might possibly enable him to, advance, either before the swamps became impassable in the fall, or in the middle of winter when they were hard frozen; and he believed that the uncommon solicitude of the government and the people made it necessary to attempt it. The preparations for the advance of the army, however, could not be completed in time for 570 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY advancing in the fall; and the openness of the winter, with other unfavorable occurrences defeated him in that season. People who were impatient at the delay of the Northwestern Army, did not know that before it could arrive at Detroit, it had to pass a wilderness of 180 miles, and many who knew that circumstance, did not know that the greater part of that desert was a frightful swamp, and that the best of it would be considered impassable for carriages of any kind, by the people of the Atlantic States. With the knowledge which the general possessed of the country, he could not for a moment have thought of passing, in the latter part of the fall or beginning of winter, the swampy district which crosses every approach to the lake, even if his preparations for the march had been complete. But this was far from being the case. At a time when it was supposed that he might have been in full march upon Malden, some of the pieces of artillery which were intended to reduce that fortress had just been forwarded from Washington City, and a part of the timber for the carriages of the latter was still standing in the woods near Pittsburgh. The very unexpected surrender of Hull had thrown all the western arrangements of the government into confusion. Reinforcements had been ordered for his army, and during the excitement produced by his surrender, additional reinforcements were ordered into the field before any arrangements had been made to furnish them with provisions and clothing, and to supply the place of the artillery which was lost in Detroit. The story of what may be termed the first campaign under Harrison has now been given, together with the facts of Tippecanoe, Hull's surrender at Detroit and Winchester's disaster at the River Raisin. In all this the narrative of McAfee has been followed, mostly verbatim, as the best authority. Next comes the campaign for the year 1813. CHAPTER XLIV HARRISON'S CAMPAIGN DURING YEAR 1813 ASSEMBLES TROOPS AT LOWER MAUMEE RAPIDS-COLONEL WOOD BUILDS FORT MEIGS-BRITISH AND INDIANS ADVANCE FROM MALDEN-FIRST SIEGE OF FORT MEIGS-ADVANCE OF FORCES UNDER GENERAL CLAY-STORY OF DISASTER TO COLONEL DUDLEY-BRITISH AND INDIANS RAISE SIEGE AFTER NINE DAYS' ATTACK-SECOND SIEGE OF FORT MEIGS-COMPLETE STORY OF THIS IMPORTANT AMERICAN POST. After the termination of General Harrison's campaign for the year 1812 and he had assembled his troops on the east bank of the Maumee at the foot of the Rapids, the commander-in-chief directed his attention to fortifying his position there, to the' distribution of the troops which would remain after the discharge of the Kentucky and Ohio contingent and to the gathering of provisions and stores at his present post for the next campaign. On February 11, 1813, from his headquarters at the foot of the Rapids he wrote the secretary of war among other things as follows : "Having been joined by General Leftwich with his brigade, and a regiment of the Pennsylvania quota at the Portage River (Pemberville) on the 30th ultimo, I marched thence on the 1st instant and reached this place on the morning of the 2d with an effective force of sixteen hundred men. I have since been joined by a Kentucky regiment and part of General Tupper's Ohio brigade, which has increased our numbers to two thousand noncommissioned officers and privates. * * * I have ordered the whole of the troops of the Left Wing (excepting one company for each of the six forts in that quarter) the balance of the Pennsylvania brigade, and the Ohio brigade under General Tupper, and a detachment of regular troops of twelve-months volunteers under command of Colonel Campbell, to march to this place as soon as possible. * * * The disposition of the troops for the remainder of the winter will be as follows : A battalion of militia lately called out from this state, with a company of regular troops now at Fort Winchester (Defiance) will garrison the posts upon the waters of the Auglaize and St. Marys. The small block-houses upon Hull's trace (M'Arthur, Necessity, Findlay, and Portage - 571 - 572 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY River, south of now Bowling Green—Editor) will have a subaltern's command in each. A company will be placed at Upper Sandusky, and another at Lower Sandusky. All the rest of the troops will be brought to this place, amounting to from fifteen to eighteen hundred men. "I am erecting here a pretty strong fort (Meigs) capable of resisting field artillery at least. The troops will be placed in a fortified camp, covered on one flank by the fort. This is the best position that can be taken to cover the frontier, and the small posts in the rear of it , and those above it on the Miami ( Maumee) and its tributaries. The force placed here ought, however, to be strong enough to encounter any that the enemy may detach against the forts above. Twenty-five hundred would not be too many. But, anxious to reduce the expenses during the winter within as narrow bounds as possible, I have desired the Governor of Kentucky not to call out (but to hold in readiness to march) the fifteen hundred men lately required of him. All the teams which have been hired for the public service will be discharged, and those belonging to the public, which are principally oxen, disposed of in the settlements where forage is cheaper, and every other arrangement made which will lessen the expenses during the winter. Attention will still, however, be paid to the deposit of supplies for the ensuing campaign. Immense supplies of provisions have been accumulating along the Auglaise River, and boats and pirogues prepared to bring them down as soon as the river opens." In the matter of assembling supplies, little could be done until the opening of the rivers in the spring to bring down by water conveyance what had been accumulated on the St. Marys and the Auglaize. From Lower Sandusky there was some progress made in transportation by going around on the ice down the Sandusky River and along the border of Lake Erie and thence up the Maumee Bay and river. The construction of the works which was named Fort Meigs in honor of the governor of Ohio was left to Col. E. D. Wood, captain of the corps of engineers, who wrote as follows : "So soon as the lines of the camp were designated, large portions of labor were assigned to each corps in the army, by which means a very laudable emulation was easily excited. Each brigade or regiment commenced the particular portion of work allotted to it with great spirit and vigor. The camp was about 2,500 yards in circumference, the whole of which, with the exception of 574 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY several small intervals left for batteries and block-houses, was to be picketed with timber fifteen feet long, from ten to twelve inches in diameter, and set three feet in the ground. Such were the instructions of the engineer. To complete this picketing, to put eight block-houses of double timbers, to elevate four large batteries, to build all the storehouses and magazines required to contain the supplies of the army, together with the ordinary fatigues of the camp, was an undertaking of no small magnitude. Besides an immense deal of labor was likewise required in excavating ditches, making abatis, and clearing away the wood about the camp; and all this was to be done too, at a time when the weather was inclement, and the ground so hard frozen that it could scarcely be opened with the mattock and pick-axe. But in the use of the axe, mattock and spade consisted the chief military knowledge of our army; and even that knowledge, however trifling it may be supposed by some, is of the utmost importance in many situations, and in ours was the salvation of the army.—Colonel Wood." Colonel Wood's meaning in this is that by great diligence, the fort was completed in time to withstand the attack of the British batteries and the attempted capture of the works. As Wood further says, the fort was 2,500 yards in circumference or 7,500 feet; near a mile-and-a-half around. And according to his specifications, it took some 8,000 logs or picket timbers to enclose the fort, not to mention the timber for the block-houses, batteries, storehouses and army quarters. Laid end to end, the 8,000 timber pickets, fifteen feet long, would reach some twenty-three miles. The position thus fortified was deemed the most eligible that could be selected for the protection of the frontiers and the small posts in the rear of it. In fact it was the key to all the operations in the Northwest. As a depot for the artillery, military stores and provisions, it was also. indispensably necessary to maintain it, for it was now impossible to bring them away. To notice some transactions which occurred after the defeat at the River Raisin in the states which had troops in the Northwestern Army it may be said that when General Harrison at Lower Sandusky, received the information from General Win. chester, that the Kentucky troops were not disposed to remain in service after their six months had expired, he immediately addressed a letter to Governor Shelby, in which he appealed to the patriotism of that chief and the people of his state for reinforce- 576 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY ments. He requested that a corps of 1,500 men might be raised and marched to the army with all possible dispatch, to supply the place of the Kentuckians then in the field. The legislature of Kentucky was in session, and the governor in a confidential message, communicated the information and request, which he had received from General Harrison. A law was immediately passed offering the additional pay of seven dollars per month to any 1,500 of the Kentucky troops who would remain in service till a corps could be sent to relieve them. This law with an address from the legislature to the troops, was immediately dispatched to them by Col. Anthony Crocket, who arrived at the Northwestern Army about the eighth of February. The men had suffered so much by the unparalleled privations which they had to encounter in a winter campaign in that rigorous climate and unfavorable country, and they were now so anxious to return to their friends at home, that they partially resisted the strong appeal to their patriotism in the address of the legislature, supported by the offer of additional pay. They would not engage for any specified length of time, but if their General was ready to advance against the enemy they would not hesitate to accompany him without any pecuniary inducement. A similar offer was made about the same time by the State of Ohio, and afterwards by Pennsylvania, to their respective troops, which was attended with similar success. In the meantime the Legislature of Kentucky was engaged in passing an act, to authorize the governor to detach a corps of 3,000 men from the militia, of which 1,500 were intended to march immediately to General Harrison. On the second of February, they received intelligence of the victory obtained at Frenchtown by Colonel Lewis, which produced the liveliest joy at the capitol—but a sad reverse was at hand. In the evening the leading theater was unusually crowded, and the hearts of the people teemed with congratulation at the victory obtained by their fellow-citizens in arms, when Colonel Wells arrived about 8 o'clock in the night with information of the defeat and massacre at the River Raisin. What a shock to the feelings of the people, says McAfee! The flower of the Kentucky troops and of the citizens of that state were totally defeated and barbarously cut to pieces. The sad reality filled every mind with horror—the fictitious scene of public amusement was quickly abandoned for the private firesides to mourn the loss of friends and the misfortunes of the country. But the public spirit did not sink under the pressure of this calamity. Though many widows and orphans TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 577 were left to mourn the loss of husbands and fathers; yet the monstrous outrage of the twenty-second only roused the indignation of the yeomanry and one universal call for vengeance on the unprincipled foe, was heard from one extreme of the state to the other. On the next day the governor put his approving signature to the law for calling out 3,000 militiamen; and the legislature placing the utmost confidence in the patriotism, energy and military talents of that veteran, passed a resolution in conformity with the Constitution, "advising him to command personally in the field," at any time when he could best promote the public interests by such personal service. At the Rapids on the thirteenth, the fragments of the regiments, originally commanded by Colonels Allen, Scott, and Lewis, were honorably discharged; and about the same time the original troops from Ohio were also permitted to retire. The Kentucky regiments under Barbee, Poague, and Jennings terminated their period of service on the first of March and returned home. The Virginia and Pennsylvania troops still formed a competent force at the fort, but their time was also drawing to a close. The commanding general, considering the destruction of the enemy's vessels at Malden as an object of the greatest importance and as one which might be accomplished by an expedition on the ice of the lake, prepared in the latter part of February for an enterprise of that kind, which he entrusted to the command of Captain Langham, a young officer of great promise. The detachment with which he was to execute it consisted of 170 volunteers from the different corps at the Rapids, who were capable of any enterprise that valour and perseverance could effect. They were provided with all the combustible materials and instruments necessary for such an undertaking; and the particular party charged with setting fire to the vessels was placed under the immediate direction of Mr. Madis, conductor of artillery, a young French gentleman who had been an officer of the navy in his native country and who was distinguished for his great zeal in our cause and for his knowledge of all the duties of the artillery service. Sleighs were provided for the whole detachment and they were directed to go down the lake to Bass Islands, and proceed from one island to another in the chain running towards Malden, managing their movements so as to set out from the Middle Sister about dark that they might reach the destined scene of action some hours before day. When they came near to Malden, the 578 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY sleighs were to be left and the party to proceed on foot, being all provided with moccasins or cloth socks to prevent their feet from making a noise on the ice. Having completely fired the vessels they were to return to their sleighs which it was supposed would convey them so rapidly away as to render pursuit negligible. On the second day after their departure; General Harrison advanced with a considerable detachment for the purpose of meeting any party which might pursue them. But at the mouth of the Maumee Bay, he had the infinite mortification to meet Captain Langham returning. He had proceeded but a short distance from the Bass Islands, when he found the whole lake open, which of course put a stop to his progress. In' most winters the passage of the lake on the ice is practicable at this period. Had it been so at this time, there is good reason to believe that the scheme would have succeeded, and have illuminated the setting darkness of the campaign with a blaze of glory. The subsequent conduct of Captain Langham proved that a better choice for a leader of such an enterprise could not have been made; nor could a more proper person have been selected for firing the vessels than Mr. Madis, from his intimate acquaintance, with everything relating to them, and his acknowledged bravery which he had displayed in the campaign of General Hull. There was at this time a disposition on the part of the government to cut down expenses by eliminating some of the militia service. But fortunately General Harrison before receiving instructions on this point against which he remonstrated on account of leaving the frontiers in a defenseless condition, had called for the reinforcements from Kentucky and Ohio, which even then would not be sufficient to garrison the different posts sufficiently. And Fort Meigs had been constructed for a force of 2,000 men, for the general had thought it necessary to maintain a force at that place which would be able to contend in the field with all the disposable force of the enemy, in order to prevent him from getting into its rear and destroying the weaker posts which more immediately protected the frontiers. For future understanding, it is mentioned here that Colonels M'Arthur and Cass were appointed brigadier-generals, to command the troops destined to form the Northwestern Army; and Governor Howard was appointed a brigadier, and assigned to the command of the Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri territories. In the meantime General Harrison had left the frontiers and repaired to Cincinnati where his family resided, having entrusted TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 579 the command of Fort Meigs to General Leftwich. Upon the failure of the expedition under Captain Langham he saw that it was now impossible to annoy the enemy in any manner, and that until the lake became navigable, it would be equally impossible for the enemy to make any formidable attack on his posts. He was equally confident that as soon as the lake became completely open in the spring an attack would be made on some of his advanced positions, and most probably on Fort Meigs, on the safety of which depended the success of our operations in the next campaign. At the conclusion of the last campaign, that place had become from inevitable necessity as well as from choice, the grand depot of nearly all the artillery, military stores, and provisions belonging to the Northwestern Army; for unless the provisions in the posts on the waters of the Maumee were taken to Fort Meigs while the waters were navigable in the spring, they would be rendered useless for any operations in advance of those places until midsummer, when the roads would become sufficiently dry and firm for their land transportation. Before the period when the attack on the place was to be expected, its garrison would be reduced to insignificance by the discharge of the militia; hence the general deemed it his duty to repair to the interior and hasten out with reinforcements to take their place; and this was particularly necessary, as it was probable that they would be too late, unless their march were hastened by those extraordinary and expensive measures to which a commander-in-chief can with propriety resort, but of which few subordinate officers will take the responsibility. The general had also a powerful motive for visiting Cincinnati, in the state of his family. They had suffered and were still suffering the most unexampled afflictions of disease. Governor Meigs had ordered two regiments to be organized, which rendezvoused at Dayton and several other points in Ohio, in the early part of March, and were placed under the command of Brig.-Gen. John Wingate, who proceeded with one of the regiments under Colonel Mills to St. Marys, to garrison the posts in that quarter. The number of men in his brigade, however, proved greatly deficient. From one division of militia, from which 250 men were to be detached, only forty appeared in the field; and the whole amount obtained was insufficient to garrison the small posts only. The governor of Kentucky acting under the law recently passed in that state, had on the 16th of February, ordered 3,000 580 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY men to be drafted and organized into four regiments under Colonels Boswell, Dudley, Cox and Caldwell, to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. Green Clay. The two former rendezvoused at Newport about the 1st of April, at which place General Harrison had waited till the first three companies arrived, which he furnished with a pack horse for every two men, and sent them on by forced marches. He had received letters from the Maumee Rapids (Fort Meigs) informing him that the Virginia and Pennsylvania brigades would leave that place the moment their time was out, which would be on the 2nd of April. And as the openness of the season would soon render the lake navigable, and the enemy had learned from a prisoner they had taken the situation of our affairs, an immediate attack upon Fort Meigs was anticipated. This state of affairs was communicated to the War Department, and the propriety of calling out the balance of the Kentucky draft to be placed at Fort Wayne to keep the Indians in check, was pressed on the attention of the government. The general immediately set out for the Maumee Rapids, leaving the Kentucky regiments to follow him with the utmost expedition in their power. In the meantime the Virginia and Pennsylvania troops returned home, except about two hundred and thirty of the latter, who had volunteered under the influence of patriotic sentiments and the eloquence of their chaplain, Doctor Hersey, to remain till the reinforcements had arrived. When the General afterwards arrived, these patriotic men informed him through their officers, that upon reaching home in the course of a few weeks depended upon their raising crops in the ensuing season, but that they were determined never to abandon him until he thought their services could be spared without danger to the fort. The General dismissed them on the arrival of the advanced companies of the Kentucky militia. After the building of Fort Meigs was well under way, there was, however, an unfortunate delay in its completion which might have proven disastrous. Had Proctor appeared up the Maumee and at Fort Miami a month, or even two weeks earlier, there might have been a different story to write. As above stated, when General Harrison left for Cincinnati and then the interior to speed up the organization and forwarding of troops, he left Fort Meigs in command of General Leftwich, who was to look after and hasten the completion of the works. Colonel Wood in his later writings referred to Leftwich as "a phlegmatic Dutch- TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 581 man who was not even fit for a pack horse master, much less to be intrusted with such an important command." Wood, at the time captain of the engineers was called to look after strengthening Fort Stephenson and wrote later, that after General Harrison left camp, Leftwich "cared not what became of those who remained, nor did he do anything to get a part of his men (whose time of service had expired) to remain a few days." Continuing, Wood wrote that the conduct of Leftwich was highly reprehensible; "for instead of carrying on the unfinished works he even permitted the men to burn the picketing timber for fuel, instead of getting it from the woods." Not a single thing was done towards completing the fort until Captain Wood returned from Lower Sandusky, March 20 (1813), when he found the lines of the fort had been destroyed while Leftwich was in command, and further says that besides himself, those young patriotic officers, Croghan, Bradley and Langham, were greatly chagrined at the situation. A saving grace, however, was the fact that after Leftwich "the old Dutchman" left the command of the camp about April 2, the command devolved upon Major Stoddard, who was a most capable officer. But that this time the forces, all told, had been reduced by enlistment expirations and other causes to 500 men —and the fort far from completion! With Major Stoddard at the head of affairs, he seemingly went about bringing order out of chaos as fast as possible, until the return of Captain Wood and General Harrison himself. A most significant fact in this regard is shown by the original Military Order Record of the army at Fort Meigs at this important time, which book is to be found in the Toledo Public Library and the access to which the editor of this work, acknowledges to the Toledo Library force his obligations. The very first "Garrison Order" in this record dated "Fort Meigs April 2nd, 1813," gives notice that Major Stoddard as senior officer assumes the command of the troops in the garrison. Lieutenant O'Fallon was detailed to receive all reports and make the details, and "is to be respected accordingly." The guards were to be "turned off from the grand parade by the several adjutants in rotation." "Four guards" were provided for, evidently to remain on duty six hours each. The most important points to be guarded were the boat landing, the magazines and the hospital stores. The detail of men assigned to work on the fort were "on no account to sit down." 582 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY The situation further brightened April 8, with Lieutenant-Colonel Ball's arrival with 200 dragoons, "as fine fellows as ever drew sword," said Wood, and their presence gave renewed life. Then General Harrison returned April 12, with 300 men, by way of Forts Barbee, Amanda, Jennings and Winchester, and learning of the activities of the British and Indians towards Fort Meigs, he dispatched a messenger to Governor Shelby to send the entire 3,000 men drafted by Kentucky. Captain Wood went ahead with the completion of the fort with great fervor, and following the moving of the ice from the rivers advantage was taken of the high stage of water to boat supplies to Fort Winchester and to Fort Meigs from the supply stations above. Fortunately, also, the Kentucky troops Harrison had dispatched in advance of his own return, by way of Forts McArthur and Findlay and the Portage River camp (where Portage, Wood County now is), constituting a battalion of Colonel Boswell's regiment, came down Hull's Trail and arrived at the fort without being intercepted. Knowing that Gen. Green Clay's Kentucky troops were well on the way to Fort Meigs, General Harrison dispatched Capt. William Oliver, commissary of the fort with an oral message to hasten their coming. He found that General Clay with 1,200 men had just arrived at Fort Winchester. A part of the force under Colonel Dudley had come down the Auglaize, and the balance under Clay himself had reached there by the way of the River St. Marys, to Fort Wayne and thence down the Maumee. Clay had heard of General Harrison's dangerous situation and two days before had sent the famous Leslie Combs then a captain of riflemen scouts, with soldiers named Johnson, Paxton and two Walker brothers, and also Black Fish, Jr., a Shawnee Indian guide, to inform- Harrison of their approach. The messengers were attacked by a greater number of Pottawatomies just as they had sighted the American flag floating over Fort Meigs. Paxton and Johnson after being wounded were taken prisoner. Johnson died of his wounds and Paxton was finally restored to his friends. Captain Combs and Black Fish escaped and returned to Fort Winchester about the time of the arrival there of Clay's forces and Captain Oliver. At this time the cannonading of Fort Meigs could be heard distinctly. The last of March,. before General Harrison's return from the interior, a party of citizens arrived at Fort Meigs from Detroit with the information that General Proctor had issued TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 583 orders for the assembling of his British forces at Sandwich on the Canadian side of the Detroit River, for an expedition to the lower Maumee, the capture of Camp Meigs and further invasion of American soil. During the middle and toward the last of April, small parties of the enemy were seen about the fort by the American scouts. A cautionary order was issued by Major Stoddard, fort commander at Meigs, April 9, three days before General Harrison's return. In case of alarm, the troops were to repair immediately to their respective alarm posts. No troopers were to pass outside the picket line except by order of the commanding officer. "The gates will be shut and kept shut by the guards until they are directed to open them." And no fatigue party was to be sent from the fort "without a guide with it." One subaltern and one commissioned officer and twenty privates of the Dragoons and a like force from each corps, "will be kept in as much readiness as practicable to make a sudden pursuit of the enemy on proper occasion," and "no men are to straggle along the river more than three hundred yards either above or below the pickets without the written permission of the officer commanding." A strenuous part of this order related to keeping the enclosure and ground clean, and a police was to report the condition of the various quarters. A garrison order dated April 11, 1813, provided that the commissary issue with the usual rations, "two days rations of salted pork to all the troops." An order of the same date provided that "the remaining punishment awarded by a court martial against John Arnold of Captain Cushing's company is hereby remitted and he will be liberated from the ball and chain and return to his duty." The first order in this record of orders made by General Harrison himself, was issued immediately after his return and taking personal command of the fort. On account of its importance it is given in full as follows : "Headquarters N. W. Army "Camp Meigs, 12th of April, 1813 "The Commanding General has received from Major Stoddard a report of the good conduct of the troops in this camp since they have been placed under his command, which gives him great satisfaction. He requests the Major, the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of his late command to accept his thanks for their past conduct as well as for the disposition they 584 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY at present manifest for the performance of their duty. Our situation indeed requires the greatest exertion upon the part of every individual attached to the army. Threatened with a siege of the enemy with our works in an unfinished state, every man must devote all his thoughts and all his strength toward their completion. Their own safety, their honor and the interests of the country demands this from them. The General confidently expects it as the result of their own reflections and of those principles (the word is written "principally") which glow in the breast of every true American. "But he must not be disappointed, and he is determined to exact from all the most punctual performance of every duty. Inattention and neglect will be immediately noticed and punished. Situated as we are, even inactivity is a crime. The General will have no officer of this description with him, and should he dis cover an incorrigible disposition of this kind to exist in one whose duty requires him to set an example to others, he will make use of the authority with which he is invested, to exchange him for some of those gallant and ardent spirits who are now employed in the peaceful duties of the interior, longing to be called to posts of danger, of difficulty and honor. "The General promises that each officer, non-commissioned officer and soldier, who distinguishes himself, not only in battle but in the discharge of those scarcely less important duties, of preparing the means of defense, shall be reported to the President, and of the militia to the executives of their respective states. The ordinary guards and fatigue will remain as heretofore. But besides this, every man must be employed. The Engineers will direct what part of the defenses each corps is to complete and the manner of doing it. The police of the camp must be strictly attended to and the orders which have been issued upon this subject punctually obeyed. "John O'Fallon  "Acting Depty. Adjt.-General." The Canadian Militia assembled at Sandwich April 7th and on the 23rd General Proctor's army consisting of 600 regulars, 800 militia, embarked at Malden on a brig and several smaller vessels for their attack on Fort Meigs, convoyed by two gunboats with artillery. Most of the Indians, about eighteen hundred in number, crossed the Detroit River and came by land down the usual southern route ; a few came with the British in canoes. Gen- TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 585 eral Harrison was kept informed of the approach of the enemy by a small detachment of troops under Captain Hamilton who were reconnoitering along the lower Maumee and the bay, accompanied by the scout Peter Navarre as runner with other spies. Navarre was also dispatched to Lower Sandusky and Upper Sandusky and to Governor Meigs at Urbana with news of the character of the approaching British and Indian forces. Proctor's advance with his British and Indian forces, the latter headed by Tecumseh, was discovered at the mouth of the Maumee Bay, April 26, and on April 28, their whole force was seen approaching Fort Miami across the river and below Fort Meigs. Their boats landed their guns at Miami, and as soon as their ordnance was on shore, the boats were employed to carry the Indians across the river (where Perrysburg cemetery now is) completely investing Fort Meigs, "nothing but their hideous yells and the firing of musketry was now to be heard." The situation was rapidly approaching a crisis. Before going into the nine days' siege itself, there are some preliminary facts, which General Harrison's orders bring out, worthy of mention as the fort was being completed and strengthened for its defense. General Harrison issued a general order April 16, confirming the regulations established by Major Stoddard; except that the commanding officers on the four sides of the stockade could order the gates opened if necessity required. "Colonel Miller is to command that part of the line occupied by the Regular Troops; Major Ball the river or front line as far as it is occupied by the Dragoons; Major Neyson (or the Kentucky officer who relieves him) the rear line from the termination of the line of the Regular Troops to the commencement of that of the Ohio Militia; and all the Batteries by Major Stoddard. The four faces of the encampment, in the future will be designated as above. * * * Major Alexander's battalion and Captain Nearing's company, will form a disposable force and will assemble on their own parade. * * * Reserves or displacable forces must not move from their positions until ordered by the General, or from the most urgent necessity by the commanding officer of one of the lines. * * * Galleries for all the sentinels will be immediately fixed and as soon as it is done, the sentinels must be made to call out 'all is well,' every fifteen minutes; to be commenced by the sentinels placed near the main guard, and proceeding along the front of the line, repeated in succession until it passes around the whole encampment. In the 586 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY event of an alarm, .the men must be made to take their posts without noise and with the greatest order." Continuing, this order recites that "ten pounds of Buckshot cartridges will be distributed this evening to each man. The officers commanding corps will each day cause all the arms to be examined and kept in the best firing order. Each corps will this day draw twelve extra cartridges per man, to be kept by the Quarter Master respectively, for distribution. A select party of men must be placed in the upper story of each block-house, and these must be furnished with an extra musket and cartridge box, filled." This order also recites a trial by court-martial for desertion, Colonel Miller of the Thirteenth U. S. Infantry presiding. The prisoner was William Clark, a private in Captain Nearing's company and the case was an extreme one. Clark was charged with deserting three times from Lebanon, Ohio, once from Chillicothe, once from Cincinnati, and finally on April 6, 1813, for deserting "on a march to this place"—Fort Meigs. He was found guilty, the sentence being approved by General Harrison, and Clark was shot at 6 o'clock on the evening of April 16. April 17, 1813, the detachment of Pennsylvania militia under the command of Major Nelson, was by a general order honorably discharged, that they might return to their home demands of spring work. April 22nd order : "The firing of a single cannon, will in future be the signal for all scouts and parties of any description to repair to camp. Colonel Miller, Colonel Mills, Major Stoddard, Major Ball and Major Alexander, will form a board for fixing the price of articles sold in camp by the suttler. Their report will be made to the General and the result will be published in General Orders." Here are the prices per pound : coffee 62 1/2 cents, refined loaf sugar 62 1/2, imported brown sugar 50, chocolate common 50, chocolate first quality 621/2, maple country sugar 371/2, tea good quality $3, tobacco 50 cents, maple and dissolved sugar molasses $1.50, molasses imported per gallon $3, whisky when sold by permission $1.25, (quantity not stated, probably per gallon), brandy spirits and rum $4.50 (probably per gallon), pepper per pound $1, soap (hard) 50 cents per pound, soap soft 25 cents per pound, butter 371/2 per pound, bacon 25, moulded cotton wick candles 40 cents per pound, common dipped candles 25 cents per pound, good vinegar $3 per gallon. TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 587 Another order dated April 22, 1813, reads : "The guards will in future when relieved, be conducted to the outside of the camp and under the direction of the officer of the day, will discharge the loads in their guns at a mark. The best shot will receive a quart of whiskey; the second best a pint. A watchword will in future be given with the parole and a countersign to the officer of the day. A retreat beating it will be given by the acting Adjutant to the commanding officer of the corps; and at tattoo, the latter will distribute it to the platoon officers." In his order of April 24, General Harrison complained of the lax policing of the camp and the lack of cleanliness. It seems that the soldiers liked the fishing in the Maumee River, for in this order appears this : "No non-commissioned officer or private is to be suffered to go to fish without taking his arms; nor any to be allowed to go farther down the river than the lower part of the first bottom below the camp; nor above more than half a mile from the landing; nor is any one to cross the river without permission from the General. No fishing will be allowed until after seven o'clock in the morning." The order of April 26, declares that "the Redoubts and Blockhouses will be known and numbered as follows, viz. : The large battery on the river front, the highest up the river, is to be called the Big Battery. The one just below it the Little Battery. The east battery built by Captain Croghan, the Croghan Battery. The block-house built by General Tupper, Wood's Battery, and that on the rear, Hukill's Battery. The block-house at the west end of the west triangle of the encampment, to be called Block-house number one. The next below it on the river number two, and so on in numbered order around the encampment in that direction to the block-house at the southwest angle, which will be called number seven." The order further provided that each of the seven block-houses be occupied by a non-commissioned officer and ten men as riflemen from the various commands. The crisis at Fort Meigs was now at hand. Proctor was planting his batteries across the river and Tecumseh and his Indians had crossed over to the east side below the fort and were eagerly awaiting the scalps of the white men. Here is General Harrison's order issued April 29, before the cannonading began May 1. "General Order : It is at length rendered to a certainty that the enemy is about to carry into effect their threatened attack 588 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY upon this post. The temerity of the attempt can only be accounted for by their ignorance of our strength or their reliance upon our want of resolution to defend ourselves. The General is confident that in both they will be woefully disappointed. "Can the citizens of a free country who have taken up arms to defend its rights think of submitting to a band composed of mercenaries, of reluctant Canadians goaded to the field by the bayonet, and of wretched, naked savages? Can the breast of an American soldier when he casts his eyes to the opposite shore, the scene of his country's triumphs over the same foes, be influenced by any other feeling than the hope of victory and glory? Is not this army composed of the same materials with that which fought and conquered under the immortal Wayne? Yes, fellow soldiers, your General sees your countenances beam with the same fire that he witnessed upon that glorious occasion. And although it would be the highest of presumption to compare himself to a hero, he boasts of being that hero's pupil. To your posts then fellow soldiers! And remember that the eyes of your country are upon you! * * *" The order closed with the direction that the whole army be furnished with a ration and a half per day until further orders. A general order of April 30, directed that the utmost caution be paid to conserving fuel and that the commandants of corps must see that no more fuel is consumed than is absolutely necessary for cooking. A fire must not be made for any other purpose. The British had established their camp about two miles clown the river at their place of landing below Fort Miami. During the night of April 29, they planted three batteries opposite Fort Meigs on the high west bank about three hundred yards from the river, the intervening low ground being open and partly covered with water. Two were gun batteries with four embrasures and were situated nearly opposite Fort Meigs; one on the site of the present Methodist Church, Maumee. The other was a bomb battery placed also on the opposite bank a little below the fort, where stands at this writing the Presbyterian Church of the above named city. They had progressed far enough in the night to be able to work on the batteries by daylight the following day. A fire from Fort Meigs considerably impeded their progress and killed several of their men. The enemy's mode of attack now being understood, under the direction of Captain Wood of the engineers, defense works at Fort Meigs were revised and feverishly worked. upon by the TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 589 whole army, to counteract the British plans. The ground around the fort had been cleared of trees to a distance of 200 to 300 yards from the lines. Some scattering trees remained and the trunks of others remained on the ground. Behind these logs and the stumps, the Indians crept up within shooting distance and did some execution; but they suffered the most for their temerity. On the right or the down river side of the fort where standing trees were the closest, the Indians climbed to their tops and poured forth tremendous volleys of musketry. But they were at too great a distance to work much damage. A British force under Major Muir and Indians under Tecumseh also crossed to the east side of the river below the fort, where a battery was located in where is now Fort Meigs cemetery, Perrysburg, and General Harrison observed that "they probably intended to amuse us with their .batteries while they would attempt to storm the fort." William Christy of Kentucky, acting quartermaster, was directed by the General to nail an American flag on each of the batteries, where they remained during the siege. The British batteries opened fire May 1. But under the direction of Captain Wood, a "grand traverse," the lines of which can yet be seen today, twelve feet high, upon a base of twenty feet and 300 feet long, on the most elevated ground, was completed through the middle of the fort. This embankment could not be penetrated by the enemy's shots, and behind it the American army was reasonably secure. The five days' almost continuous cannonading by the British did little damage. Two were killed and three or four wounded. One great loss was that of Maj. Amos Stoddard heretofore mentioned, who was wounded and died of lockjaw. The British completed a third battery of three twelve-pounders between the first two, on the night of May 1, and on the 3rd a battery of several mortars was put in operation near the river. Additional traverses of earth rendered the shots ineffective. Now as to General Clay at Fort Winchester, approaching with his 1,200 Kentuckians. Captain Oliver, the express sent by General Harrison to hurry Clay along with his troops, had arrived at the Auglaize with the commander-in-chief's message. On May 4th General Clay was ready to descend the Maumee in eighteen flatboats, the sides of which were raised high enough to cover his men from the fire of the Indians along the river banks. Major Trimble, who had accompanied Clay from Kentucky, vol- 590 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY unteered to precede the detachment in a large barge with fifteen men, accompanied by Captain Oliver, to apprise Harrison of Clay's approach. Trimble knew of the fate of the attempt of Captain Combs, but notwithstanding the hazards of the journey he reached Fort Miegs in safety about midnight and told General Harrison that Clay with 1,100 men would probably arrive about daylight May 5. And now let McAfee tell the story : Harrison immediately determined to make a general sally against the enemy on General Clay's arrival, for which he made preparations at camp, and dispatched Captain Hamilton and a subaltern, with the necessary orders to General Clay. Captain Hamilton proceeded up the river in a canoe, and met the detachment five miles above the fort after daylight, in consequence of their pilot having detained them till morning instead of descending in the night as at first was intended. The captain immediately delivered the following orders to General Clay: "You must detach about 800 men from your brigade and land them at a point I will show you, about a mile, or a mile and a half above Camp Meigs. I will then conduct the detachment to the British batteries on the left bank of the river. The batteries must be taken, the cannon spiked, and carriages cut down; and the troops must then return to their boats and cross over to the fort. The balance of your men must land on the fort side of the river, opposite the first landing, and fight their way into the fort through the Indians. The route they must take will be pointed out by a subaltern officer now with me, who will land the canoe on the right bank of the river, to point out the landing for the boats." General Clay was also informed, that the British force at their batteries was inconsiderable, the main body being at their camp a mile and a half further down, and that the Indians were chiefly on the same side with the fort. General Clay's order of descending the river was the same as in the line of march in solid column, each officer taking position according to his rank. Colonel Dudley being the oldest colonel led the van. As soon as Captain Hamilton had delivered the orders, General Clay who was in the 13th boat from the front, directed him to go to Colonel Dudley, with orders to take the twelve front boats and execute the plans of General Harrison on the left bank, and to post the subaltern with the canoe on the right bank, as a beacon for his landing. General Harrison intended, while the detachment TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 591 under Dudley was destroying the batteries on the north side, and General Clay was fighting the Indians above the fort, to send out a party to destroy the batteries on the south side, but his plans were marred in the execution. General Clay ordered the five boats remaining with the one he occupied, to fall into a line after him; and in attempting. to do it they were driven on shore and thus thrown half a mile in the rear. The General kept close to the right bank, intending to land opposite to the detachment under Dudley, but finding no guide there and the Indians having commenced a brisk fire on his boat, he attempted to cross to Dudley's detachment. The current, however, was so swift that it soon carried him too far down for that project; he therefore turned back and landed on the right bank further down. Capt. Peter Dudley with a part of his company was in this boat, making the whole upwards of fifty men, who now marched into camp without loss amidst a shower of grape from the British batteries and the fire of some Indians. The boat with their baggage and four sick soldiers was left as the General supposed, in the care of two men who met him at his landing, and by whom he expected she would be brought down under the guns of the fort. In a few minutes, however, she fell into the hands of the Indians. The attempt which he had made to cross the river induced Colonel Boswell with the rear boats to land on the opposite side, as Clay had attempted; but as soon as Captain Hamilton discovered the error under which he acted, he instructed him to cross over and fight his way into camp. When he arrived at the south side his landing was annoyed by the Indians; and as soon as his men were on shore he formed them and returned the fire of the enemy; at the same time he was directed by Captain Shaw from the commanding general, to march in open order through the plain to the fort. As there was now a large body of Indians on his flank, General Harrison determined to send out a reinforcement from the garrison to enable him to beat them. Major Alexander's battalion, composed of the Pittsburgh Blues, the Petersburgh volunteers, etc.; Major Johnson with a part of his battalion, and the companies of Captains Nearing and Dudley were ordered to prepare for this service. They were ready to join the Kentuckians as they arrived at the gates of the fort. Colonel Boswell then formed his men on the right; Major Alexander on the left; and Johnson in the centre. In this order they marched, against the Indians and drove them at the point 592 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY of the bayonet, though much superior in numbers, to the distance of half a mile into the woods. The greatest ardor was displayed by the troops, and when it became necessary to return, it was with the utmost difficulty that the officers of the Kentucky detachment could restrain their men from the pursuit. General Harrison had taken his position upon a battery to watch with a glass the various operations which at this moment claimed his attention. He discovered a body of British and Indians filing along the edge of the woods to fall on the rear and left of the corps under Boswell. He immediately dispatched John T. Johnson, Esq., his volunteer aide, to recall them from the pursuit. Johnson's horse was killed under him before he could reach the detachment. The order was then repeated by Major Graham, and the reluctant though necessary retreat was at last commenced. The Indians then rallied and pursued them some distance, doing more execution while our men were retreating, than they had done in all the rest of the contest. The detachment under Colonel Dudley in the meantime had made their appearance at the batteries on the other side of the river, and were performing their share in the operations of this eventful day. But before attention is directed to them, the occurrences on the south side will be told. General Harrison now ordered a sortie from the fort, under the command of Col. John Miller of the regulars, against the batteries which had been erected on that side (in now Perrysburg Cemetery). This detachment was composed of the companies and parts of companies commanded by Captains Langham, Croghan, Bradford, Nearing and Elliott and Lieutenants Gwynne and Campbell, of the regulars; the volunteers of Alexander's battalion, and Captain Sebree's company of Kentucky militia. The whole amounted only to 350 men. Colonel Miller, accompanied by Major Tod, led on his command with the most determined bravery, charged upon the British and drove them from their batteries; spiked their cannon and took fourteen prisoners including an officer, having completely beaten and driven back the whole force of the enemy. That force consisted of 200 British regulars, 150 Canadians, and 500 Indians, being considerably more than double the force of the brave detachment which attacked them; but our troops charged with such irresistible impetuosity that nothing could withstand them. In this sortie, in which all the troops engaged were distinguished for their good order and their intrepid, impetuous TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 593 bravery, the militia company of Captain Sebree was particularly noticed by the general for its uncommon merit. With characteristic ardor the Kentuckians rushed into the thickest ranks of the enemy and were for some time entirely surrounded by the Indians. They still bravely maintained their ground against more than four times their number, but must ultimately have been cut to pieces, had not Lieutenant Gwynne of the Nineteenth Regiment boldly charged upon the Indians with a part of Captain Elliott's company and released them from their desperate situation. The British and Indians suffered severely, and were routed in great confusion. A few more men would have enabled the General to disperse and capture the whole force of the enemy remaining on the south or east side of the river. Colonel Miller now returned to the fort with his prisoners, having lost many brave men on the field, and had several of his officers wounded. As he retired the enemy rallied and pressed hard on his rear, till he arrived near the breastwork. The operations on the north side of the river will now claim the attention. The detachment under Dudley effected a landing in tolerably good order considering the roughness of the Rapids and the swiftness of the current, and were immediately marched off through the open plain to the hill which was covered with timber. (Dudley's landing was evidently some distance above Winchester's old camp on the high ground above the battle ground of Fallen Timbers). No specific orders were given by the colonel; even his majors were left to conjecture the object of the enterprise. After marching some distance the troops were formed into three columns. Colonel Dudley commanded at the head of the right; Major Shelby on the left, and Captain Morrison, acting as major, in the centre. The right column kept the edge of the woods on the brow of the hill, which was in some places half a mile from the river across the open bottom. The centre column marched parallel to the first at the distance of 150 yards in the woods; and the left, a similar distance still further back. The distance to the batteries of the enemy was two miles, but they were in full view from the ridge on which Winchester before his march to the River Raisin had encamped, and above which the Colonel marched unperceived by the enemy into the woods. When the detachment arrived within half a mile of the batteries, which were cannonading Fort Meigs, Major Shelby was ordered on the suggestion of Captain Hamilton to march the left forward as expeditiously as possible till its rear passed the head of the other 594 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY two columns, and then to wheel to the right and march towards the river. The batteries were thus to be surrounded, and the whole of the British force captured and destroyed; but while the other columns were still several hundred yards from the batteries, they raised the Indian yell, charged upon them at full speed and carried them without the loss of a man; having frightened off the few artillerists who were serving them, almost without knowing by whom they were assailed. The most complete success was thus achieved as respected the great object of the enterprise. The British flag was cut down, and the shouts of the fort garrison announced their joy at this consummation of their wishes. General Harrison was standing on the grand battery next the river, and now called to the men and made signs to them to retreat to their boats—but all in vain. They remained at the batteries for some time, viewing the curiosities of the place without destroying the carriages or magazines, or even spiking the whole of the cannon. The general at last offered a reward to any person who would cross the river and order them to retreat. Lieutenant Campbell undertook to perform this service, but before he could get over, the fate of the detachment was decided. About the time the batteries were taken, a body of Indians lying in ambush had fired on a party of spies under Captain Combs, who had marched down on the left of Major Shelby. Presently, Colonel Dudley gave orders to reinforce the spies and the greater part of the right and centre columns rushed into the woods in confusion, with their colonel among them, to fight the Indians whom they routed and pursued near two miles from the batteries. The left column, remained in possession of the ground till the fugitive artillerists returned with a reinforcement from the main British camp and attacked them. Some of them were made prisoners at the battery, others fled to their boats, and a part who were rallied by the exertions of their major, were marched by him to the aid of Colonel Dudley. The Indians had also been reinforced, and the confusion in which Major Shelby found the men under Dudley, was as great as to amount to a cessation of resistance, while the savages skulking around them continued the work of destruction in safety. At last a retreat commenced in disorder, but the greater part of the men were either captured by the Indians, or surrendered to the British at the batteries. Colonel Dudley after being wounded was overtaken and dispatched by the tomahawk. The number of all those who escaped and got into the fort from the whole TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 595 detachment, was considerably below 200, out of a force of 850. Had the orders which Colonel Dudley received been regarded, or a proper judgment exercised on that occasion, the day would certainly have been an important one for the country, and a glorious one for the army. Everything might have been accomplished agreeably to the wishes and instructions of the General, with the loss of but few men. When the approach of the detachment under Dudley was reported to Proctor, he supposed it to be the main force of the American army; from which he was apprehensive that he might sustain a total defeat. He, therefore, recalled a large portion of his troops from the opposite shore. They did not arrive in time, however, to partake in the contest on the north side. Tecumseh was among them. The prisoners were taken down to headquarters, put into Fort Miami, and the Indians permitted to garnish the surrounding rampart, and to amuse themselves by loading and firing at the crowd, or at any particular individual. Those who preferred to inflict a still more cruel and savage death, selected their victims, led them to the gateway, and there under the eye of General Proctor, and in the presence of the whole British army, tomahawked them and scalped them. This work of destruction continued nearly two hours, during which time upwards of twenty prisoners, defenseless and confined, were massacred in the presence of the magnanimous Britons to whom they had surrendered, and by the Indian allies too with whom those Britons had voluntarily associated themselves, knowing and encouraging their modes of warfare. The chiefs at the same time were holding a council on the fate of the prisoners, in which the Pottawatomies who were painted black were for killing the whole, and by whose warriors the murders were perpetrated. The Miamies and Wyandots were on the side of humanity and opposed the wishes of the others. The dispute between them had become serious when Colonel Elliott and Tecumseh came down from the batteries to the scene of carnage. As soon as Tecumseh beheld it, he flourished his sword and in a loud voice ordered them "for shame, desist. It is a disgrace to kill a defenseless prisoner." His orders were obeyed to the great joy of the prisoners, who had by this time lost all hopes of being preserved. In this single act Tecumseh displayed more humanity, magnanimity, and civilization, than Proctor with all his British associates in com- 596 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY mand, displayed through the whole war on the Northwestern frontiers. The prisoners were kept in the same place till dark, during which time the wounded experienced the most excruciating tor-ments. They were taken into the British boats and carried down the river to the brig Hunter and a schooner, where several hun-dred of them were stowed away in the, hold of the brig, and kept there for two days and nights. Their sufferings in this situation are not to be described ; it is left to be imagined by those who can feel for the wrongs of their country. They were finally liberated on parole and landed at the mouth of Huron River below the Sandusky Bay. General Proctor made a proposition to ex-change the Kentucky militia for the friendly Indians residing within our frontiers—men who were not prisoners to us, but our friends who had taken no part in the war. Whether he made this proposal by way of insult, or for the purpose of recruiting his allies, is known only to himself. General Harrison through courtesy told him he would refer the subject to the consideration of the President. A general order issued by General Harrison dated May 6, 1813, after the five days' bombardment, reads as follows: "The General cannot pass by the opportunity which the events of yesterday afforded, of expressing to the troops his high sense of the distinguished valor which they manifested in each of these severe conflicts in which they were engaged. The attack made by the Indians on the left flank, (above and back from the fort) was repelled by Captain Nearing's company, Major Alexander's volunteers and the Kentucky militia, in the most gallant manner. Colonel Miller and Major Tod, with the detachment of the 19th Regiment, and Croghan's and Bradford's companies of the 17th, and Major Alexander with the volunteers, attacked the enemy's batteries on the right flank, carried them, drove off a superior force of the enemy and killed or took prisoners the greater part of the two best companies in the British service. "Before the attack was made on this side, the General had ordered taken the enemy's batteries on the opposite shore by the Kentucky militia. This was executed under the orders of Colonel Dudley at the head of about eight hundred men with great gal-lantry. The four batteries were stormed, all the guns but one spiked and every object that the General had intended effected. It is truly painful that this operation so eminently successful in the commencement should have been brought to an unfortunate TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 597 issue by temerity and disobedience of our troops. The possessing of the batteries and destroying the cannon, was the sole object of the enterprise; and having done so, the troops should have returned to their boats which they could all have reached in safety. This, however, was not done. They remained upon the ground scattered and disordered, suffered a feint skirmishing to draw them into the woods beyond the cover of our batteries, where they were surrounded by the enemy and the greater part made prisoners. Such is the terrible effects of disobedience and inattention, and that fatal confidence which is so apt to prevail with militia upon a success." Concluding this long order with a statement that "an almost unprecedented fire from the enemy batteries of five days continuance" did little harm; expressing his contempt for the enemy and encouraging his forces with the information that large bodies of relief troops were on their way from the interior, although the force within the lines was amply sufficient for the defense, his closing words praised again the army for its bravery and efficiency. The nine days' British and Indian siege of Fort Meigs directed by General Proctor terminated May 9, 1813. The cannonading during the siege was returned from Fort Meigs with effect, though sparingly with the large guns, for the supply of 18-pound shot was very meager, there being only 360 of that size in the fort when the siege opened, and about the same number of 12-pound shot. The supply of this size balls had failed to arrive from Pittsburgh with the artillery. The batteries of the British supplied the fort with 12-pound shot which were gathered up after being fired into the fort. Hundreds of shot were gathered by the American troops, but the heaviest guns of the British were 24-pounders. After the termination of the fighting on the 5th, no more occurred worthy of notice while the enemy continued the siege. Immediately after the firing had ceased on that day, General Proctor sent Major Chambers over to demand the surrender of the fort. Harrison replied to the proposition that he considered it an insult, and requested that it might not be repeated. The demand was made as a finesse to prevent the Americans from molesting him in the retreat which he meditated. Intelligence of the capture of Fort George by the American forces under General Dearborn, was now received at the British camp, which considerably alarmed General Proctor. His situation appeared to 21-VOL. 1 598 - STORY OF THE MAUMEE VALLEY be hazardous, for the wind now blew constantly up the river. Harrison's forces he expected would soon be reinforced, and the Indians began to desert his standard in great numbers. He had flattered them with the hopes of splendid success and rich rewards. The Prophet and his followers were to have the Michigan territory for their services in capturing the fort and Gen-eral Harrison was to be delivered into the hands of Tecumseh. But their prospects were now completely reversed; and it is a rule with Indians to follow the fortunate and adhere to the strong. Proctor now saw that if he delayed much longer he would probably be captured and leave Upper Canada unprotected, as reinforcements were not to be expected there, while the American arms were successful below. He therefore made his arrangements to retreat as soon as possible. Nearly all the Indians had left him very much dissatisfied; and during the night of the 8th a considerable stir was apparent in his camp. Early next morning his troops were seen to be moving off. A sloop and several gunboats were near the camp receiving the artillery and baggage, and on them our batteries were opened as long as they remained in that situation. Major Chambers had promised on the part of General Proctor to furnish us with a list of prisoners in his possession; but he retreated with too much precipitation to comply. He left a quantity of cannon ball with a fine sling carriage, and several other valuable articles. He had, however, shared with the Indians in the plunder of the boats in which the Kentucky militia had descended, after a few of them had been brought over to the fort by those who escaped from the Dudley defeat. The whole force of the enemy at the siege was about 600 regulars, 800 Canadian militia, and 1,800 Indians. The force in Fort Meigs did not much exceed 1,200, and perhaps not more than 1,000 effectives, who had to defend a fortification large enough for three times that number. The General Order issued by General Harrison the day Proctor abandoned the first siege is deemed worthy of production here in full and is as follows: "Headquarters Camp Meigs, May 9, 1813, "General Orders: "The information received by the General and the movements of the enemy, indicate their having abandoned the siege of this Post. The General congratulates his troops upon having com-pletely foiled their foes and put a stop to their career of victory TOLEDO AND THE SANDUSKY REGION - 599 which has hitherto attended their arms. He cannot find words to express his sense of the good conduct of the troops of every description and of every corps; as well as in sustaining the heavy fire of the enemy as far as their assiduity and patience in the performance of their laborious duties which the occasion called for. Where merit is so general, indeed almost universal, it is difficult to discriminate. "The General cannot omit to mention the names of those whose situation gave them an opportunity of being more useful. From [on account of] the long illness of Captain Gratiot of the Corps of Engineers, [the] arduous and important duties of fortifying the camp, devolved on Captain Wood of that Corps. In assigning to him the first palm of merit as far as relates to the termination within the works, the General is convinced that his decision will be acceded to by every individual in the army who witnessed his indefatigable exertions; his consummate skill in providing for the safety of every point and in foiling every attempt of the enemy and his undaunted bravery in the performance of his duty in the more exposed situation. An unfortunate wound in the commencement of the siege deprived the General after that time, of the able services of Major Stoddard of the artillery. Captain Gratiot in the revision of a serious illness, took charge of a battery and managed it with ability and effect. Captain Cushing of the artillery and Captain Hall of the 17th Infantry, but doing duty with the former corps, were extremely active and attentive to their post. Colonel Miller and Major Tod of the 19th U. S. Infantry, Major Ball of the Dragoons and Alexander of the Volunteers, Colonel Mills, Major Lodwich and Major Pitger of the Ohio Militia and Major Johnson of the Kentucky militia, rendered most important services. To each of the above gentlemen, as well as to each captain, subaltern, noncommissioned officer and private of their respective commands, the General gives his thanks; and expresses his warm appreciation also of Adjutant Brown, Mr. Timerlin, Mr. Peters, conductor of ordnance, Mr. Lyons, principal artificer, and to Sergeants Henderson and Toms and Meldrum, who severally had charge of batteries or block-houses. The battery managed by Sergeant Henderson, was as the enemy confessed, managed with peculiar efficiency and effect with respect to the sorties which were made on the 5th inst. "The subsequent information which has been received from the prisoners, has given the gallant troops which were employed